Look Who Is Disaffected Now:
Political Causes and Consequences of Learned Helplessness in the U.S.

A Dissertation
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
BY

Christina Elizabeth Farhart

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Joanne M. Miller

August 2017

Acknowledgements

This work would not have been possible without the financial support of the Department of Political Science and the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota. My research has benefitted considerably from support and feedback from faculty and students in the political psychology and American politics proseminars, and the Minnesota Political Methodology Colloquium (MPMC).

I am grateful to all of the faculty with whom I have had the pleasure to work during this and other related projects. Each member of my Dissertation Committee has provided me with extensive personal and professional guidance, feedback, and support. I would especially like to thank my advisor, Joanne Miller, my chair, Paul Goren, and my committee members, Christopher Federico, Wendy Rahn, and Kathryn Pearson. Beyond my committee, I would also like to thank Howard Lavine for thoughtful feedback on this and related projects. I would also like to thank Benjamin Bagozzi for his extensive teaching and methodological guidance and feedback, as well as Doug Chapin and Larry Jacobs for the opportunity to learn and work with the Election Academy through the Humphrey School of Public Affairs.

Dissertations often tend to be labors of love, not without claiming their fair share of blood, sweat, and tears. This dissertation was no different. However, my path to this dissertation originated long ago with a love for politics, history, and a fascination for why people participate in politics. After working in a congressional district office in high school and college, I knew I wanted to study political psychology, but was not sure where to start.

Much of what set me on my academic path is thanks to a small group of inspirational faculty and mentors from my time at Colorado State University. I would like to thank Barb Kistler and Alexis Kanda-Olmstead, who taught me the value of leadership, civic engagement, service learning, and social justice, and have inspired me to bring these concepts into the classroom. These two brilliant women continue to mentor and support me through life's adventures. I would also like to thank Blane Harding, who taught me the value of difficult conversations in the classroom, challenging the status quo and seeking to better understand the history that has led us to where we are today.

I am someone who values mentorship, and learning from those around me. In particular, there are three people who have left a lasting impression on who I am as a student, scholar, colleague, and friend. I am lucky to say that I have them in my corner. First, I would like to thank Kyle Saunders, who was not only my advisor at Colorado State University, but has served and continues to create time and space to be a mentor, sounding board, and coauthor. Kyle has always encouraged me to pursue challenging research, and to challenge myself as a student and scholar. Second, I would like to thank Brian Humes. I had always wanted to live and work in Washington, D.C., so after finishing my BA and MA at CSU, I moved to D.C. and serendipity placed me at the National Science Foundation. As my supervisor, Brian, became a valued mentor and friend, encouraging me to explore new approaches to studying questions that interest me, and always reminding me of the most important things needed to balance out tough work schedules: family, friends, pets, and great books. Third, I would like to extend another round of thanks to my dissertation advisor, Joanne Miller. While working at the NSF, I

had the opportunity to meet Joanne and instantly knew I wanted to work with her at the University of Minnesota. For the last five years, I have been lucky to have Joanne as my advisor, mentor, and coauthor. From motivating me early on to go the extra mile, to teaching me how to be a good mentor and instructor, she has always gone out of her way to make me a better colleague and scholar. These three have shown me the best aspects of our discipline, and of being an academic. Because of these three, I look forward to the career in front of me and my turn as an advisor and mentor to future students.

I found that one of the greatest keys to surviving graduate school was my colleagues in the program. I would like to extend my deepest thanks to each of the following truly amazing women, whom I am lucky to call colleagues and friends: Amanda Bryan, Emily Baer, Jennifer Spindel, Ashley English, Marissa Theys, and Carly Potz-Nielsen. They each brought laughter, support, and care when it was needed most as life outside does not stop while in graduate school. I would like to thank Geoff Sheagley, who I befriended nearly ten years ago at the Summer Institute of Political Psychology, and Phil Chen, who mentored me through the program and have become valued colleagues and coauthors. To Matt Motta, Matt Luttig, Tim Callaghan, and Paul Snell, I would like to extend thanks for the many rounds of feedback, assistance, and idea generation. Thank you to my cohort-mates, with whom I survived courses, deadlines, exams, and presentations: Jennifer Spindel, Aaron Rosenthal, Brianna Smith, Lucas Franco, Bridget Marchesi, Katrina Heimark, Jenn Halen, Ryan Halen, and Hannah Kim. And, to my coauthors, I would like to extend my sincerest thanks to Aleksander Ksiazkiewicz, Joseph Vitriol, Pierce Ekstrom, and Rafael Aguilera.

Nobody has been more important to me in my academic pursuits than my family. I would like to thank my parents, Richard and Lynne, who kindled my affection for academics and politics, and whose unending love and guidance are with me through whatever endeavor I pursue. I would also like to thank my spouse's parents, Sue and Al, and grandparents, Emma Lou and George, whose support and encouragement never wavered. Most importantly, I wish to thank my loving, tenacious, and supportive spouse, Jake, and our kitty housemates, Maxwell and Marshall, who bring joy to each day, while putting up with unusual work schedules and writing hours, books and papers strewn across the dining room table, and many conversations about politics and research, and without whom I would not have survived this and life's many adventures.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my parents, my loving spouse, Jake, and the best proofreaders out there, our cats Maxwell and Marshall. Any typos that remain are likely due to the cats' proofreading expertise and "help."

Abstract

Contemporary U.S. democracy currently faces a catch-22. While democratic legitimacy and functioning can hinge on the participation of its people, the U.S. has experienced declines civic and political engagement. Situated in the broader political behavior literature, this dissertation explores explanations for why people utilize different forms of political exit and voice through engagement or disengagement in instrumental and expressive political action, i.e., voting behavior and protesting behavior, respectively. To do so, this dissertation pushes the existing concept of disaffection by incorporating work from psychology on learned helplessness. To examine the impact of learned helplessness on political disaffection and political involvement, this dissertation utilizes both survey and experimental methods. This dissertation demonstrates that learned helplessness has discriminant validity when compared to, and incremental predictive validity above and beyond, constructs of political disaffection, e.g., internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. More consequently, this dissertation demonstrates that situations and experiences of repeated failure that lead people to feel uncontrollability have consequences for feelings of disaffection and the ways in which they engage politically. Throughout the dissertation, three areas of investigation are pursued: 1) What are the causes and consequences of learned helplessness? 2) How has learned helplessness contributed to exit and voice in the U.S.? 3) How does contemporary political context, i.e., income inequality or elite polarization, exacerbate learned helplessness, and potentially mediate the relationship between context and participation in instrumental and expressive political behavior?

Table of Contents

List of Tables

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

List of Figures

Chapter 1 – Introduction

Political Malaise in the 21st Century: Helplessness, Disaffection, and U.S. Politics

When was the last time you failed at something? When was the last time you repeatedly attempted to accomplish something meaningful and you were met with disappointment or failure? What did that failure mean to you and how did that failure make you feel? Did you feel like you could change the outcome? Did you feel that you could change the outcome of future events like the ones you failed? This brief thought experiment may lead some to recall memories of losing athletic competitions, or getting passed up for raises and promotions at work. Yet for others, the recalled memories resonate from a deeper, more internalized place stemming from repeated experiences – failing to succeed academically or to get into college, failing to get hired, failing to be taken seriously, failing to be seen as unthreatening or deserving, or even failing at being well-represented and continually being on the losing side of elections. These examples strike at the heart of a concept taken from social psychology, *learned helplessness*, that captures a sense of powerlessness resulting from trauma, persistent failure to succeed, or loss of control, which becomes incorporated into perceptions of the self and the ability to change their circumstances. Within this dissertation, I argue that despite the contemporary U.S. political context being one of high political polarization and inequality, current definitions and measures of political disaffection focus too much on institutions and neglect individual learned helplessness. Within my argument, I expect that learned helplessness as a pre-political predisposition shaped by experience, will

impact the ways in which people experience disaffection, ultimately impacting engagement in (or disengagement from) political activities.

Withdrawal from politics and political processes stems, at least in part, from what some scholars have identified as apathy resulting from loss of status, entrenched in deprived areas, and among particular marginalized groups. Decades ago, Lampman (1959) found that 70% of the low-income population had one or more characteristics that tend to push a person down. Consequently, Lampman found that it was common to find a person who is the victim of a whole chain of disadvantages, e.g., race, job discrimination, inferior educational training. Similarly, (Di Palma 1970: 181) found that apathy is exacerbated among the uneducated and unskilled due to the elite nature of the educational system and productive limits of society, reinforcing political apathy among lower status-Americans: the young, those with insufficient education, lower income, racial minorities. Identified in the 1960s and 1970s, "… the waning of organized political oppositions, the rise of technocratic politics, and the advent of inequality on the basis of merit and talent particularly affect those at the bottom of the social ladder" (Di Palma 1970: 204). If anything, this has only worsened in the contemporary context, evidenced by political disaffection.

Disaffection, which consists of negative attitudes toward democracy, centers around the lack of trust and confidence in political authorities and institutions to address the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006). The identification of disaffection in scholarly work has been more frequently discussed in regard to the study of developing democracies in Southern Europe, Latin

America, and Asia. Only a few scholars have examined disaffection in the context of developed, contemporary democracies, explaining political disaffection by studying its symptoms and consequences, which include distrust, cynicism, and general sense of estrangement from both politics and the political process (Torcal and Montero 2006).

In contemporary U.S. politics, disaffection is surging through the American public. Americans' trust in government has declined (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Citizens view government institutions negatively, particularly Congress, because it is slow to act, seems obstructionist blocking the President's agenda, and is often susceptible to outside influence (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). The public is also dissatisfied with political elites' decision making that does not "show a sensitivity and concern to the rights of citizens, a concern with their welfare, and an absence of bias or favoritism" (Tyler 2001: 241). Acute attention to disaffection in the U.S. has become more salient, highlighting the growth of these political symptoms.

Particularly, this was evidenced in, around, and following the 2016 Presidential Election, particularly related to the ongoing debate to repeal and replace the 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. "The first thing is to note that members of the public have a lot of legitimate reasons to have lost faith in institutions, and to feel disaffected and angry right now. There are also major public policy debates, and it's right for people to feel strongly about proposed actions of government that would hurt them" (Barro 2017). Americans do not believe the government is paying attention to what they need, they do not like the choices they have been given in the political candidates.

More broadly, King (2000) identifies five factors that have contributed to the development of disaffection, particularly why Americans have lost confidence in and gained distrust for the federal government. First, America has had a long-standing suspicion of government. Second, and somewhat related to the first, there has emerged a lack of dignity and honesty of many recent American presidents stemming from political scandals such as Watergate, and Administrations' decisions to engage in unpopular international conflicts, such as Vietnam. While published years before the 2016 presidential election, this reasoning would also apply to the more recent scandals of Russian involvement in the election and questions of the Trump Administration's dealings. Additionally, King (2000: 97) identifies the failure of the federal government to establish a large and supportive constituency, increased complexity, opacity, and unintelligibility of the political system to a large number of ordinary American Citizens, and the polarization and loss of comity that has taken place among the American political elites as further reinforcing these feelings of disaffection among the American public. While King (2000) acknowledges the failure of the government to support its constituency, King does not discuss the personal experiences of individuals, which may influence why Americans have lost confidence in and gained distrust for the federal government.

This dissertation does not examine the historical evolution of how levels of disaffection have come to be, but rather the effects of learned helplessness and disaffection. This dissertation posits that learned helplessness may shape how attached people are to the democratic system in the United States and how these feelings have

become incorporated into people's identity and ability/willingness to engage in (or disengage from) political behavior, specifically instrumental or expressive political activities, i.e. voting behavior or protest behavior, respectively.

Coupled with King's five factors, scholars of political behavior have grappled with the question of weakening political and civic engagement in the United States, which tie to the consequences of growing disaffection. While turnout has been fairly consistent over the last few decades, it is still mediocre in the U.S., relative to other developed countries, with only about 56% of the U.S. voting-age population casting ballots in the 2016 presidential election ("Voting and Registration…" 2017; Desilver 2017). Chapters 2 and 3 examine instrumental and expressive political behavior with more depth, yet low engagement has been identified in areas beyond instrumental action like voting behavior. For example, low participation has been observed in membership in civic organizations, community groups, and voluntary associations, as well as drop-offs in informal sociability and social trust.

These elements of social capital have been declining since the mid-1980s (Hawes, Rocha, and Meier 2012; Putnam 1995, 2000, 2015), but as they continue, public discourse has turned to include notes of disillusionment, disenchantment, and frustration with the political system. For example, just over a year ago, Dr. Robert Reich of the University of California, Berkeley wrote, "Our economy and society depend on most people feeling the system is working for them. But a growing sense of powerlessness in all aspects of our lives – as workers, consumers, and voters – is convincing most people the system is working only for those at the top" (Huffington Post, 4/27/15). Even

politicians themselves have bought into the idea that the system and American dream only apply to a select few. On August 6, 2015, during the presidential primaries, Ohio governor and Republican candidate for president John Kasich noted, "America is a miracle country, and we have to restore the sense that the miracle will apply to you."

Still, this is not a new sentiment. In President Carter's 1979 famous "malaise" speech, he reinforced a growing threat to the nation: a crisis of confidence. He said, "It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul and spirit of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of a unity of purpose for our nation." It is clear that this crisis continues to grow. These examples reflect a sense that the U.S. political system is not serving its people, leading to a sense of powerlessness, low political participation and trust, and what some scholars have pinpointed as a *democratic deficit* due to the rising public aspirations for democracy, negative media coverage of the government, and the poor performance and structure of the U.S. democratic system (Norris 2011; Torcal and Montero 2006).

Some scholars have found evidence that other aspects of engagement have declined, such as levels of attention to and interest in politics (Macedo et al. 2005; McClurg et al. 2015). Beyond this, according to Roper polls, engagement with other political activities are also lower than they were decades ago. For example, compared to the mid-1960s, Americans are 10-15% less likely to run for office, or to write to an elected official or their local newspaper (Putnam 2000). Moreover, Americans have been found to be 15-20% less interested in politics and public affairs, around 25% less likely to vote, 35% less likely to attend public meetings, and roughly 40% less engaged in political

and civic organizations (Putnam 2000). Further, political trust is at a record 60-year low (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015), and efficacy has plummeted from 67% in 1964 to 36% in 2012, as evidenced by the external political efficacy index from the American National Election Study (ANES).[1]

Some scholars have challenged whether the severity of the decline in social capital is as dramatic as implied by Putnam (1995; 2000). Some have reinforced that the degree of erosion in social connectedness and civic engagement has been generally overstated (Costa and Kahn 2003) and the models depend on whether the focus is placed on generational/cohort differences or period/temporal effects, making it appear that different generations have different levels of social capital. For example, variation in the levels of social capital may be due to historical events, which occur as people near adulthood, such that people being raised after WWII experience a fundamentally different formative experience than those being raised in later generations (e.g. around the

[1] The ANES Guide to Public Opinion provides the percentage within study year from 1952 to 2012 for the external political efficacy index. The External Political Efficacy Index is constructed from cumulative data file variables V613 and V609, recoded as "Agree" = 0, "Disagree" = 100, "Neither" = 50. These new scores are then totaled (Don't Know is not scored) and the sum is divided by the number of valid responses. The result is then rounded to the nearest integer. The questions used are: V613: "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." And V609: "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think." 2012 data are the combined (face-to-face and internet) sample. See: http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5b_4.htm.

Vietnam War, Watergate, Monica Lewinsky scandal, 9/11 and the Iraq War, or election of President Obama as the first Black president). With this, later generations have been found to be less civically engaged, and less likely to volunteer, donate, or engage in their communities to the same extent as older generations (Taylor, Funk, and Clark 2007). However, while accounting for both generational and period effects, Clark (2015) finds that over time, there is little change in informal social interactions (e.g., having friends over for dinner) or formally organized engagements (e.g., attending town hall meetings or book clubs), and that the "decline" in social capital may be due to rising inequality in the United States since the 1970s leading to the variance in trust attributed to period changes.

Given the current political climate in the U.S., an environment that is contentious, unequal, and polarized, it is important to consider when someone will turn out to vote or turn out to a rally or protest. When do people feel like they can support the existing system or voice their grievances and opinions instrumentally through a vote? When do people feel like they cannot support the existing system and need to express their voice through another avenue? Is there something about individual's learned experiences that impacts they ways in which they engage in political activities?

Consequently, the dissertation that follows argues that learned helplessness, which is expected to be largely pre-political, has been absent from the disaffection and political behavior literature, and may be key to understanding the "rootedness" of participation and civic disengagement in the U.S. As such, learned helplessness helps to distinguish engagement with more instrumental political activities, such as registering and turning out to vote, from expressive political participation, such as joining a rally or

protest. Further, learned helplessness may help explain why it is difficult to engage the disengaged. This dissertation speaks to work on political participation and civic engagement more broadly, as well as work on political disaffection from political science and learned helplessness from social psychology.

This Dissertation

With regard to political participation, this dissertation builds on work that identifies demographic and attitudinal explanations for political disaffection. The dissertation defines disaffection among the mass public as an amalgamation of people's negative attitudes toward democracy, which includes disinterest, distrust, and a lack of confidence in political authorities and institutions to govern and address the concerns of the people. However, this dissertation argues that the existing work on disaffection does not account for repeated or persistent feelings of failure and loss of control, which become incorporated into an individual's self-identity.

Drawing on work from psychology, the dissertation integrates the concept of learned helplessness into the study of disaffection in contemporary U.S. politics. Learned helplessness helps explain the resultant malaise and powerlessness observed in the American public, stemming from repeated failures and loss of control, particularly among those who are from the most marginalized communities, e.g., low income, or racial and ethnic minorities. The dissertation argues that learned helplessness is an important concept for understanding disaffection, and key to studying the rootedness of civic disengagement. In the contemporary United States, given perpetually low turnout, declines in civic

engagement, and increases in protesting behavior, this dissertation explores four empirical questions: 1) What are the causes and consequences of disaffection, and how has learned helplessness contributed to disaffection and engagement in instrumental and expressive political behavior? 2) Do contemporary political contexts, i.e., income inequality and political polarization, exacerbate learned helplessness? 3) Does learned helplessness mediate the impact of context on engagement in political activities? 4) Given the role learned helplessness plays in differentiating engagement in instrumental and expressive political activities, how can learned helplessness be mitigated?

This dissertation is the first to study the concept of learned helplessness in a political context, and utilizes a multimethod approach that combines original surveys, factor analysis, experimental methods, and large-scale secondary data analysis. With the broader focus on disaffection, many of the measures are included in nationally representative large-scale surveys. However, since this dissertation is the first to examine the effects of learned helplessness as it related to political engagement, original survey work was necessary since learned helplessness is not measured as part of the large, publically available datasets that capture political attitudes and behavior. Thus, this dissertation required the collection of five original surveys, two of which can be weighted to approximate national representative and were collected in multiple waves prior to and following the 2016 Presidential Election. The first panel was collected as part of a multi-investigator panel study conducted by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota. The CSPP Presidential Election Panel Study (CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves prior to the election and

one post-election wave. The second panel was collected as part of a University of Minnesota module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in conjunction with collaborative research with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders. The other samples are large convenience samples collected during the summer and fall of 2016 before the election, obtained from Amazon.com's online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Additional information about the five samples is available in Chapter 2 and Appendix A.

As the dissertation explores the ways in which learned helplessness contributes to political engagement and disengagement, the chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 lays the theoretical groundwork linking learned helplessness with measures of disaffection. Feelings of disaffection can be captured by inefficacy, distrust of government, and a lack of interest in politics. However, these measures of disaffection do not capture the ways in which disaffection results from lived experiences, such as from repeated political losses or feeling as if one's side is consistently playing from behind, from feelings that elected officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one's preferences, from multiple negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or even from systemic marginalization. These repeated losses and failures, could also be politically oriented in relation to repeated attempts to get what one wants but that fail, such that a political loss could stem from preferred candidates or preferred parties never winning, regardless of whether one voted.

Learned helplessness captures these lived experiences, which provide people with multiple instances of feedback that they cannot achieve what they want or that the system does not work for them. These lived experiences stem from multiple domains, and the

political domain is only one area. Thus, Chapter 2 explores the ways in which learned helplessness is differentiated from the measures of political disaffection. It is argued here that lived experiences that lead to learned helplessness spill over to affect feelings of disaffection. Chapter 2 also explores the ways in which learned helplessness may shape how people are attached to the democratic system, which determines how people engage in political activities through finding ways to voice their opinions and grievances within the system, opting out, or going outside of the conventional, institutional political system.

Chapter 3 tackles the question, *what are the causes and consequences of learned helplessness, and how has learned helplessness contributed to disaffection and disengagement?* Building from Chapter 2, Chapter 3 explores additional predictors of learned helplessness, such as political ideology, partisanship, and perceptions of being on the losing side of politics. Following this, as disaffection has been tied to the way in which people participate in political activities, the chapter examines the ways in which learned helplessness helps us to distinguish between instrumental political behavior, such as registering and turning out to vote, and more expressive political action, like participating in political rallies and protests, particularly among people from marginalized and subordinated groups.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine the role of contemporary political contexts, i.e., income inequality and elite polarization. One open question is whether learned helplessness operates temporarily, like a brief state of helplessness, or whether it has a more permanent duration, like a trait. Thus, introducing experimental manipulations, Chapter 4 explores whether perceived income inequality exacerbates learned helplessness; whereas

Chapter 5 examines whether the salience of perceived elite political polarization exacerbates learned helplessness. As an extension, both chapters also evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the impact of context on participation and civic disengagement.

Lastly, the dissertation concludes with a discussion of the current state of learned helplessness as it relates to disaffection to lay the foundation for future work. Extensions of the dissertation include investigations of alternative contemporary contexts that might exacerbate or mitigate learned helplessness, specifically, and disaffection, more generally (e.g., community factors and social and political networks). Additional studies examining the mitigation of learned helplessness would also include the use of self-affirmation studies, lessening the effect of learned helplessness, and bolstering people's self-esteem. The resulting malaise and frustration with the current political system in the U.S. is potentially more unique in 2016 than in other national election years. When presented with a polarized, unequal, unrepresentative U.S. political system, it is no wonder dissatisfaction with U.S. democracy is as high as it is. This dissertation is one step toward understanding the American public's disaffection and political engagement.

Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework

Political Disaffection and Participation: An Overview

During the War of 1812 between the United States and England, following the burning of the White House by British soldiers, Dolley Madison wrote a letter to her sister, Anna, stating, *"Disaffection stalks around us."* This letter has since become famous, as it recounts the abandonment of the White House and Dolley Madison's famous actions to save Gilbert Stuart's priceless portrait of George Washington. This letter references the vast disaffection toward President James Madison (August 23, 1814). While this example is from the 19th century and reflective of the early tumult of a new country, disaffection with political elites, institutions, and systems in the United States has continued to ebb and flow over the course of its varied history. Two centuries after Dolley Madison's letter, it is still important to understand the public's expression of dissatisfaction and unhappiness toward political elites, institutions, and systems.

This chapter specifically, and the dissertation more broadly, takes this one step further by examining what feeling disaffection, potentially shaped by general repeated failure and loss of control, does to impact overall malaise with the political system and ultimately political behavior. To do so, this chapter first expands the literature on disaffection highlighted in the introduction and differentiates it from similar measures. This section also reviews the literature on learned helplessness and ties in the expected contributions it can make to the expansion of our broader understanding of what impacts feelings of disaffection, as well as the concept's consequences for political behavior. As

learned helplessness is discussed below, feelings of helplessness are shaped by general experiences that may or may not be within the political domain, but the argument is that feelings of repeated failure and uncontrollability carry implications for how people feel disaffection and engage in politics.

Next, the chapter discusses the relations among the defining features of disaffection, i.e., political efficacy, trust, and interest, over time using weighted data from the American National Election Studies (1960-2012) and within the five dissertation studies collected in 2016. As disaffection's negative attitudes toward democracy are predictive of attitudes like cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward the federal government, as part of a proof of concept, the chapter demonstrates how the measures of disaffection and learned helplessness predict these attitudes across four of the samples collected for the dissertation. Bringing all of this together, the chapter builds to the frame for the dissertation, borrowed from Hirschman (1970) regarding when people utilize *exit*, *voice*, and *loyalty* in regard to when people choose to (or not to) voice their opinions and grievances through more institutionalized and instrumental political action, i.e., voting behavior, and expressive political action, i.e., protesting behavior.

Defining Political Disaffection: What is it and why does it matter?

Generally, disaffection can be considered an expression of negative attitudes toward democracy, encompassing peoples' lack of trust and confidence in political authorities and institutions to address the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006). More specifically, scholars have noted that

disaffection can lead to particular political symptoms, such as "a sense of personal inefficacy, cynicism and distrust, lack of confidence in representative institutions and/or the representatives elected, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, and a general sense of estrangement from both politics and the political process" (Torcal and Montero 2006: 5). Yet, it is still not entirely clear where disaffection originates.

It is conceivable that disaffection could arise from repeated political losses or feeling as if one's side is consistently playing from behind, from feelings that elected officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one's preferences, from multiple negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or even from systemic marginalization. However, existing constructs of disaffection do not account for pre-political experiences, related to repeated failure and uncontrollability. The dissertation herein argues that experiences inside and outside of the political domain that stem from situations of repeated failure and uncontrollability, explained by the psychological concept of learned helplessness, may impact the ways in which people experience disaffection, and may influence how they engage in politics.

Political scientists have long concerned themselves with the causes and consequences of attitudes toward the political system. Early work on political disaffection identified dimensions of political efficacy, i.e., people's belief that they have the ability for political influence and competence, as well as system proximity, i.e., how people believe the political system affects their lives (see Di Palma 1969; 1970). Disaffection has also been distinguished from concepts such as system satisfaction, i.e., how people

see that the political system benefits its citizens (Di Palma 1969; 1970), political discontent, i.e., frustration derived from comparing what people have with what they hope or expect to have (Gamson 1968; Gunther and Montero 2006; Kornberg and Clarke 1992), and democratic support, i.e., beliefs that politics and representative institutions are the most appropriate and legitimate framework for government. Disaffection also diverts from closely related concepts like alienation, i.e., isolation from a group or an activity to which one should belong or be involved that may lead to powerlessness, meaninglessness, and/or self-estrangement (Finifter 1970; Seeman 1959; Templeton 1966), cynicism and apathy, i.e., the inclination to believe that people are motivated purely by self-interest and the inhibition of social involvement and social competence (Di Palma 1970), and anomie, i.e., the devitalization of social norms regulating individual behavior, particularly the violation and breakdown of rules intended to govern politics and government (Durkheim 1893; McDill and Ridley 1962). These measures are often used interchangeably, measured similarly, or predicted by disaffection measures, which results in some conceptual and methodological confusion.

Methodologically, indicators used to capture the underlying latent concept of disaffection include: political efficacy, trust, the belief that political elites do not care about the welfare of their citizens, political interest, and political confidence (Gunther and Montero 2006; Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997). Political confidence, particularly confidence in government institutions, is associated with social trust and perceptions of government performance (Newton and Norris 2000). Trust and political efficacy, the two most frequently used indicators, have been used to capture feelings

associated with how political action does or can have an impact on political outcomes (Craig 1979; Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990) and may explain why people differentially engage in political behaviors (Seligson 1980). For example, low political trust does not lead people to stay home on Election Day (Citrin 1974; Hetherington 2001), and high internal efficacy increases participation (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). More generally, the disaffected are distrusting of the political system, less interested, exposed to, and informed about politics, less likely to attend political rallies or engage in volunteer work on behalf of a party or candidate, and they avoid political discussions (Gunther and Montero 2006).

In an effort to contribute to the existing political disaffection literature, this dissertation argues that the existing literature does not discuss the influence of pre-political experiences related to repeated or persistent feelings of failure and loss of control. These feelings may shape how people are attached to the democratic system and may affect people's willingness or ability to engage in (or disengage from) political behavior. To introduce learned helplessness as a concept relevant to the disaffection literature and political behavior, the next section provides a review of the learned helplessness literature before moving on to discuss how the measures of disaffection are related to one another and to learned helplessness.

Learned Helplessness

As noted above, conceptually and methodologically, this dissertation argues that work on disaffection neglects pre-political experiences tied to repeated or consistent

feelings of inability, failure, and loss of control. One concept that captures these feelings, taken from the field of psychology, is learned helplessness. Boiling the concept of learned helplessness down, it could simply be classified as the flipside of personal control. However, in the realities surrounding animal and human behavior, learned helplessness is much more complex. While the concept is similar to some measures of trust and efficacy, learned helplessness provides a unique approach to get at perceptions of one's *repeated* attempts and failures, inside and outside of the political domain, to alter political outcomes, which is not captured by existing measures of disaffection, including internal and external efficacy. Rather, it is expected that learned helplessness is causally prior to feelings of political disaffection. Further, learned helplessness has not been used to further our understanding of political behavior, as this dissertation seeks to do.

As a popular theory in contemporary psychology, learned helplessness is often described as a sense of powerlessness resulting from a traumatic event or a persistent failure to succeed, leading to perceived loss of control over a situational outcome (Seligman 1972). The original learned helplessness model provides an explanation for the inappropriate passivity that may result from people's experience with uncontrollable events (Maier and Seligman 1976). According to the model, people who experience uncontrollable events or environments learn that desired outcomes elude their control. They then generalize this belief about their own helplessness to affect the outcomes in similar and new situations. The helplessness model has been adapted to explain a number of human behaviors, e.g., systemic marginalization, depression, academic failure, victimization, athletic setbacks, poor work performance, illness and even early death

(Peterson 1990; Peterson and Barrett 1987; Peterson and Seligman 1983, 1984, 1987; Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993; Seligman and Schulman 1986).

As Dweck (1975) writes, "In learned helplessness the important variable is not the occurrence of the aversive event, but the perception of the relationship between one's behavior and the occurrence of that event" (p. 675). How people attribute cause or responsibility can produce depression proneness, such that when highly desired outcomes are believed improbable or highly aversive outcomes are believed probable and a person expects that no response in her/his repertoire will change the likelihood of the outcome, helplessness results (Abramson et al. 1978). Considering the way in which repeated political losses, systemic marginalization, or feelings of continually being un- or under-represented may induce malaise and become part of an individual's self-concept, learned helplessness is a fitting concept to expand our understanding of disaffection.

However, the theory of learned helplessness is descendant from canonical work in psychology on animal behavior, stemming from behavioral learning theories e.g., classical and operant conditioning, stimulus-response theories, and avoidance learning (Pavlov 1927; Skinner 1938; Watson 1924), as well as two-process theory (Mowrer 1947; Rescorla and Soloman 1967). Learned helplessness is also similar to theories of psychological reactance (i.e., Brehm 1966; 1972), where in situations that people's choices or freedoms are threatened, people respond by increasing their motivation to restore that freedom or choice. It is key to acknowledge that learned helplessness stemming from animal behavior and learning theory research is not about knowledge acquirement, but rather learned helplessness is about learned responses.

One of the most fitting examples of the animal behavior work comes from Solomon's students Russell Leaf and Bruce Overmier, who conducted laboratory experiments to test the two-process theory (Overmier and Leaf 1965). These laboratory experiments exposed dogs to 10-second tones followed by 0.5-second shocks to its feet. Rather than learning to jump when the dogs heard the tones, the dogs unexpectedly failed to learn to jump and avoid the shock. Learned helplessness scholars then sought to find answers to this unexpected failure to learn, answering, "Why does exposure to inescapable shock produce a dog who does not learn a very simple shuttle box task later on?" (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 20). When the shock is inescapable, the dog learns that it is unable to exert control over the shock by means of any of its voluntary behaviors. It expects this to be the case in the future, and this expectation of uncontrollability causes it to fail to learn in the future (Maier, Seligman, and Solomon 1969; Seligman and Maier 1967; Seligman, Maier, and Solomon 1971).

The learned helplessness model has been demonstrated beyond dogs, electric shocks, and avoidance learning. It has been applied to a range of species and reinforcers other than shocks in a number of learning tasks. Escape deficits following inescapable shock has been demonstrated in cats, goldfish, gerbils, guinea pigs, mice, rats, and people (see Maier and Seligman 1976 for a review of learned helplessness generality; also see Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993; Volmayer and Gass 2013). However, there are some aspects of human helplessness that are not commensurate in animal helplessness, such as people can learn to be helpless through the observation of another person encountering uncontrollable events (Brown and Inouye 1978). "With the advent of the

global television community, we can argue that more people are exposed to more uncontrollability than ever before in history" (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 112). Yet, regardless of animal or human behavior, it is generally understood that learned helplessness is a condition that characterizes animals or people who, after repeated failures, develop a belief of not being able to cope with negative situations perceived as bad or uncontrollable (Filippello et al. 2015).

More specifically, according to the learned helplessness model for there to be a true case of learned helplessness, three components of learned helplessness must be fulfilled: contingency, cognition, and behavior (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). First, contingency is the relationship between what people do and the outcomes they actually experience. For learned helplessness, the most important contingency is uncontrollability or the random relationship between people's actions and outcomes. The opposite contingency is controllability, where people's actions reliably result in desired outcomes. Second, cognition refers to how people perceive, explain the uncontrollability and then form expectations about similar or new situations. Last, behavior involves the observable consequences of the perceived uncontrollability. Typically, this involves passivity rather than action, but other consequences may ensue from the expectation of future helplessness, e.g., low self-esteem, sadness, immune changes, or physical illness.

Extrapolating learned helplessness to explain all manner of failures of human behavior demands the need to explain passivity. Scholars who have studied human learned helplessness have identified it as domain specific, complex, and often where learned helplessness is expected or observed, it may still not be a pure case because all

three conditions are not fully met. Rather, many applications are middling ones, neither excellent nor poor, demonstrating some criteria for learned helplessness but not all (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993).

Experiences of repeated failure and uncontrollability can occur in multiple domains, and this dissertation posits that learned helplessness stemming from experiences inside and outside of the political domain have consequences for political behavior. In this dissertation, learned helplessness tied to the political domain, e.g. repeated political losses or feeling as if one's side is consistently playing from behind, feelings that elected officials continually do not listen, care, or represent one's preferences, negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or systemic marginalization, generally fits Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993)'s classification of middling and good examples of learned helplessness. Other good examples from the literature include learned helplessness stemming from institutionalization, incarceration, unemployment, academic failure, illness, poverty, and racial and ethnic discrimination. Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) identify Asian Americans and Asian American immigrants who have experienced historical discrimination, ranging from being denied the right to vote or testify in court to being interned during WWII. They also highlight helplessness among Black or African Americans who have experienced a history of uncontrollable events, ranging from slavery to mass incarceration.

More generally, in regard to poverty and discrimination, Seligman (1975) hypothesizes that poverty and discrimination are devastating for many Black and African Americans because they are deprived not only of material goods but because they are

deprived of psychological assets. This has also been demonstrated through helplessness experiments in the laboratory with Black or African American and White children, where it was found that Black and African American children had more difficulty with problem solving following uncontrollable events than the White children, demonstrating what scholars identify as a failure to persevere (Smith and Seligman 1978; Weisz 1981). "Poverty and discrimination mean uncontrollability, and uncontrollability means passivity and defeatism: in short, learned helplessness" (Peterson, Maier, Seligman 1993: 255; see also Fernando 1984; Powell 1990).

It is important to acknowledge that considering the systemic marginalization and continued discrimination experienced by racial minorities cannot be complete evidence of learned helplessness alone. Sometimes, people do not act because they perceive correctly that their efforts will not result in their desired outcome. Alternatively, sometimes people do not act because they have been punished for active attempts to control outcomes. However, Peterson, Maier, Seligman (1993) would identify learned helplessness as present in either case.

Additionally, social problems or aversive events may co-occur. When they do, it may "be the result of one problem exacerbating another, as opposed to learned helplessness being at the root of all of them individually" (Peterson, Maier, Seligman 1993: 262). However, "the assumption that people make attributions (and can make them accurately) cannot be accepted at face value." (Wortman and Dintzer 1978: 77). People may struggle to make correct causal attributions. Sometimes aversive events or situations are too singular to allow causal relationships to be abstracted or because potential causes

are too numerous and confounded with one another. When people make causal explanations for the events they experience, these explanations may be perceived as real but their meaning may not be tied to a single operation/explanation (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 153). Since learned helplessness follows in the wake of uncontrollable events, aversive events alone do not cause learned helplessness, but aversive events tied to the perception of uncontrollability. The more a person perceives an outcome to be beyond their control, the more helplessly they should behave.

In the American political context, "The United States has witnessed an erosion of belief in the efficacy of its institutions…In addition, our belief in government as a benevolent and effective source of control has eroded. The futility of our government's massive exercise of force… and its failure in bettering the lives of the poor have surely contributed to this erosion as well" (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 15). This dissertation seeks to test the effects of learned helplessness on political behavior in the contemporary political context. While some learned helplessness scholars may posit that passivity exhibited in people's removal from political behavior is part of learned helplessness, this dissertation will examine the choices to disengage from more instrumental political activities, i.e., voting behavior, as a result of experienced learned helplessness. Further, learned helplessness scholars. Passivity, or the failing to demonstrate the mental or behavioral action that meets the demands of a situation, is the predominant coping strategy identified in the learned helplessness literature.

However, this dissertation also discusses political actions people undertake which occur outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system, i.e., more expressive

political action like protesting and rallying. In Abramson et al. (1978)'s reformulated model of learned helplessness, the authors turn to the explanatory styles people use to explain bad events, which ultimately predict the vigor or passivity with which people behave in many domains. Further, in some cases, reactance effects, rather than helplessness effects, are produced by uncontrollability, which means that depending on circumstances, one or the other may take place (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). Considering the ways in which protesting behavior is motivated, it is possible that it may be related to reactance and the ways in which people explain the events they are protesting.

It is also possible that for protesting behavior, it may also be tied to expectations that the outcomes are not contingent in the future, unlike when uncontrollability is expected in the future. For Mikulincer (1994), human learned helplessness is the end result of the person's *active* coping in an uncontrollable environment. Focusing on "active coping," Wortman and Dintzer (1978) note that a question is still left open, such that it is unclear when exposure to lack of control results in, "deficits and when does it result in facilitated performance?" (1978: 75). Thus, for people who are helpless, and not getting what they need from the existing conventional political system by having their instrumental needs or goals met, they may choose to engage in more expressive political behavior to reassert power or status, rectify injustices, or to restore a desired state of affairs outside of the institutionalized, conventional political system.

To assess whether learned helplessness is related to political behavior, fitting measures are needed. However, much of the work on learned helplessness has been

conducted in the laboratory environment or using batteries of items dedicated to assessing levels of depression (Peterson 1993). So as to ameliorate this and broaden the study of learned helplessness outside of the laboratory, scholars have worked to create a psychometrically sound battery to be used more broadly in the survey context. Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988) created the twenty-item Learned Helplessness Scale (LHS) that assesses respondents' expectations of uncontrollability (with an established standardized alpha reliability coefficient of .85).[2] Face and content validity of the LHS have been clearly established, as helplessness researchers Martin Seligman and Christopher Peterson assisted in item LHS and scale development (McKean 1994). Respondents are asked to respond twenty items with response options coming from a four-point agree-disagree scale, and ten of the twenty items are reverse coded. For example, respondents are asked questions like, "No matter how much energy I put into a task, I feel I have no control over the outcome" or "Other people have more control over their success and/or failure than I do." The full scale is included in Appendix B.

Unlike the measures of disaffection that are tied directly to attitudes about government and political authorities, an additional distinguishing element of the LHS is that the items are exogenous from other political measures, not tied to the political domain, and do not use language referring to political action. As learned helplessness is not tied solely to experiences with politics, it is important to utilize a measure that captures the concept beyond the political realm. As Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993)

---

[2] The alphas for the samples discussed below are slightly higher than the demonstrated reliability of the scale published from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988).

demonstrate, learned helplessness expresses itself in varying degrees depending on environmental conditions and context. To date, the LHS remains the most extensive published survey measure of learned helplessness. Other measures, like Peterson (1993: 291) capture helplessness more related to depression, e.g., "I didn't leave my house all day" or "I used another person as a crutch" and is less fitting for the use in the political context.

Repeated political losses, historical and systemic marginalization, or feelings of continually being un- or under-represented shape the ways in which people view the world and their ability to interact with existing political systems. Thus, as repeated losses or repeated failures provide feedback to individuals over time and become part of an individual's self-concept, it is important to evaluate how learned helplessness affects the ways in which people engage with (or disengage from) their political surroundings. Before moving to an exploration of how the learned helplessness affects engagement or disengagement with political activities, it is important to explore how learned helplessness is distinct from existing measures of disaffection.

For the purposes here, and as reviewed from the literature above, it is important to acknowledge that learned helplessness may stem from various life experiences, related to and separate from the political domain. Helplessness can assert itself from experiences with uncontrollability like sudden illness, unemployment, academic failure, poverty, institutionalization, incarceration, or racial and ethnic discrimination, making success more difficult. As these experiences are largely prior to political engagement and if feeling like not being able to control one's outcomes has downstream effects on

behaviors of passivity, it is also likely that helplessness may have downstream effects on political engagement. Further, as helplessness may be pre-political, it would follow that it also occurs before feelings of disaffection.

Learned helplessness is discussed here similar to the way the concept of need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski 1989, 2004) is discussed in the political psychology literature, as it has been found to be prior to but related to the political domain, e.g., conservativism (Jost et al 2003; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009; Jost, Federico, and Napier 2013), stereotyping, prejudice, and right-wing authoritarianism (Kruglanski 2004), as well as racism (Van Hiel et al. 2004). Similarly, learned helplessness is expected to be prior to feelings of disaffection and will have spillover effects onto political behavior. However, unlike need for closure that is a cognitive trait, learned helplessness is shaped by experience. Whether learned helplessness is actually a trait, predisposition, or a state, is still up for debate in the psychological literature, and an area of interest for future research.

Again, this dissertation explores learned helplessness as prior to disaffection. However, with only cross-sectional data, it is not possible to test whether learned helplessness is causally prior to disaffection. Thus, the next section discusses the trends and relatedness of the disaffection measures, i.e., internal and external efficacy (political efficacy), trust, and political interest. Following that, the dissertation begins to meet a minimum threshold of differentiating helplessness from disaffection. While it is not possible to demonstrate that helplessness causes disaffection with the current data, a

minimum threshold of differentiation is met that is necessary but not sufficient for causality.

Relations Among the Defining Features of Disaffection

Dimensions of Disaffection

Political Efficacy

Democratic theorists have placed emphasis on meaningful citizen involvement as a mechanism of holding the government accountable (Barber 1984; Pateman 1970; and Schumpeter 1942). Given this underlying assumption that the people are confident and capable of influencing or changing the system, scholars have been interested in determining the way in which to measure how and whether people believe they are politically efficacious. In the 1950s and early 1960s, when scholars found that Americans felt relatively efficacious and moderately trusting toward government (Nie, Verba, and Petrocik 1976), they took this as a signal of government stability and government's ability to respond to public concerns. Yet, when toward the late 1960s and early 1970s when feelings of powerlessness and cynicism became more widespread, scholars become concerned that these attitudes may pose a threat to the established democratic order (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990; Miller 1974). Early comparative work on disaffection identified aspects of political efficacy as particularly relevant (Di Palma 1969; 1970).

Generally, political efficacy has been considered to be, "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact on the political process, that is, that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties" Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954:187).

Alternatively, “the concept of political efficacy contains the tacit implication that an image of the self as effective is immediately related to the image of democratic government as responsive to the people” (Lane 1959:149). Campbell, Gurin and Miller (1954) began an empirical study of political efficacy using survey data from the 1952 American National Election Study (ANES), where measures of political efficacy have continued to appear, including within the latest 2016 election survey.

As these measures have been studied over time, there has been some debate as to whether there are different dimensions of political efficacy. Lane (1959) made an early case that efficacy should be split into two related but distinct measures: internal and external political efficacy. Thus, external political efficacy refers to the belief that political elites and governmental institutions are responsive to citizen demands and internal political efficacy refers to the belief that one is competent to engage and exert influence in the political process (Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010). The two components of efficacy have been shown to be strongly correlated, yet two-factor models of efficacy demonstrate that the internal-external distinction fits the survey data somewhat better than does a single-factor model (Clarke and Acock 1989; Clarke et al. 2010). The distinction between internal and external efficacy follow democratic virtues associated with an engaged, confident and capable citizenry, but also raises questions regarding whether political elites or the functioning of government institutions can influence perceptions of political efficacy and can affect the way in which people engage with politics.

In regard to external efficacy, Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) differentiate between two dimensions of external efficacy: incumbent-based (viewing individual representatives as responsive) and regime-based (viewing procedures and institutions as legitimate and responsive) efficacy components. Taken together, items that capture external efficacy ask respondents about how much they think public officials care or how much say they have about what government does. For example, items ask, "How much do public officials care what people like you think?" and "How much can people like you affect what the government does?" External political efficacy has been found to affect feelings that the system is responsive (Abramson and Aldrich 1982), political trust (Balch 1974; Craig 1979), and diffuse system support (Wright 1976; Iyengar 1980), as well as perceived political influence, political knowledge participation, attention, trust, and satisfaction with democracy (Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010). The items used in the dissertation samples are available in Appendix B.

On the other hand, internal efficacy measures ask respondents about their ability to understand politics (politics is too complicated for me to understand) and ability to participate effectively (I am well qualified to participate in politics). As it is measured, internal efficacy is the closest concept to learned helplessness. As opposed to learned helplessness, where the scale does not include questions directly related to politics or political engagement, debates surrounding the way in which internal efficacy should be measured to clearly distinguish it from external efficacy have ranged from the types of questions abounding in the literature (Morrell 2003), inclusion of multiple questions to

index (see Morrell 2003; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991) to whether the questions should be positively or negatively framed (see Clarke et al. 2010).[3]

Some scholars maintain that internal efficacy is more highly correlated with measures of political participation than external efficacy (Craig et al. 1990; Niemi, Craig, and Mattei 1991). The political consequences of internal efficacy have largely been studied in the context of voting behavior. Scholars have examined the ways in which internal efficacy may increase when people engage in participatory democracy and deliberative decision-making. While deliberation may not lead to direct, positive effects on citizens' internal political efficacy, face-to-face deliberation can lead citizens to feel more competent in their deliberative abilities and may increase internal political efficacy more than those who only vote (Dyke and Lascher 2009; Morrell 2005).

---

[3] For the sake of the inclusion of internal efficacy within this dissertation, it follows the general index combining the four items from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) which were developed from a 1987 NES Pilot Study, demonstrating a reliable and valid measure of internal efficacy. These items include: 1) I consider myself to be well qualified -to participate in politics (SELFQUAL); 2) I feel that I have a pretty good under- standing of the important political issues facing our country (UNDERSTAND); 3) I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people (PUBOFF); and 4) I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people (INFORMED). Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto (2010) do not find any evidence that negatively framing the statements, versus positively framing them, is problematic (see also Morrell 2003).

Being on the winning or losing side of an election may affect perceptions of external efficacy. For example, ‘‘...the impact of candidate preferences on efficacy may often be transient, with the heightened efficacy of those favoring ‘winners’ being eroded by negative evaluations of winning candidates’ (or their party’s) behavior in office’’ (Clarke and Acock 1989: 562). However, over time, winners become less enthusiastic about the degree to which they perceive government is responsive, while losers’ external efficacy begins to rebound (Davis and Hitt 2016). Scholars have also found other differential effects for external efficacy. Using survey data spanning 12 years, Secret and Johnson (1985) find that African-Americans have lower political efficacy (external efficacy) than Whites, and is more dependent upon socioeconomic correlates for African-Americans than it is for Whites when explaining voter registration and turnout, or other election related activities, such as trying to influence someone else’s vote, working for a campaign, or attending a political event.

Trust

Beyond debates of small versus large government, general public sentiment of the government currently is less than positive. As with the assumptions made about an efficacious populace, political theorists have also approached trust in the political system as a normatively positive requirement, not only to ensure engagement, but proper representation of society’s interests. Scholars have suggested that political trust was important because it contributed to the legitimacy and longevity of governments, providing a “reservoir of support” for leaders even during hard times (Easton 1965;

Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Normatively, while political knowledge may not be high, people can rely on a general trust as a heuristic to judge their satisfaction with the political system. However, Americans are more distrustful of government today, coinciding with a 60-year low in political trust (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). This also reinforces the implications and consequences of the behavior of political elites on the mass public.

Once the government has earned the trust of its citizens, it may have more leeway to pursue its policy goals. "Since political trust is necessary to generate support for redistributive and race-targeted policies, low levels of political trust have a particularly negative effect on those who rely most on government programs, specifically the economically disadvantaged and racial minorities" (Hetherington 2005: 7). Moreover, at the root of political trust is the degree to which people perceive that government is producing outcomes consistent with their expectations (see Stokes 1962). This is further complicated by the partisan or ideological nature that is conditioned by who is running the government at a given point in time, e.g., conservatives and Republicans will be more positive than liberals and Democrats when conservatives and Republicans are running the federal government, and vice versa (Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Citrin 1974; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Miller, Saunders and Farhart 2016). Where policy ends are more important than policy means, political trust reflects how positively citizens perceive government's performance, relative to expectations.

In the U.S. context, early work on political trust sought to understand its decline from the late 1950s to the 1980s (Citrin 1974; Miller 1974). Yet, scholars have measured

trust in the political context in a few different ways.[4] Most often, trust in government, or political trust, is measured using some form of the following single item: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?" (Hetherington 2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). Scholars often use this measure because it is not only a single item, but it is also available overtime on the American National Election Study surveys (from the 1950s to the most recent presidential election in 2016). However, Hetherington (2005: 14) highlights how this political trust measure relates to other measures of confidence, trust, and cynicism in regard to items asking about waste, i.e., "Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes," interest, i.e., "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" and crooked politicians, i.e., "Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked?"

Where political trust is a general evaluation of the entire government, trust in a single target is only one dimension of a more complex evaluation (Hetherington 2005).

---

[4] Scholars have distinguished social trust from political trust. Putnam (1993; 2000) showed that trusting relationships facilitate cooperation between people. Further, he shows that social trust may affect whether individuals vote or participate more actively in politics. Newton and Norris (2000) highlight that high macro-social trust is also tied to countries that experience greater overall confidence in political institutions, but there are still weak correlations between social trust and confidence in political institutions at the individual level.

More specifically, political trust is an evaluation of government performance. Some people some may have more complex feelings about the government, e.g., people may care not only about political outcomes, but also political processes (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015). However, most Americans do not want to see the processes behind the political curtain, but do want to trust elected representatives to be able to come together and implement commonsense solutions to political problems (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Anderson and LoTempio (2002) find that political trust is lowest for those who voted for presidential and congressional losers, but highest for voters who voted either for both the presidential and congressional winners or the presidential winner and congressional losers.

However, overtime, political trust may also be subject to effects from scandals and corruption brought to light in the public eye, exacerbating general disaffection as well (King 2000). For example, Alford (2001) demonstrates that both Democrats and Republicans experienced declines in trust in government across the Johnson and Nixon administrations, but that both recovered some of the lost trust during the first Reagan administration. These measures of political trust are largely tied to how confident people feel about the government in general and about specific government institutions. Newton and Norris (2000: 53) note, "loss of confidence in institutions may well be a better indicator of public disaffection with the modern world because they are the basic pillars of society. If they begin to crumble, then there is, indeed, cause for concern." Tying trust and confidence in institutions together, Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn (2000: 76) find that evaluations of trust in the national government actually drive perceptions of government

responsiveness, but when confidence in the people running governmental institutions is greater, so too are the evaluations of trust in government.

Despite the difference in trust or confidence, citizens still generally view government institutions negatively (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995), and scholars have been concerned with the causes and consequences for a long time. Yet, Hetherington (2005) notes that one of the reasons scholars have underestimated the importance of declining political trust is because they were looking for effects over the same time period that voter turnout was declining. Therefore, scholars connected the effects of declining trust to declining voter turnout. Citrin (1974) has shown that low political trust does not cause people to stay home on Election Day. Yet, it could be conceived that for different people, trust would have a different impact. The connection between trust and participation for those high and low in trust is ambiguous. On one hand, if someone is trustful, they might express their satisfaction with the political system by participating. On the other hand, this same satisfaction might lead to abstaining or protest votes, because they trust that their interests will be protected regardless of whether or how they participate. Distrustful people might feel the greatest to participate to change the status quo, or they could feel so bad about the system that abstention is their only solution. Hetherington (2005) points to the possibility that individual psychological makeups might lead individuals to react to these four situations differently, that would better explain the lack of a direct relationship between political trust and participation.

For this reason, this dissertation will explore the differential effects of trust and learned helplessness, in addition to the use of a generalized measure of trust. As may be

more fitting in relation to the effects of general disaffection, rather than trust in government specifically, the generalized measure of trust is an index of trust measures for trust in government, law enforcement, media, and people in general (see Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 2016). Alternatively, as noted above, scholars have measured political trust using a single item about whether government can be trusted to do the right thing or a battery of four questions about whether government can be trusted to do the right thing, how much tax money the government wastes, whether government is run in the interests of all, and how many in government are crooked (see Hetherington 2005).

Interest

Coinciding with efficacy and trust, scholars have long examined political interest as a predictor of political attitudes and behaviors, such as information seeking (Shani 2009), and political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Luskin 1990; see Lupia 2016 for further discussion of attention to politics and competence as it relates to political knowledge). Particularly related to political participation, political interest is a strong and consistent predictor of political participatory activities, such as turning out to vote, as well as campaign and non-campaign related activities (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lane 1959; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, Milbrath and Goel 1977; Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

The findings regarding political participation and political interest are robust, to where political interest is classified as “the potential readiness to participate” (Deth 2000:

119). Moreover, in models predicting overall political participation, the size of the interest coefficient is considerably larger than other measures of resources and engagement, such as income, knowledge, and partisan strength (Verba et al. 1995). In conjunction with its robustness, political interest is also stable over the lifetime, such that "political interest behaves like a central element of political identity, not like a frequently updated attitude" (Prior 2010: 763).

Beyond the robust effects, however, scholars have also grappled with evidence that less than a majority of the electorate is really interested in politics, classifying much of the electorate and general American public as apathetic (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Di Palma 1969, 1970; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Neuman 1986), which justifies why many scholars have considered interest in politics as one indication of political disaffection. The tie between disinterest and disengagement is greatest for those who have weakest ties to political parties, whereas interest is greatest for those who hold strong political opinions (Miller and Rahn 2002) and for those with stronger partisanship attachments (Bennett 1986; Miller and Rahn 2002).[5] Beyond group attachments, political interest can also be subject to contextual influences. McClurg, Miller, Peterson, and Saunders (2015) find that from 1960-2008, elite polarization has shaped the public's interest in politics, and demonstrated a particular decline in general political interest among independents. Taking note from McClurg et al. (2015), scholars often only use

[5] Interest is also higher for individuals with a stronger sense of civic duty and higher internal political efficacy (Bennett 1986), as well as higher external efficacy (Rosenberg 1954).

general political interest and spend little time on distinguishing between general political interest and interest in and attention to political campaigns, which may operate differently and may be more sensitive to political contexts, such as McClurg and his colleagues show in regard to sensitivity to elite polarization.[6] For this dissertation, measures of interest will be more general, including questions about how interested individuals are in politics, broadly, rather than focus on interest in the campaign, as the data were collected at different times leading up to and following the 2016 Presidential Election.

Thus, taken all together, one could conceive of a perfect storm of political disaffection—someone who is low in internal and external efficacy, low in political trust, and low in political interest. It is conceivable that they would be the most disengaged from voting behavior, e.g., registering and turning out to vote. However, individuals may differ in their levels of efficacy, such that they may be high in internal efficacy and low in political trust, which may lead them to participate in alternative political activities or civic engagement, such as attending rallies or volunteering with an organization in their community, but not to turnout to vote. There is a rather complicated relationship between the various facets of disaffection, and it is this to which the next two sections turn.

Disaffection Trends (1960-2012)

[6] One example where interest in campaigns is used to explain directly voter turnout, rather than general political interest, can be found in Lewis-Beck, Jacoby, Norpoth, and Weisberg (2008).

While measures of learned helplessness have not been included in publically available, nationally representative datasets, such as the General Social Survey (GSS) or the American National Election Study (ANES), the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File does include measures of disaffection across multiple decades. As noted above, disaffection may be assessed with various measures, such as low internal and external efficacy, lack of trust, and low political interest. Consequently, Figure 2.1 illustrates the overtime trends in disaffection for each presidential election year from 1960 to 2016.

[Insert Figure 2.1 Here]

For the sake of comparison, all of these measures were placed on a 0-100 scale, with higher values reflecting higher levels of each measure. The trends reflect the weighted average for each survey year. The 2016 Time Series data was added to the cumulative data trends, as the 2016 data was not yet available in a new release of the cumulative data file.[7] The 2012 and 2016 averages include both face to face and online survey interview modes. Table 2.1 reflects the weighted averages across the 15 presidential election years for each measure.

[Insert Table 2.1 Here]

---

[7] There were also three missing values: internal efficacy in 2004, trust in government in 1960, and interest in public affairs/politics in 2012. The averages treat these three time points as missing data. The graph includes the previous year's measure for graph continuity for internal efficacy in 2004 and interest in public affairs/politics in 2012. The 2016 measures were recoded to match how the measures were coded and scaled in the cumulative data file.

Focusing on the change from 1960 to 2016, the most dramatic decline is for the external political efficacy index. The external political efficacy index is an average of two questions "Public officials don't care much what people like me think" and "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," where disagreement with these questions reflect greater external efficacy. In 1960, on a 0-100 scale, average external political efficacy was 74. Respondents in 1960 seemingly felt that public officials were responsive and cared about what the public thought. However, this has shifted dramatically where by 2016, the average on this index was only 35, reflecting more than a 38-point decline in external political efficacy. Similarly, for trust in government, the overtime trends support the nearly 60-year low in trust highlighted by Hetherington and Rudolph (2015). Reflected in Figure 2.1, trust in government falls from 64 in 1964 to only 36 in 2016. This is a considerable 28-point drop. Considering the current political and media environment, these declines are potentially unsurprising, albeit substantial.

Internal efficacy, on the other hand, has been more consistent over these 15 presidential elections, with the exception of 2016. Measured using disagreement with the question, "Politics and government are too complicated to understand," internal efficacy scores hovered between 25 and 41, until it spiked in 2016 with an average of 57. Additionally, reported interest in campaigns and elections has increased since the 1960s. Despite external efficacy and trust in government dropping, interest in campaigns and elections was fairly stable through the early 2000s, but increased from 2004 to 2016, peaking in 2012. This increase could be due to the political and economic climate and the particular candidates running, e.g., the Bush administration's decision to go to war in

2003, the re-election of President George W. Bush, the Great Recession of 2008, and the election and re-election of President Barack Obama. However, reported interest in public affairs and politics does not exhibit the same increase, as it hovers around its 1960-2016 average of 59.0.

Affecting these trends is not only the political and economic climate of each election cycle, but it is also likely that in the 21st century, the increase in ease of access to media and news through the proliferation of the internet and the 24-hour news cycle has jaded the American public against the federal government, while providing them frequently with attention-grabbing information. Overall, these trends illustrate that disaffection is multifaceted and while one aspect of disaffection may be increasing, other aspects may be simultaneously decreasing. Reviewing these trends reinforces the need to examine these various dynamics of disaffection, the ways in which they operate in conjunction with one another, how they impact political behavior, and what external factors may influence the dynamics of disaffection. The remainder of the chapter turns to addressing the relatedness and distinctiveness of the multiple aspects of disaffection, providing context for the dissertation's theoretical framework.

Relationship Between Helplessness and Disaffection

This dissertation argues that existing work on disaffection does not discuss the influence of pre-political experiences related to repeated or persistent feelings of uncertainty, inability, or failure, which may contribute to internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. Thus, it is important to illustrate that this concept, learned

helplessness, is methodologically distinct from the measures of political disaffection. Since learned helplessness is not measured in large, publically available datasets, surrounding the 2016 Presidential Election, five samples were collected that included measures learned helplessness, along with the measures of disaffection and measures of instrumental and expressive political activities. However, since these samples are not longitudinal, it is not possible to test whether learned helplessness actually causes disaffection. A table summarizing the variables included in and the organization of the samples, as well as further information about the demographic breakdown of each sample is available in Appendix A.

Dissertation Data

Sample 1. This sample is a large internet convenience sample, collected between May 20, 2016 and July 20, 2016 from Amazon.com's online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Four thousand, three hundred and forty-nine U.S. adults 18 years of age or older were recruited. However, this survey was collected in collaboration with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders and includes two survey manipulations not directly relevant to the analyses discussed within this dissertation: 1) a political loser experimental manipulation and 2) a self-affirmation manipulation. For the sake of the analyses within this chapter, the analyses focus on the 728 respondents who were randomly selected to participate in the true control condition. Despite sampling from the MTurk online population, respondents who participated in this survey were prevented from participating in subsequent MTurk surveys utilized for the dissertation.

Sample 2. This sample of U.S. adults was also recruited from MTurk through TurkPrime. A total of 816 respondents were surveyed between June 11 and July 24, 2016. Respondents were randomly assigned to participate in the control condition or to two survey experiments: 1) a learned helplessness manipulation, and/or 2) an elite polarization experiment, discussed in Chapter 5. Of the 816 respondents, 201 respondents were randomly assigned to the true control condition, and 72 respondents were randomly assigned learned helplessness condition, only.

Sample 3. This is another MTurk sample of U.S. adults, recruited from MTurk through TurkPrime. Within this sample, 3,696 U.S. adults over the age of 18 were recruited during the week leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (November 3 - 8, 2016). This data collection effort included two survey experiments: 1) income inequality discussed in Chapter 4, and 2) elite polarization discussed in Chapter 5. Respondents were not assigned to overlapping survey conditions, so the analyses presented here from Sample 3 focus on the 731 respondents randomly assigned to the control condition. Respondents from previous MTurk samples were prevented from participating in this data collection effort.

Sample 4. This sample was collected as part of a large, multi-investigator panel study conducted by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota during the 2016 Presidential Election. The CSPP Presidential Election Panel Study (CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves prior to the election and one post-election wave. This data collection effort recruited 3,552 U.S. citizens using Survey Sampling International (SSI).

The first pre-election wave was conducted July 1 - 18, 2016. The second wave was administered September 10 - 16, 2016, wave three was collected between October 20 - October 29, 2016, and wave four measures were administered post-election, November 7 - 10, 2016. Attrition from wave 1 (n= 3,552) to wave 4 (n=1,713) for participants who responded to all of my measures was approximately 39%. In wave 2, Sample 4 also includes my elite polarization survey experiment and a learned helplessness experiment.

The analyses reported for Sample 4 have been weighted to approximate national representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative proportional fitting procedure proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights adjust the observed data to match several different known population parameters, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, education, and income. As a few weights can be quite large, weight scores were truncated at 5.0, following general practices. The raked weights reflect distributions similar to other gold standard surveys, such as the American National Election Studies.

Sample 5. This sample was collected as a University of Minnesota 1,000-person module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in collaboration with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders. Brief measures of key dissertation items were included, with the exception of a measure of external efficacy, which was excluded from the 2016 CCES Common Content (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). Particularly, a brief measure (five items) of learned helplessness on the pre- and post-election waves of a 1,000-person module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). Analyses from this sample include other brief disaffection measures, plus demographic measures included within the CCES Common Content. The pre-election wave of the

2016 CCES was fielded in October and the post-election wave was fielded in November 2016 through YouGov. The analyses for this sample presented in this chapter are also weighted using raked weights to approximate national representativeness.

As noted above, these samples included survey experiments. To summarize, Samples 2, 3 and 4 included elite polarization experiments. Samples 2 and 4 included learned helplessness experiments and Sample 3 also included an income inequality survey experiment. The manipulations may be found in Appendices C, D, and E, and are discussed in depth in Chapters 3-5. The remaining sections of this chapter explore the correlates and predictors of political disaffection and demonstrate the ways in which learned helplessness is distinct from the measures of political disaffection.

Measurement: Helplessness and Disaffection Measures

Building off of the dimensionality analysis of disaffection conducted by Gunther and Montero (2006), the four indicators of disaffection were measured. Each of the five samples contain measures of disaffection and learned helplessness, as well as other demographic, attitudinal, and behavioral measures. As survey space can be difficult to obtain, most of the disaffection measures were captured using multiple item indices, but there was some variation across samples. For example, in Samples 4 and 5, which were surveys collected with multiple investigators, it was not possible to get the same number of items onto the surveys to capture the concepts under investigation. Appendix B includes specific question wordings for all survey measures conducted.

As a brief overview, Samples 1-3 included the full 20-item learned helplessness scale, a five-item internal efficacy scale, a four-item external efficacy scale, a four-item generalized trust scale, and a single political interest in national politics item. Sample 4 included the same LHS, trust, and interest measures, but only two-item scales for internal and external efficacy. Sample 5 included a five-item measure of learned helplessness, a single measure of internal efficacy, a four-item measure of generalized trust, and a single national political interest item. Sample 5 did not include a measure of external efficacy.

Learned Helplessness. To measure observed learned helplessness in the surveys, Quinless and McDermott Nelson's (1988) 20-item scale of learned helplessness was included. Ten of the 20 items are reverse coded. On the LHS, respondents indicate their level of agreement on 4-point Likert scales (strongly agree, agree, disagree, and strongly disagree) for questions such as, "No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out the way I want them to," or "When I do not succeed at a task, I do not attempt similar tasks because I feel that I would fail them also." Possible scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores suggesting greater helplessness due to the perception that events are beyond the respondent's control. Respondents who at least "agree" with most statements attain scores above 41. For the analyses presented below, the 20-item scale was placed on a 0-1 scale with standardized and unstandardized Cronbach's alphas of .88, .90, .88, .88, and .88 for the control conditions in Samples 1, 2, and 3, wave one in Sample 4, and pre-election wave in Sample 5, respectively. Figure 2.2 illustrates the kernel density plots of the LHS across the five samples.

[Insert Figure 2.2 Here]

Exploratory factor analyses were conducted across the samples and the 20 helplessness items load overwhelmingly onto one factor across the samples (Sample 1 Eigenvalue 5.55, proportion explained .71; Sample 2 Eigenvalue 6.61, proportion explained .75; Sample 3 Eigenvalue 5.38, proportion explained .75; Sample 4 Eigenvalue 4.84, proportion explained .67; Sample 5 Eigenvalue 2.88, proportion explained 1.13).[8] There were consistent mean differences between ideology and party identification on measures of learned helplessness, such that Democrats and liberals scored significantly higher than Republicans and Conservatives across Samples 2, 3, and 4, but not Samples 1 and 5.[9]

---

[8] Sample 5 includes a brief measure of learned helplessness that includes only five of the 20 items, averaged and rescaled to create a single scale. The five questions are: 1) No matter how much energy I put into a task, I feel I have no control over the outcome; 2) Other people have more control over their success and/or failure than I do; 3) I feel that I have little control over the outcomes of my work; 4) I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks; 5) No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out the way I want them to.

[9] In the control condition in Sample 2, the mean difference between Republicans and Democrats was .05 ($t = 2.42$, $p<.01$) and between conservatives and liberals was .03 ($t = 1.50$, $p<.10$). For the control condition in Sample 3, the mean difference between Republicans and Democrats was .01 ($t = 1.10$, n.s.) and between conservatives and liberals was .02 ($t = 1.70$, $p<.05$). Lastly, in wave 1 of Sample 4, the mean difference

As the LHS is a more generalized measure not directly asking about political helplessness, Sample 3 also included a brief five-item measure of learned helplessness in regards to political outcomes. This index was modeled after the five-items utilized in Sample 5, but were altered such that the emphasis was placed on respondents' abilities to alter political outcomes.[10] In the control condition of Sample 3, these five items have good internal consistency with Cronbach's alpha of .81, standardized and unstandardized. As the disaffection measures are worded to be directly politically relevant, the political learned helplessness index is expected to be highly correlated with the disaffection measures. However, these questions are similar to those that construct the internal and external efficacy measures, so it is possible that this index is not tapping into individuals' political learned helplessness, but rather their internal and external efficacy. In fact, in the control condition of Sample 3, the political learned helplessness measure is significantly

---

between Republicans and Democrats was .01 ($t = 2.13$, $p<.05$) and between conservatives and liberals was .01 ($t = 1.43$, $p<.10$).

[10] The five political learned helplessness items in Sample 3 are: 1) No matter how much energy I put into a politics, I feel I have no control over the outcome; 2) Other people have more control over political successes and/or failures than I do; 3) I feel that I have little control over the political outcomes; 4) I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks related to politics; 5) No matter how hard I try, political outcomes never seem to work out the way I want them to. However, since this was only measured in Sample 3, analyses focus on the LHS measured across multiple samples.

correlated at p<.001 with the other measures in the expected directions (Pearson's correlation coefficients: LHS=.32, internal efficacy=-.33, external efficacy=-.54, trust=-.17, interest=-.29).

Trust. The first of the disaffection measures, trust was measured with a four-item index including trust in government, media, law enforcement, and people in general. This measure is built off of a four-item measure of generalized trust (Miller, Saunders, and Farhart 2015). The trust index is an average of responses to the four questions (each question had four response options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to greater trust) that assessed how much of the time respondents thought that the target of the question can be trusted to do what is right. The index has internal consistency across the five samples (Sample 1 α = .58; Sample 2 α = .50; Sample 3 α = .62; Sample 4 α = .70; Sample 5 α = .61).

Internal Efficacy. This index, which refers to beliefs about people's own competence to understand and participate effectively in politics, combined five items, taken from Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) in Samples 1-3. Each item had five response options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to greater internal efficacy. For the MTurk samples, the internal consistency of the internal efficacy index in the control conditions was quite high (Sample 1 α = .84; Sample 2 α = .88; Sample 3 α = .81). However, due to space on the two large collaborative surveys, Sample 4 included two of the four internal efficacy questions (wave 1 α = .37) and Sample 5 only included only one of the four internal efficacy question. These differences are noted in Appendix B.

External Efficacy. This index, which refers to beliefs about the responsiveness of governmental authorities and institutions to citizen demands, was measured using an average of four items similar to the ANES external political efficacy index (e.g., "People like me don't have any say about what the government does," and "Public officials don't care much what people like me think"). Each item included four response options, coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to greater external efficacy. The index in Samples 1-3 utilize four items, whereas the index in Sample 4 utilizes only two of the four items and Sample 5 does not include a measure of external efficacy. The index shows high internal consistency across the samples (Sample 1 $\alpha = .78$; Sample 2 $\alpha = .81$; Sample 3 $\alpha = .84$; Sample 4 wave 1 $\alpha = .66$).

Political Interest. Across all five samples, political interest was captured using a single measure of interest in national government and politics. In Samples 1-4, this item had five response options, which were coded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values correspond to greater political interest. Sample 5 had slightly different wording, such that respondents were asked as part of the CCES Common Content, "How much of the time are you interested in the news on government and politics?" This item had four response options, which were recoded to range from 0 to 1 such that higher values corresponded to greater interest. The overall average scores on these disaffection measures are shown in Figure 2.3. This figure illustrates that these disaffection measures are quite consistent across the samples. The means are also listed in Table 2.2.

[Insert Figure 2.3 Here]

Overall, the measures perform consistently across the five samples. To demonstrate a first illustration of measurement consistency, Table 2.2 shows the sample means across the five samples. With the exception of a missing measure of external efficacy in Sample 5, the sample means are quite stable, despite sample size variation.

[Insert Table 2.2 Here]

Second, considering that across the samples, most of these measures are scaled and averaged across multiple items, it is important to examine the scales' internal consistency reflected by the scales' Cronbach alpha coefficients. Table 2.3 shows the reliability of the multi-item scales across the five samples. With the exception of the use of fewer items to measure internal and external efficacy in Samples 4 and 5, the internal consistency of the scales is quite consistent and high across the five samples.

[Insert Table 2.3 Here]

Common Correlates

As learned helplessness captures a sense of repeated uncertainty or failure and related loss of control, it is important to acknowledge how it differs from the measures of disaffection. To justify the inclusion of the LHS as a measure that has political consequences beyond the measures of disaffection, bivariate analyses were conducted using pairwise correlations between learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection. These bivariate results are shown in Table 2.4.

[Insert Table 2.4 Here]

It is expected that learned helplessness would be negatively related with the disaffection measures. Bivariate analyses from the samples revealed that the LHS is negatively correlated with internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest, all at least at the $p<.05$ levels and in the expected directions. The only two exceptions were in Samples 4 and 5 between LHS and generalized trust which were not statistically significant and between LHS and external efficacy in Sample 4, which was only marginally statistically significant ($p<.10$). The bivariate correlations presented in Table 2.4 provide evidence of discriminant validity that learned helplessness is associated to the measures of disaffection, as reflected in the significant correlations, but that it can be distinguished from these measures, as the correlations are not large.

It is also expected that these five measures would not load onto the same underlying factor. If factor analyzed using confirmatory factor analysis, the disaffection measures and learned helplessness load on separate factors, as we would expect from the factor analysis conducted on internal and external efficacy and trust (Craig, Niemi, and Silver 1990). Since Sample 5 is missing a measure of external efficacy, factor analyses were only conducted on Samples 1-4. Across these four samples, the multiple factor models fit the data better than the single factor models. These factor models were constructed utilizing the factor command, as well as the sem, stand command in Stata 14. Samples 1, and 2 struggled to converge using the structural equation modeling techniques. However, focusing on the analyses using the factor command with orthogonal varimax rotation with Horst normalization, reflect the notion that the multiple factor model is a better fit for the items than the single-factor model.

In Sample 1, the single-factor model produces an eigenvalue of 6.95, explaining 48.8% of the variance. Similarly, in Sample 2, the single-factor model produces an eigenvalue of 7.62, explaining 43.9% of the variance. Sample 3's single-factor model produces an eigenvalue of 6.59, explaining 46.2% of the variance and Sample 4, produces an eigenvalue of 5.17, explaining 49.7% of the variance. Given that these single-factor models explain less than half of the variance, it is reasonable to expect that the items for learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust and interest would load on more than a single factor. Further, as noted above, this expectation in reinforced by findings from Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990), which demonstrates that internal efficacy, external efficacy, and trust load on separate factors. Thus, it is expected that the five-factor model will perform better than the single-factor model across the samples.

To test whether this is the case, we can compare the AIC and BIC goodness of fit-statistics for the single vs. five-factor models in Samples 1-4. In Sample 1, for the single-factor model, the AIC is 4928.44 and the BIC is 5082.29. However, the five-factor model produces an AIC of 1374.58 and a BIC of 2098.58. These goodness-of-fit statistics are smaller in the five-factor model, suggesting a better fit to the data, than the single-factor model. Samples 2-4 produce similar results. In Sample 2, the single-factor model produces an AIC of 1977.25 and a BIC of 2088.36, whereas the five-factor model produces an AIC of 943.29 and a BIC of 1466.15. Similarly, in Sample 3, the single factor model's AIC is 5260.84 and the BIC is 5415.53, and the five-factor model's AIC is 1740.88 and the BIC is 2468.83. Lastly, Sample 4's single factor model produces an AIC of 16254.51 and a BIC of 16431.19, whereas the five-factor model produces an AIC of

2096.10 and a BIC of 2918.60. Consistently across the four samples, the five-factor model is a better fit for the items of learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest, loading on separate factors rather than on a single factor.

Moreover, since the items were measured using different response scales, they have not been standardized and scaled together as a single disaffection measure. Thus, the measures of learned helplessness and disaffection will be included as individual indices, rather than a single index of disaffection in the analyses in the remainder of the dissertation.

Common Predictors

To reinforce the discriminant validity beyond bivariate correlations, common predictors among the measures of learned helplessness and disaffection should also be compared. Again, as the dissertation data does not allow for tests of whether learned helplessness causes disaffection, one method of differentiating these measures cross-sectionally is to evaluate differences across common predictors of learned helplessness and measures of disaffection. Across the samples, as learned helplessness captures the internalization of repeated failures or perceived uncontrollability, it is expected that it would be explained by different demographic and attitudinal predictors than those predicting efficacy, trust, and interest. Utilizing multivariate OLS regression, common

predictors may be compared across samples, allowing the inclusion of multiple demographic covariates.[11]

Tables 2.5-2.9 present OLS models of common predictors for each measure across the five samples However, there is one exception for external efficacy in Sample 5, which was not measured as part of the 2016 CCES. Table 2.10 presents a summary of Tables 2.5-2.9, denoting where the relationship between the predictors and the measure of disaffection was significant in two or more samples.

All of the following models include measures coded 0 to 1 of respondents' level of education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female (coded as 1) or male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as White (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). Appendix B includes the question wording for all variables discussed and within the sample summaries, Appendix A shows the distribution of these demographic variables across the five samples. Additionally, since learned helplessness is negatively related to the measures of disaffection, it has been reverse coded in the following set of models, so that 0 reflects

[11] As with the sample means reported above, the common predictor analyses reflect unweighted OLS models for Samples 1-3 control conditions from these cross-sectional surveys and Wave 1 or pre-election weighted analyses for Samples 4 and 5. *N*s reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.

high learned helplessness and 1 reflects low learned helplessness. This should allow for more direct comparison between the measures in Tables 2.5-2.10.

[Insert Table 2.5 Here]

[Insert Table 2.6 Here]

[Insert Table 2.7 Here]

[Insert Table 2.8 Here]

[Insert Table 2.9 Here]

Across the five samples, there are some consistent predictors. However, it is clear that the predictors do differ across the measures. Table 2.10 presents a summary of the Tables 2.5-2.9, where the predictors presented a statistically significant relationship in two or more samples. The statistically significant, positive relationships are represented by a (+) and the statistically significant, negative relationships are represented by a (-).

[Insert Table 2.10 Here]

From Table 2.10, it is clear that the demographic predictors of learned helplessness differ from the measures of disaffection. Across the samples, controlling for other demographics, as income increases, learned helplessness decreases (since it is reverse coded for the sake of comparison), and internal efficacy and trust increase. Increased education is related to a reduction in learned helplessness and greater internal and external efficacy, as well as greater trust and interest in politics. Women experience less internal efficacy and interest across the samples. Age is positively related to decreased learned helplessness and greater internal efficacy, trust, and political interest.

Lastly, the main effects of race and ethnicity on the measures across the samples should be interpreted carefully. Controlling for other demographics, identifying as Hispanic, Latino, or of Spanish descent is related to lower internal efficacy. This is only marginally significant in Sample 3, a larger MTurk convenience sample, and is statistically significant at $p<.05$ level in Sample 5, the weighted CCES sample. Additionally, controlling for other demographics, White respondents were shown to have lower external efficacy. However, this is only significant in Sample 1 and marginally significant in Sample 2, both of which are unweighted MTurk convenience samples, and Sample 2's control condition is small.

Taken together, it is possible that these relationships may be more complicated and conditional than the main effects suggest. The next chapter addresses this particularly for learned helplessness. Regardless, the summary presented in Table 2.10 illustrates additional discriminant validity evidence in support of the ways in which learned helplessness is differentiated from the measures of disaffection. While learned helplessness can be viewed as related to but different from the existing measures of disaffection, the next section turns to a demonstration of how learned helplessness also assists in explaining cynicism attitudes, as well as democratic (dis)satisfaction.

Cynicism and Democratic (Dis)satisfaction

As measures of disaffection have been shown to predict measures of cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and general attitudes toward the federal government (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Clarke, Kornberg, and Scotto 2010; Di Palma 1970; Hetherington

2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006; Tyler 2001), it is worth demonstrating how learned helplessness may also predict these attitudes. This will provide further justification that learned helplessness should be considered as politically consequential, despite not asking politically oriented questions. The OLS analyses that follow report results from Samples 1-4, as measures of cynicism and democratic satisfaction were not available in Sample 5, the 2016 CCES module.

Cynicism. To demonstrate the impact of these measures on cynicism, three questions were evaluated. First, in three samples, respondents were asked, "How often do politicians lie?" This measure was recoded from 0-1 so that higher values corresponded to responses that politicians lie most or all of the time. This question was present in Samples 1, 2, and 3. Second, an index was created measuring perspectives on how crooked government officials are. The following items were placed on a 0-1 scale and averaged, with a Cronbach's alpha of .65, .63, and .64, across the control conditions of Samples 1-3, respectively. Sample 4 only included a single question regarding federal government officials. The items averaged together were: "Do you think that quite a few of the people running your federal/local government are crooked, not very many are crooked, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked?" Lastly in all four samples, respondents were asked whether, "Having elections makes the government pay attention to what people think." Responses were recoded from 0-1 so that higher values corresponded to agreement that elections lead the government to pay more attention to the people. Table 2.11 shows the average scores of the cynicism measures.

[Insert Table 2.11 Here]

Democratic Satisfaction. A fourth measure, similar to the three cynicism measures, was asked of respondents in Samples 1-3, "On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United States?" Respondents were given four response options from "very satisfied" to "not at all satisfied" and the responses were recoded to range from 0-1 so that higher values correspond to greater satisfaction. Across the two MTurk samples, mean satisfaction varied slightly (Sample 1 mean = .45, std. dev. = .24; Sample 2 mean = .44, std. dev. = .27; and Sample 3 mean = .47, std. dev. = .25), also reported in Table 2.12.

[Insert Table 2.12 Here]

Government Feeling Thermometer. Fifth, a feeling thermometer, similar to the trust in government measure, was asked in Samples 1-3. Respondents were asked to rate the federal government on a 0 to 100 scale, where lower values are less favorable or warm toward the federal government and higher values reflect greater favorability or warmth toward the federal government. The mean for Sample 1 was 38.28 (std. dev. = 23.73), and Sample 2 was 37.23 (std. dev. = 24.59); whereas Sample 3 was slightly higher (mean = 39.83, std. dev = 24.47), also reported in Table 2.13.

[Insert Table 2.13 Here]

Taking these measures together, to further illustrate learned helplessness' relevance in explaining politically consequential attitudes, the three measures of cynicism were regressed on learned helplessness (LHS) and demographic controls. Tables 2.14-2.18 present these OLS regression models. Within these Tables, Samples 1-3 report coefficients for the control condition only from the cross-sectional surveys. Sample 4

coefficients reflect wave 1 measures, which were administered in a separate wave from one of the survey experiments discussed in later chapters. Beyond demographic controls, LHS inconsistently predicts cynicism, dissatisfaction with U.S. democracy, and feelings toward the federal government.

First, regarding the measures of cynicism, from Table 2.14, LHS significantly predicts perceptions of how often politicians lie in Sample 3 only (b_1=.06, n.s.; b_2=.11, n.s.; b_3=.17, $p<.01$). Second, Table 2.15 shows that LHS is a significant predictor of perceptions that people in government (federal and local) being crooked in Samples 1 and 3, such that higher learned helplessness corresponds to a perception that many people in government are crooked (b_1=.14, $p<.10$; b_2=.11, n.s.; b_3=.21, $p<.01$; b_4=-.07, n.s.). Lastly, learned helplessness is significantly, negatively related to perceptions that elections make the government pay attention to what people think in Samples 1, 3, and 4 (b_1=-.18, $p<.01$; b_2=-.18, n.s.; b_3=-.22, $p<.01$; b_4=-.12, $p<.05$), such that as learned helplessness increases, agreement that elections make the government pay attention decreases.

As for satisfaction with the way democracy works in the U.S., learned helplessness is a negative, statistically significant predictor in Samples 2 and 3 (b_1=-.06, n.s.; b_2=-.31, $p<.05$; b_3=-.23, $p<.01$) – as learned helplessness increases, democratic satisfaction decreases. Lastly, regarding feelings toward the federal government, the federal government feeling thermometer was regressed on learned helplessness to show that less favorable feelings toward the federal government are predictive of higher learned helplessness. (b_1=-4.44, n.s.; b_2=-5.33, n.s.; b_3=-17.73, $p<.05$). Since there is some variability in the significance of these relationships, it is possible that the measures

from Samples 1 and 3 are significant where they are not in Sample 2 due to sample size limitations in the control condition or the timing of the sample data collection.

[Insert Table 2.14 Here]

[Insert Table 2.15 Here]

[Insert Table 2.16 Here]

[Insert Table 2.17 Here]

[Insert Table 2.18 Here]

In addition to the bivariate association with the measures of disaffection, across the various measures of cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and feelings about government, learned helplessness helps to explain politically consequential attitudes toward government and politicians, expressive of frustration with the existing political system. The next section sets up for the crux of the dissertation: who experiences greater learned helplessness and how does learned helplessness impact engagement with (or disengagement from) political activities.

Causes of Learned Helplessness: Who's Helpless?

Before moving to the explicit hypotheses, it is important to evaluate who is more likely to experience learned helplessness. Table 2.19 illustrates the regression models across the three samples. Utilizing ordinary least squares regression, across the five samples, income (b_1=-.07, p<.01; b_2=-.08, p<.05; b_3=-.10, p<.01; b_4=-.06, p<.01; b_5=-.11, p<.01) and age (b_1=-.07, p<.05; b_2=-.12, p<.01; b_3=-.02, n.s.; b_4=-.10, p<.01; b_5=-.15,

$p<.01$) are consistent significant predictors of learned helplessness, controlling for basic demographics, authoritarianism, as well as party identification and ideology.

The models in Table 2.19 include measures for the following (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female, coded as 1 or male, coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic, coded as 1 or not, coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as White, coded as 1, or not, coded as 0).

The models also include measures of partisan identification, with two dummy variables, one coded "1" for Republicans versus Democrats and independents, and the second coded 1 for Democrats versus Republicans and independents. These allow independents to be the reference category in the OLS models. A recoded 0-1 measure of political ideology is also included, where 0 represents "Extremely liberal" and 1 represents "Extremely conservative." Also, as authoritarianism has been connected to conservative ideology and conservative ideology (rather than liberal ideology) has been found to satisfy "epistemic needs to attain certainty, order, and structure" (Jost et al. 2013: 236), the child-rearing scale is included at a potential predictor of learned helplessness. [12] Lastly, an attitudinal measure of whether respondents perceive

[12] Further, Cheung and Kwok (1996) found that among first-year college students in Hong Kong that conservative orientations (authoritarianism being one orientation identified) leads to feelings of hopelessness (a form of helplessness identified by the

themselves to be on the losing side of politics is also included in the models, where 0 represents the perception that their side has been winning more often than losing in politics and 1 represents the perception that their side has been losing more often than winning in politics. Appendix B includes the question wording for all variables discussed and Appendix A shows the distribution of the demographic control variables across the samples.

To provide examples of graphic representations of these relationships, Figure 2.4 illustrates the relationship between learned helplessness and income and Figure 2.5 illustrates the relationship between learned helplessness and age. Both of these images are generated from Model 4 in Table 2.19. This model was selected to be demonstrative as the analyses include the largest N and the model was weighted to approximate national representativeness. Thus, as people's level of income increases or as they age, their feelings of learned helplessness decrease. In Sample 4, moving from the minimum value of income to the maximum value of income, there is a 7% decrease in learned helplessness. Moving from the minimum age in Sample 4 (18 years of age) to the maximum (93 years of age), there is a 10% decrease in learned helplessness. These factors may coincide with work that points to the crystallization of political attitudes and consistency of behaviors as one ages, thus reducing political uncertainty and clarifying political identities.

[Insert Table 2.19 Here]

---

authors). See Stenner (2005) and Feldman and Stenner (1997) for a greater discussion of authoritarianism.

[Insert Figure 2.4 Here]

[Insert Figure 2.5 Here]

Additionally, in Samples 2 and 3 (b_1=-.05, p<.05; b_3=-.03, p<.05), identifying as white, rather than non-white is negatively related to learned helplessness. This is fitting theoretically, as individuals from marginalized communities, particularly those related to non-white racial identity, are expected to experience greater learned helplessness. Figure 2.6 displays this relationship in Samples 2 and 3. Lastly, in Samples 3, 4, and 5, feeling as if one is on the losing side of politics is positively related to learned helplessness (b_3=.03, p<.01; b_4=.02, p<.05, respectively; b_5=.04, p<.10, respectively). Figure 2.7 illustrates this relationship graphically across samples 3, 4, and 5.

[Insert Figure 2.6 Here]

[Insert Figure 2.7 Here]

The measures of disaffection were also included in Table 2.19 to demonstrate the complex and interrelated relationship between learned helplessness and disaffection. As expected, above and beyond all controls and the measures of disaffection, increased internal efficacy is highly predictive of decreased learned helplessness in Samples 1-4. In Samples 1 and 3, increased external efficacy is also predictive of lower learned helplessness. Similarly, in Samples 2, 3, and 4, an increase in interest is predictive of lower learned helplessness. While in Samples 2 and 3 an increase in trust is significantly predictive of a decrease in learned helplessness as expected, in Sample 4, increased trust is actually significantly related to an increase in learned helplessness. This is unexpected based upon the theory of disaffection and also evident in the non-significant bivariate

correlations for Sample 4 discussed above. While Sample 4 was collected by a survey organization, Survey Sampling International, it is possible that the sample collected is an anomaly or it is possible that when the responses were collected, something occurred to influence respondents' trust in an unexpected direction. However, the latter is unlikely. Again, with the current data, it is impossible to establish directions of causality among these variables. However, given the evidence presented here, it seems clear that they are empirically linked.

While Table 2.19 clearly assessed the demographic predictors of learned helplessness, by following the learned helplessness literature, other uncontrollable situations may also influence how helpless people feel. In Sample 3, respondents were asked three items to capture a few of the experiences that may increase learned helplessness (all rescaled to range from 0 to 1). The first measure asked respondents if they were pulled over by law enforcement officials, how negative were those experiences on a 1-5 scale from "Extremely positive" to "Extremely negative." The second measure asked respondents if they had to go to a government official to explain an issue, how much consideration would the government official give to the respondent. This was on a scale of 1-5, ranging from "I wouldn't say anything" to "A great deal of consideration." The last measure asked respondents about their experiences with government programs. The focus here is on experiences of the respondent and the respondent's family's experience with welfare. Respondents were asked whether they had received welfare. Dummy variables were created where respondents said that 1 "yes" they had received welfare and 0 if they had not.

As it is expected, Table 2.20 demonstrates that for people who had increasingly negative experiences with being pulled over, learned helplessness increased. This is the case in the bivariate model (Model 1, b=.06, p<.01), as well as above and beyond demographic controls (Model 2, b=.05, p<.01), as well as beyond the measures of disaffection when they are included in the model (Model 3, b=0.04, p<.01). As concern grows over law enforcement, their use of force, and media coverage of greater occurrences of negative experiences with law enforcement, it makes sense that those who have greater negative experiences with law enforcement officials during traffic stops also experience greater learned helplessness. However, since this is a cross-sectional dataset, no conclusions about causal ordering may be made, as these respondents may have felt helpless prior to their negative experiences.

[Insert Table 2.20 Here]

For Table 2.21 it is expected that respondents who feel that their concerns would be given greater consideration by government officials, they would feel less learned helplessness. In fact, these models reflect that expectation. In the bivariate model, as perceived consideration increases, respondents feel less helpless (b=-.12, p<.01). When demographic controls or the disaffection measures are included, a significant, negative relationship between perceived consideration and learned helplessness is apparent (Model 2, b=-.10, p<.01; Model 3, b=-.07, p<.01). As expected from the learned helplessness literature, feeling as if one has greater control over the ability to get a government official to listen would decrease learned helplessness.

[Insert Table 2.21 Here]

Last, in a similar way that we would expect resources, such as income, to impact feelings of learned helplessness, Table 2.22 illustrates that for respondents who are receiving needs-based assistance from the government, i.e., welfare assistance, also experience greater learned helplessness. This expectation stems from Kane (1987) who shows that the perception of lack of personal control and learned helplessness are common among Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) recipients. Decades later, in Sample 3, this is evident in Model 1, the bivariate model ($b=.03$, $p<.01$), as well as when demographic controls are included (Model 2, $b=.02$, $p<.01$) and when disaffection measures are included (Model 3, $b=.02$, $p<.01$). Like with the first example, there is no way to tell whether respondents felt helpless prior to receiving welfare assistance, or as a result of receiving welfare assistance. However, this is interesting to note that, at least in correlational analyses, respondents who receive welfare assistance experience greater learned helplessness. This would be as expected from the learned helplessness literature, as Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) identify experiencing poverty is one of the truest examples of learned helplessness.[13]

[Insert Table 2.22 Here]

Thus, considering the predictors of learned helplessness explored above, in addition to the relationships with the existing measures of disaffection and the explanatory power demonstrated across the various measures of cynicism, democratic

[13] Further, this evidence carries implications for engagement in voting behavior, as Schlotzman, Verba, and Brady (2012) found that only 6% who received support from means-tested programs reported as having voted.

satisfaction, and feelings about government, we can consider learned helplessness to be politically consequential. Given this evidence, we may now move to our broader theoretical framework for the dissertation regarding how learned helplessness impacts exit or voice through civic engagement and participation.

To Vote or Not To Vote: Feeling Helpless and Disaffected, Protest Instead?

As this dissertation is concerned with the consequences of learned helplessness on (dis)engagement with instrumental and expressive political activities, this section builds from the *exit*, *voice*, and *loyalty* framework proposed by Hirschman (1970). Much of the work on American political behavior focuses on engagement or disengagement with political activities which serve to affect and incrementally change the existing political system through action set to fulfill instrumental goals, e.g., registering and turning out to vote. These activities may be considered instrumental, in many ways, such that these activities are structured and responsive to the existing representative political system in the U.S. Instrumental political behavior, such as voting behavior, seeks to accomplish a specific, often self-interested, goal, i.e., a voter likes a candidate so they turn out and vote for the preferred candidate. However, another area of political behavior literature studies how people engage politically, beyond the institutional electoral system, utilizing more expressive actions, by sending social or public signals through engagement. One of the most prominent of these expressive activities is attending rallies, marching, or protesting.

Piven and Cloward (2000) find that the United States is the only major democratic nation in which the less-well-off, as well as the young and minorities, are substantially

underrepresented in the electorate. Further, they point to ways in which institutions intended to make registration and voting easier, as well as the political parties themselves, have contributed to demobilizing the electorate, rather than improving access. For people who have been historically and systemically marginalized, un- and under-represented, or those who have experienced multiple political losses, they receive feedback through these experiences that inform them that they cannot get what they need from the existing system, and consequently, cannot get what they need by participating within the existing system. So, what options might they take?

Taking lessons from the learned helplessness literature in the academic domain, for example, students who believe their academic failure reflects their low ability and lack of skills, they struggle to reverse school failure (Filippello et al. 2015). Yet, when students are trained to not attribute their failures to ability, but instead to lack of effort, students' reactions to failure are improved as is their academic performance (Dweck 1975). Thus, it may be expected that for those who experience greater learned helplessness, they may be likely to disengage from the existing electoral system and not participate in the aforementioned instrumental political activities. If they feel as if they are unable to fulfill their instrumental goals or that the political outcomes are truly uncontrollable, they may engage in more expressive actions to reassert control. Thus, alternatively, they may turn to avenues outside of the institutional political system to voice their opinions and grievances.

Democracies are largely built around the act of voting. Voting "is the manner the state provides for citizens to express their displeasure or satisfaction with government

policies, collectively. To rely only on this form of conventional participation, however, means that citizens must wait until the next election before they can offer opinions" (Crozat 1998: 59). Additionally, when voting does not produce desired outcomes, repeatedly, or when people are demobilized, they learn that the vote outcomes are largely uncontrollable. While voting may be more of a blunt instrument, to pass judgment on candidates and their platforms, it is much more difficult to express approval or unhappiness with specific policies or to recommend alternatives through the act of voting. While more conventional activities, like sending a letter to or calling an elected representative may provide an opportunity to do this, these actions may be less effectual than other "louder" actions that draw greater attention. This may particularly be the case for members of the electorate who have been marginalized or demobilized, or even for those who are less knowledgeable about the democratic system.

Thus, more expressive activities like rallying, marching, and protesting can be used by any group to convey specific and timely feedback, providing a voice without elections (Crozat 1998; Tilly 1983). Protesting behavior generally has been perceived as "politics by other means," providing an alternative way of influencing public decisions (McCarthy and McPhail 1998). This form of democratic responsiveness can express strong informational cues to the government to change federal policies, particularly for minority groups engaged in protest actions, such as those that took place during the Civil Rights Era (Gillion 2013). The power behind protesting behavior lies in its public nature and its ability to disrupt normal routines, gathering attention from political elites, with the goal of having authorities respond to protesters' demands (McCarthy and McPhail 1998).

However, protesting activities may range from actions confirming to norms of the existing social system, e.g., petitioning and taking part in a demonstration, to actions that challenge or violate existing social norms, e.g., illegal protests and civil disobedience (Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam 1990), which may impact the way in which the government and political actors respond.

Classic work on protesting behavior posited that people participate in protest to express grievances stemming from relative deprivation, frustration, or perceived injustice (Berkowitz 1972; Gurr 1970; Lind and Tyler 1988). Alternative work points to ways in which efficacy, resources, and opportunities predict protest participation (Klandermans 1984; McAdam 1982; McCarthy and Zald 1977), along with the role of collective politicized group identities (Klandermans and De Weerd 2000; Klandermans 2014; van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010). The more effective people believe the protest activity will be in addressing their grievances with a reasonable cost, the more likely they are to participate (Klandermans 1984, 1997).

Most related to the investigation of learned helplessness, disaffection, and protest behavior, is prior work on efficacy, cynicism and political unrest. As such, efficacy is treated in a slightly different manner than outlined above, as the belief that individual actions may alter political conditions or policies through protest (Gamson 1992). In the comparative context, highly efficacious people tend to engage in more normative protest activities, such as petitioning or attending demonstrations; whereas low efficacious people are more likely to engage in actions such as civil disobedience (Tausch et al.,

2011). Similarly, Klandermans et al. (2008) finds that those who are high in cynicism and feel that they have been unjustly treated, are the most likely to engage in protest behavior.

Post-World War II in the U.S. and Western Europe, the mostly stable social and political life of the 1950s was replaced by social unrest, political protest, and social movements into the 1960s and 1970s (Gundelach 1995). Regardless of whether protest behavior has become more accepted over time (see Crozat 1998 and Kaase and Newton 1995 for opposite findings in this debate), beyond the 1970s, protest behavior in the U.S. has become more incorporated into the repertoire of political action, particularly less contentious protest actions, such as boycotts, petitions, and marches. Considering the current contentious and polarized political environment in the U.S., predicting whether someone is likely to participate in instrumental or expressive activities can be complicated, taking into account individual demographic differences, personal experiences, and specific attitudes about democracy and government.

Thus, when can we expect someone to turn out to vote versus turn out to a rally or protest (or engage in both)? How can we predict when people feel like they can support the existing system and voice their opinions through a vote? How can we predict when people feel like they cannot get what they need from the existing system and need to voice and express their opinions through another avenue? To capture how repeated or consistent experiences of uncontrollability, inability, or failure spill over to the political domain, this dissertation turns to the concept of learned helplessness and its effects on political behavior.

Borrowing the frame of *exit*, *voice*, and *loyalty* from Hirschman (1970), the dissertation explores when people are likely to participate or disengage in political situations. Applying Hirschman's model to the contemporary U.S. political context, the government provides services to its people and when its people are disappointed or dissatisfied with how it is operating, people have two choices: exit or voice. While exit and voice may signal decline, they can also operate as feedback mechanisms so that the government remains in good health.

Exit. In the economic sense, if customers are displeased with a product they stop buying a firm's product or if members of an organization are dissatisfied with the quality of the organization, they leave the organization. In a political context, if citizens are dissatisfied with the way government is operating, they can either opt out of voting within the existing system or choose a more extreme action and leave the country. Additionally, exit does not necessarily need to be a physical action. Rather, it can be psychological or emotional, if people are unable or unwilling to voice their dissatisfaction. Hirschman's concept of dissatisfaction stems from an instrumental perspective, such that customers, workers, or even citizens operate from a place of self-interest and seek self-interested outcomes. This applies to learned helplessness, for those who have experienced repeated failures to accomplish a desired instrumental outcome, they are more likely to exit from the existing system and not participate in instrumentally-oriented political activities, such as registering and turning out to vote.

Voice. As with exit, in the economic sense for voice, when customers of a firm or members of an organization are dissatisfied, they express these opinions to management

or anyone who cares to listen. Voice serves as an alternative to exit, such that customers, members, or citizens must weigh the tradeoffs from the certainty of exit against the uncertainties of an improvement in the deteriorated product or democratic system, as well as their ability to influence the outcome (Hirschman 1970: 77). Within a democratic system, depending on its decline and how people view dissatisfaction, voice may operate through turning out to vote to support the existing system or through protesting to voice greater displeasure and need for change.

Voice is a far more "messy" concept, as "it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest" (Hirschman 1970: 16). In the U.S. context, for those have experienced greater learned helplessness, which may be evidenced by identity with historically and systemically marginalized groups, feeling under or un-represented by the existing political system, or feeling as if they are always on the losing side of politics, the expectation is that these individuals may turn to expressive activities, e.g., rallying or protesting, over instrumental political activities.

When people are dissatisfied with their government, it is unlikely that they will chose to move to another country. "If one's own government deteriorates one does not usually 'go over' to another… Because exit has an essential role to play in restoring quality performance of government, just as in any organization. It will operate either by making the government reform or by bringing it down, but in any event, the jolt provoked by clamorous exit of a respected member is in many situations an indispensable complement to voice" (Hirschman 1970: 117). Rather, they are more likely to make an

effort to revitalize the system and voice their grievances, providing space for exit and voice to work in conjunction with one another.

Loyalty. Democratic systems need both exit and voice to healthfully persist. The way in which people utilize exit or voice may be a function of their loyalty to the system. For firms and organizations, loyalty operates like a special attachment to a firm's products or an organization's mission. For democracies, loyalty attachments may function through feelings of patriotism, or even attachment to one political party over the other. Theoretically, loyalty may prevent complete exiting, allowing people to select forms of voice. However, this may depend on people's ability to exert influence and pressure toward addressing their grievances.

In examining the effects of learned helplessness on political activity, this dissertation posits that learned helplessness may shape how attached people are to the democratic system in the U.S. Helplessness results when preferred outcomes are perceived to be improbable and uncontrollable, or aversive outcomes are perceived to be highly likely, and people believe that their actions are unlikely to change the outcome (Abramson et al. 1978). For those who feel they are well-served, well-represented, and able to achieve what they need and want in the existing U.S. democratic system, they are likely to be well attached to the system and may voice their opinions through instrumental political actions, e.g., voting behavior. However, for those who feel they are under or un-represented by the existing political system, on the losing side of politics, or are member to historically or systemically marginalized groups, their attachment to the existing system is expected to be much more tenuous, leading them to opt out of

instrumental political activities, e.g., voting, and potentially voice opinions through other more socially expressive means, e.g., rallying or protesting, depending on the extent of grievances and feelings of injustice.

Discussion

As this dissertation seeks to explore the causes and consequences of disaffection, this chapter began by discussing and illustrating that general feelings that stem from experiences of repeated failure and loss of control, differ from measures of disaffection are politically consequential. This concept is captured by a measure borrowed from psychology, learned helplessness. Not previously studied in the political context, the 20-item learned helplessness scale from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988) was applied in this chapter and will be applied in the remaining dissertation. To demonstrate that learned helplessness differs from the disaffection, this chapter utilized five survey samples to show consistent and significant bivariate relationships between the measures in the expected directions. The only exception was between learned helplessness and trust in Samples 4 and 5.

The chapter then illustrated that while learned helplessness is significantly related to disaffection, the bivariate correlations are not large. Theoretically, it is expected that feelings of helplessness occur prior to feelings of political disaffection. However, the current dissertation data is unable to test this causality. One additional way to differentiate helplessness from disaffection was to demonstrate that these measures have different demographic predictors, which suggests that these concepts are distinct from

one another. The chapter also sought to demonstrate that learned helplessness has implications for politically consequential attitudes. Thus, the chapter tested whether helplessness would predict cynicism, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward the federal government. While not overwhelmingly consistent across multiple samples, learned helplessness did predict, in the expected direction in at least one sample, attitudes about how often politicians lie, perceptions about how many of the government officials were crooked, whether elections make the government pay attention to the needs of the people, democratic satisfaction, and attitudes toward government.

There are likely numerous potential explanations for what causes learned helplessness and political disaffection. This chapter explored some of the demographic, attitudinal, and experiential predictors of learned helplessness, as the LHS has not been widely used in survey work. The most robust and consistent predictors of learned helplessness were income and age. As people earn more money or live in a household with a greater household income, their reported learned helplessness decreases. There is no question that employment, mobility, earning potential, and other aspects of class create an overall feeling of economic security, or lack thereof. Further, level of income has long been identified as one of the greatest predictors of whether someone is likely to engage in instrumental behavior, i.e., voting behavior. Additionally, as people age, they showed less learned helplessness. There is a possibility that as the aging process continues and potential negative health diagnoses are received, that learned helplessness would increase. The data in this dissertation cannot speak to that, however.

Learned helplessness stems from experiences with uncontrollable situations, where people learn that they cannot change a current or similar future uncontrollable situation and thus respond with passive behavior. In the political context, being low income, from a historically or systemically marginalized and subordinated group, or experiencing repeated political losses could affect learned helplessness. Moreover, experiences with government institutions, such as the law enforcement and justice systems or government assistance programs may also shape feelings of learned helplessness. This chapter demonstrated that this is the case. In Sample 3, people who had negative experiences with being pulled over showed greater learned helplessness than those who did not have negative experiences with law enforcement. Also in Sample three, people who had received state or federal government assistance (welfare) also showed greater learned helplessness than those who did not receive assistance.

Despite the deeper dive into the covariates of learned helplessness and disaffection, the causes and consequences of disaffection and learned helplessness are wide and quite numerous. This chapter only scratches the surface. It is clear that learned helplessness, however, stems from experience. Theoretically, it is expected that feelings of helplessness that impact passive behavior are likely to spill over into the political domain and thus, affect political behavior. In applying the discussion of learned helplessness to Hirschman's (1970) theory of *exit*, *voice*, and *loyalty*, it is possible to test when people exit, and disengage from politics, i.e., voting behavior, and choose to voice their opinions and grievances through expressive political action, i.e., marching, rallying, or protesting. For those who are helpless, do they disengage from the conventional,

institutionalized political system and not engage in voting behavior? For those who are helpless, and not getting what they need from the existing political system, do they attempt to reassert some control to cope with the helplessness by engaging in expressive political behavior that goes outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system? To explore these questions, the next chapter first focuses on how learned helplessness is tied to the ways in which people utilize exit or voice through political behavior.

Chapter 3

Disaffected (Dis)Engagement

There are a number of ways that the mass public can "show up" to participate. To show their support for or dissent from the conventional, institutionalized political system, for example, people can turn out to vote, they can write to their elected representatives, or they can donate money to issue and candidate campaigns. However, these conventional activities can limit how people choose to voice their opinions and grievances with the existing political system. Alternatively, they could seek more expressive actions that go outside of the institutionalized political system through actions like rallying, marching and protesting.

Much of the disaffection literature has been politically oriented, but learned helplessness has yet to be examined explicitly in relation to its potential impact on political behavior. The current chapter begins to assess the effects of learned helplessness on engagement in political activities in the contemporary U.S. context. It is expected that people's choice to exit and disengage from the existing political system (choosing not to vote), or their selection for voice utilizing instrumental or expressive political participation (voting or protesting) is a result of feeling helplessness. On one hand, it is expected that people engaging in protesting behavior who feel helpless may hold less clear instrumental goals and view the outcomes as more controllable with greater payoffs, leading to a way to reassert control from feeling helpless. This is opposed to voting behavior, on the other hand, which may be viewed as highly uncontrollable with few

incentives for participation. The application of learned helplessness to explain activity in rallying, marching or protesting behavior, rather than solely explaining passivity and disengagement from political behavior like voting, is a divergence from the classical learned helplessness literature.

To study this divergence further, this chapter anchors the above expectations in the vast participation and voting behavior literature, as well as turning to research on expressive participation activities like rallying, marching, and protesting. Taken together, these literatures ground the chapter so as to better frame the ways in which learned helplessness impacts both exit and voice in contemporary American political behavior. The chapter first discusses some of the challenges with placing an overabundant amount of attention to instrumental voting behavior, as the United States has had a complex and conflictual history. The chapter then turns to a review of the literature to set up the hypotheses to be tested. After the hypotheses are tested, the chapter concludes with a broad discussion of implications for mass political behavior, for the ways in which contextual salience may impact learned helplessness and political behavior.

Democratic Participation in America: Historical and Contemporary Influences

Given the Preamble of the Declaration of Independence, it is seemingly the responsibility of citizens to participate, to drive and shape their government. This implies engagement in more instrumentally-oriented actions, such as voting, but could also echo a call for participation in more expressive activities, harkening back to the Revolutionary War. However, taking a step back, would this Preamble ring as true in the same way

today for all Americans? For a first-time African-American voter? Or, for a Latino immigrant? Or, even for a well-educated, retired White voter? While there are demographic differences in participation and possibly in interpretation, there are also historical influences ingrained into the American democratic system that impact the way in which political participation is expected from and available to different groups.

Since its Founding, America has grappled with two sides of a democratic coin of "inclusion." One side, America is seen as a nation of immigrants. As the Statue of Liberty states, "Give me your tired, your poor,/Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,/The wretched refuse of your teeming shore./Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, I lift my lamp beside the golden door." Yet, on the flip side of the coin, America has struggled with deep racial tensions. The first side implies an open, more pluralistic system supporting and including diverse groups into the political system; the second side reinforces the violent racial and economic friction and lack of political inclusion and power among groups based on ascribed racial and ethnic identity.

The American democratic process and desire for "liberty" have historically excluded racial, ethnic, and gender minorities, leading them to be underrepresented and preventing their political incorporation and influence. It is not always clear whose liberty is preserved, and to what extent, such that, "In society, liberty for one may mean the suppression of liberty for others" (Myrdal 1996: 9). The historical exclusion of particular social groups reduces their ability to seek power and influence. Yet, exclusion is not a distinct experience of only one particular social group. Rather, intersectionality across race, gender, ethnicity, class, immigration status and other subordinated identities lead to

further exclusion, marginalization, subordination, and disenfranchisement. As identities overlap, the bright boundaries of power and influence between social groups are blurred, but also create greater conflict and contradictions within the American political system. These conflicts and exclusions, whether chosen or systematically engrained, have the possibility of resulting in a deep malaise and withdrawal from the political system.

Normatively, the American democratic system is supposed to function in response to its citizens. Assuming that is the case, American citizens have a normative responsibility to respond in-kind and actively engage in their communities, participate in the political process, and turn out to vote to select their representatives. However, historically, and in contemporary context, in the U.S. all who can engage do not, or are prevented from doing so. This is particularly true where participation in the political process can be costly, requiring expendable free time and/or financial resources (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Requirements to dedicate time and energy in learning about the candidates and political issues of the day, as well as the ability to take time off of work or away from family to engage can overburden marginalized and low income communities. Yet, disengagement is not only limited to a lack of resources, or identity from a historically or systemically marginalized group.

Scholars have widely debated whether overall political and civic engagement is in decline. Rates of political participation in the United States have been low for much more

than just the past decade.[14] On one hand, the 2016 Gallup Global Civic Engagement Report ranks the U.S. as second in the world on its civic engagement index, based on more than 145,000 interviews with adults in 140 countries in 2015.[15] However, mediocre turnout has placed the U.S. behind most other developed countries.

On average, 40% of the U.S. voting eligible population does not vote during Presidential elections, and nearly 60% do not cast a ballot during congressional midterm elections. For example, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated that of the 235 million eligible voters in November 2012, approximately 40% (nearly 90 million voters) failed to turn out, and the 2014 midterm elections pointed to the lowest turnout since World War II.[16] Further, in November 2016, some reports note that about 55% of voting age citizens cast

---

[14] According to U.S. Census Bureau statistics, since 1980, voting-age turnout has varied within a 9-percentage-point range – from 48% in 1996, when Bill Clinton was re-elected, to 57% in 2008, when Barack Obama won the White House (Desilver 2017).

[15] Respondents were asked about inclinations to donate time and money, as well as to provide assistance to others in need. The 2016 Gallup Global Civic Engagement Report was released September 19, 2016 (Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/195686/2016-global-civic-engagement-report.aspx).

[16] See DelReal, Jose A. Nov. 10, 2014. "Voter turnout in 2014 was the lowest since WWII." *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/10/voter-turnout-in-2014-was-the-lowest-since-wwii/

ballots; yet, approximately 59% of the voting eligible population turned out to vote, which is nearly commensurate with turnout from 2012.[17]

However, turnout is only one way in which people choose to voice their opinions and grievances with the existing political system. This chapter begins to assess the effects of disaffection, and in particular, learned helplessness. In the political context, it is expected that people's choice to exit and disengage from the existing political system, or their selection for voice utilizing instrumental or expressive political participation is a result of feelings of learned helplessness, which may compound disaffection. Before digging into the hypotheses and tests of whether this is the case observationally and experimentally, the next two sections frame the chapter theoretically. The first explores the instrumental political participation related to voting behavior. The second delves into work on one specific type of expressive political participation, e.g., rallying, marching, and protesting. Taken together, these literatures ground the chapter to better frame how learned helplessness impacts both exit and voice in contemporary American politics.

---

[17] For a discussion of the turnout percentage for the voting age population in 2016, see Wallace, George. Nov. 30, 2016. "Voter turnout at 20-year low in 2016." *CNN Politics.* http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/. For a discussion of the turnout percentage for the voting eligible population in 2016, see Regan, Michael. Nov. 20, 2016. "What does voter turnout tell us about the 2016 election?" *PBS Newshour,* http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/voter-turnout-2016-elections/ and the U.S. Elections Project at University of Florida, http://www.electproject.org/2016g.

To Vote or Not to Vote, That Seems to be the Question

To explain trends in civic and political engagement, scholars of American political behavior have focused on research aimed at determining: 1) who is likely to turn out, and 2) how to temporarily boost voter turnout. In studying turnout, scholars have looked at both demographic and attitudinal variables. Voters are more likely to be from privileged groups, e.g., White, male, older, more educated, and affluent (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), and at the individual level, tend to have higher trust, be more interested in politics, and feel more positive about the system's responsiveness and their own ability to impact political outcomes (Cook and Gronke 2005; Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Hetherington 2005; Timpone 1998). Beyond resources and the characteristics noted above, people with civic skills obtained from employment, religious involvement, or volunteering for nonpolitical organizations, e.g. writing letters, oral communication, or planning meetings, are more likely to participate (Verba et al. 1995).

Due to considerable demographic differences in turnout, scholars have sought ways to boost turnout, e.g., by matching Get Out the Vote (GOTV) canvassers' race and ethnicity with demographic backgrounds of potential voters (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012), or by inducing social pressure to overcome low interest in elections by using direct mail GOTV campaigns sharing neighbors' voting records (Green and Gerber 2008; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008), since voting in one election can increase the likelihood of voting in the future (Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003). Yet, despite substantial strides to advance mobilization, turnout and civic engagement are still relatively low on average.

Mediocre civic engagement and low turnout would be less problematic if those who voted were demographically and attitudinally similar to those who do not. Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) originally concluded voters were approximately representative of nonvoters on policy issues. However, more recent work demonstrates this is no longer the case. While voter preferences predict aggregate Senator roll-call behavior, nonvoter preferences do not (Griffin and Newman 2005). If nonvoters were to vote, consensus around issue attitudes would likely shift, leading campaign content to change in response (Highton and Wolfinger 2001). Further, voters and nonvoters hold different attitudes on economic and redistributive issues, underscoring how turnout demographics have changed since 1972 (Leighley and Nagler 2014). Indeed, "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent" (Schattschneider 1960: 35). Yet, variables that often explain participation do not do enough to help us understand nonvoters and those who are disengaged.

Racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the community do not explain overall group differences in participation (Logan, Darrah, Oh 2012). Relatedly, variables found to be highly correlated with participation at the cross-sectional level do not adequately explain individual-level variation in political behavior over time. In particular, resources (income, employment, and education), mobilization (contact by a political party), and political engagement (interest in and attention to politics) vary too slowly over time to be able to explain the variability in participation (Miller and Saunders 2015).

While these individual factors have been found to widely influence turnout, many models of political behavior are anchored on instrumental explanations, particularly in regard to voting behavior. As instrumental behavior is inherently self-interested and goal oriented, many political scientists have considered voting behavior as instrumental. For example, the Downsian model assumes that a person's vote has value only insofar as it helps push their preferred candidate over the top (Downs 1957). Riker and Ordeshook (1968), as well as Fiorina (1976) suggested that voting behavior may be both instrumental and expressive, such that voters may want to not only influence the outcome of the election, but they want to express their opinions about the candidates, the policies the candidates represent, and may want to signal publically that they did their "duty" to support the democratic system.

Importantly, the difference between instrumental and expressive political behavior lies in the different rewards or outcomes sought. Particularly, expressive political behaviors are not instrumentally outcome-related. As such, it is possible that learned helplessness may shape people's motives to participate with instrumental or expressive motives in mind. For the broader discussion herein, the dissertation will consider voting behavior as more instrumental than expressive, but acknowledges that voting can be expressive under certain circumstances. Tying instrumental and expressive behavior to exit and voice, the, scholarly literature still has space to study when and why people voice their opinions and grievances through engagement in voting behavior, compared to when they exit.

Rallying, Marching, Protesting: Voice of a Different Nature

For people who are not well represented by the political system or by their elected officials, what options for engagement do they have to express and voice their opinions and grievances? Those who are feel helpless or politically disaffected—people who feel the political system does not serve them—are less likely to turn to methods of political engagement that supports the existing system, as their efforts to change the system are likely to be ineffectual. These more instrumental of political acts, like registering and turning out to vote, writing letters to their elected officials, or volunteering for campaigns, may lead people to feel that they cannot impact the existing system. These feelings of uncontrollability may also disproportionately affect members of communities that have been marginalized and subordinated within the conventional, institutionalized political system. As instrumental political actions continue to fail or remain uncontrollable, people may turn to less instrumental and more expressive activities outside of the political system, such as volunteering with community organizations or attending rallies, marches, and protests, to reassert control.

Taking feet to the streets is not new in the U.S., particularly for historically marginalized and subordinated communities seeking voice and change. Historical marches such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.'s March on Washington August 28, 1963 or the Moratorium March against the war in Vietnam November 15, 1969 serve as prominent examples, as do the sit-ins and protests on college campuses in the 1960s, e.g. Berkeley's "Free Speech Movement." Later in the 1980s and 1990s, marches centered around equal rights, e.g., LGBT rights, solidarity for Black men and women in American

through the Million Man (1995) and Million Women (1997) Marches, and solidarity for women's rights. In the early 2000s, protests turned to voicing disagreement with the Iraq War, and today, engagement through rallies, marches, and protests is peaking again.

The recognition of different types of protest, e.g., signing petitions, boycotts, marches, occupations, and uprisings, have been identified as forms of democratic responsiveness. These actions can serve as informational cues voicing displeasure with policies, administrations, decisions to go to war, or they may represent solidarity with marginalized populations. These signals are important as they often serve to the provide feedback to the government during times not centered around elections and also give political power and voice to those who may not be eligible to vote.

Meyer and Tarrow (1998) point to the end of the 20th century and looking toward the 21st century as a time of contentious politics, creating an era of a movement society (Tarrow 1994). From formal movements like Occupy Wall Street that started in September of 2011 and Black Lives Matter that started in July 2013, to more recent protests in response to police shootings of young black men, marches and shutting down of airports across the country in response to President Trump's immigration ban, the Women's March, and the March for Science, protests continue to serve as a common expressive form of political activity and engagement, and are widely supported in American public opinion. For example, in a Pew survey from February 2017, 79% of people view the right to nonviolent protest and 74% of people view protecting the rights

of those with unpopular views as very important components of a strong democracy.[18] In the same survey, some differences in attitudes were identified, such that Republicans were less likely than Democrats to view the right to nonviolent protest or protecting the rights of people with unpopular views as very important. Further, the survey highlighted that younger people and those who are more educated view both of these actions as important to maintain a strong American democracy.

As it is expected for younger people to feel less represented and incorporated into the existing political system, it is unsurprising that they not only historically have been more likely to engage in social and public expressive political participation, from the sit-ins and protests in the 1960s, but they are also more engaged today. The Higher Education Research Institution at UCLA has identified a rising interest in activism, citing a survey of their incoming freshmen students (CIRP Freshman survey). They found an increase from 2014, citing the highest percentage ever of incoming students who said they would be likely to participate in protests. Further, Black students were the most likely to say they would protest, "with 16 percent reporting that they had a very good chance of demonstrating for a cause while in college."[19] This coincides with recent

---

[18] "Large Majorities See Checks and Balances, Right to Protest as Essential for Democracy." March 2, 2017. Pew Research Center, U.S. Politics and Policy. Retrieved from http://www.people-press.org/2017/03/02/large-majorities-see-checks-and-balances-right-to-protest-as-essential-for-democracy/.

[19] "College students' commitment to activism, political and civic engagement reach all-time highs." February 10, 2016. UCLA Newsroom, Higher Education Research Institute.

successful protests by college students across the country in response to a perceived lack of responsiveness of university administrators to racial bias and discrimination.

Given the current political climate in the U.S., an environment that is contentious and polarized, it is important to consider when someone will turn out to vote versus turn out to a rally or protest (or engage in both). When do people feel like they can support the existing system or voice their opinions and grievances through a vote? When do people feel like they cannot support the existing system and need to voice their opinions and grievances through another avenue? Thus, is there something about individual's repeated, learned experiences that impacts the ways in which they engage in political activities?

Stemming from Hirschman (1970), the expectation here is that when people feel helpless and as if their vote does not and cannot help them get what they need or want from the political system, they will choose to disengage, or *exit*. However, for those how feel helpless, they may choose to cope with their loss of control by expressing or voicing their opinions and grievances in an attempt to reassert control through actions outside of the political system that is failing them, i.e., through rallying, marching, or protesting. Though, it is possible that as the cost of being politically expressive increases, the likelihood of expressiveness declines (Copeland and Laband 2002). This chapter seeks to explore these questions and test possible explanations.

Consequently, this chapter furthers the argument from Chapter 2 that learned helplessness, has been absent from the political behavior literature, and may be key to

---

Retrieved from http://newsroom.ucla.edu/releases/college-students-commitment-to-activism-political-and-civic-engagement-reach-all-time-highs.

understanding the "rootedness" of disengagement from instrumental political activities in the contemporary American political context. As such, learned helplessness helps to distinguish likelihood of engagement with more instrumental political activities, such as turning out to vote, from more expressive political participation, such as joining a rally or protest. This distinction further assists in separating the utilization of *voice* or *exit*. Further, learned helplessness may help explain why it can be difficult to engage those who have disengaged from the conventional, institutionalized political system.

Hypotheses

This chapter further examines the political consequences of learned helplessness and tests its direct effects on the various ways people choose to voice their opinions and grievances through political participation. To test the relationship between learned helplessness and people's choice to voice or exit, H1, the *helplessness hypothesis,* expects that those who experience higher levels of learned helplessness will be more likely to exit and thus, less likely to participate in politics through instrumental participation, e.g. voting. This is based on the expectation following from the learned helplessness literature that helplessness is related to passivity. As those who experience learned helplessness may feel as if the existing system is uncontrollable and that they do not get what they want or need from the conventional, institutional political system. They would be expected to not support the existing system, and exit by choosing to not vote.

The data used here presents a challenge in regard to determining causal ordering with cross-sectional and single-election panel data. Thus, H1a and H1b examine

moderation and mediation. First, it is possible that the effects of learned helplessness on instrumental political behavior may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial identification, ethnic identification, gender or income. Accordingly, H1a expects that the effect of learned helplessness may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial identification, ethnic identification, gender or income, as it is expected that attachments to the existing system may be more tenuous.

As the resources literature expects that level of income is one of the most robust predictors of whether an individual is likely to turn out to vote, it is expected that in the dissertation samples that this would hold (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). However, as is predicted by the learned helplessness literature, poverty is one of the truest forms of learned helplessness (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993). Thus, H1b explores whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between income and instrumental political behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout.

Alternatively, if learned helplessness predicts exit, it is possible that it may also explain alternative forms of voice where people are seeking reassert control over the uncontrollable conventional political system by going around or outside of it. Thus, H1c expects that as learned helplessness increases, people will turn to methods of expressive participation, e.g., rallying or protesting, to voice their opinions and grievances. Lastly, since the observational data presents challenges with causal ordering, Samples 2 and 4 include experimental manipulations of learned helplessness, with the expectation that if learned helplessness is made salient, respondents will report a lower likelihood of voting.

H1d expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, the tendency to exit will be evident through lower reported voting behavior and a turn to more expressive actions, like rallying or protesting.

Procedure

Data

This chapter includes data from all five of the dissertation samples. Samples 1-3 are unweighted internet convenience samples collected from Amazon.com's online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Samples 4 and 5 are also internet samples. However, the analyses from Samples 4 (CCES-PEP) and 5 (CCES) are weighted to approximate national representativeness. Further information about these samples may be found in Chapter 2, as well as in Appendix A. Additionally, the learned helplessness experiment was conducted across two of the dissertation samples (Samples 2 and 4). Additional information about this experiment may be found in Appendix E.

Measures and Manipulation

Helplessness and Disaffection Measures: As noted in Chapter 2, building off of the dimensionality analysis of disaffection conducted by Gunther and Montero (2006), the four indicators of disaffection (internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest) were measured, in addition to the learned helplessness scale (LHS). These measures were discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2 and the specific question wordings utilized may be found in Appendix B.

Control Variables. The analyses conducted in this chapter control for the following demographic and attitudinal variables (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female, coded as 1 or male, coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic, coded as 1 or not, coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as White, coded as 1, or not, coded as 0). The models also include measures of partisan identification, with two dummy variables, one coded "1" for Republicans versus Democrats and independents, and the second coded 1 for Democrats versus Republicans and independents. These allow independents to be the reference category in the OLS and logistic regression models. A recoded 0-1 measure of political ideology is also included, where 0 represents "Extremely liberal" and 1 represents "Extremely conservative." Lastly, an attitudinal measure of whether respondents perceive themselves to be on the losing side of politics is also included in the models, where 0 represents the perception that their side has been winning more often than losing in politics and 1 represents the perception that their side has been losing more often than winning in politics. Unlike the models assessing the predictors of learned helplessness, the models reviewed in this chapter do not include a measure of authoritarianism. Appendix B includes the question wording for all variables discussed and Appendix A shows the distribution of the demographic control variables across the samples.

Dependent Variables: Instrumental Political Participation – Voting Behavior. With the expectation that learned helplessness will decrease engagement in more

instrumental political behaviors like voting behavior, the five samples included a range of prospective and retrospective participation questions. The analyses below focus on three measures of instrumental political participation: vote likelihood/intention, vote confidence, and reported voter turnout. In four of the five samples, vote likelihood was measured on a 5-point scale from "Extremely likely" to "Not at all likely" and was recoded to range from 0 to 1. In Sample 1, 59.7% was "Extremely likely" to vote, whereas in Sample 2, 59.3%, in Sample 3, 70.14% and Sample 4 wave 2, 76.2% were "Extremely likely" to vote. In Sample 5, the CCES common content did not ask about vote likelihood, but vote intention. Respondents were asked whether they intended to vote in the 2016 election. This question was collapsed into a dummy variable, where 1 was coded for "Yes, definitely," and "I already voted (early or absentee)," and 0 was coded for "Probably," "No," and "Undecided." In Sample 5, 80.4% of respondents said that they intended to or already had voted.

Vote confidence, measured in Samples 3 and 4, was measured with a five-point scale in Sample 3 and a seven-point scale in Sample 4, ranging from "Extremely confident" to "Not at all confident" and recoded to range from 0 to 1. Similar to vote likelihood, vote confidence provides an additional assessment of how people feel about their decision to vote. For people who experience learned helplessness, it is expected that they are likely to be less confident in their preferred candidate, as they may feel like their choice will not matter and impact the result, or they may not feel that the candidate options will do anything to assist, support, or represent them if they do win the election. In Sample 3, 42.35% of respondents were "Extremely confident." In Sample 4, vote

confidence was measured at waves 1, 2 and 4. In wave 1, 44.82% of respondents were "Extremely confident," whereas in waves 2 and 4, 43.37% and 63.54% were "Extremely confident." The key difference here is that wave 4 reflects vote choice confidence post-election, thus reflecting post-election increases in confidence.

Lastly, since Samples 4 and 5 are panel surveys, in wave 4 of Sample 4 and the post-election wave of the CCES, reported turnout was also collected. In Sample 4, turnout was coded as 1 for "I am sure I voted" and 0 for other responses, i.e., "I did not vote in the election this November," "I thought about voting this time, but did not," and "I usually vote, but did not this time." In Sample 4, unweighted, 90.0% reported having voted. Similarly, in Sample 5, turnout was coded 1 for "I definitely voted in the General Election," and 0 for other responses, i.e., "I did not vote in the election this Nov.," "I thought about voting this time - but didn't," "I usually vote, but didn't this time," and "I attempted to vote but did not or could not." In Sample 5, unweighted, 92.3% of respondents said they voted. It is important to note that reported participatory activities are often inflated due to social desirability, and it is possible to speculate that is the case here, particularly in the post-election reported voter turnout.[20] While reported

[20] The weighted values for Sample 4's voting behavior measures are as follows: 1) vote likelihood in Sample 4 wave 2, 69.29% of respondents were "Extremely likely" to vote; 2) vote confidence in wave 1, 41.56% of respondents were "Extremely confident," whereas in waves 2 and 4, 40.91% and 61.05% were "Extremely confident"; 3) reported turnout in wave 4, 87.82% reported turning out to vote. The weighted values for Sample 5: 1) 73.7% intended to vote; 2) 94.7% reported turning out.

participatory activities are likely to be inflated due to social desirability, Sample 3 does include a direct behavioral measure of participation.

Expressive Political Participation – Protesting Behavior. The analyses below also include a measure of retrospective protesting and rallying behavior. Respondents were asked in two questions whether they had participated in a rally in support or in opposition in the last three or six months. These two questions were combined into a single dummy variable, coded 1 for "Yes" and 0 for "No." The one exception was in Sample 4, where respondents were asked these two questions in a single item that was still coded 1 for "Yes" and 0 for "No." In Sample 1, 16.2% said they had participated in a rally, whereas in Sample 2, 7.32%, in Sample 3 10.47%, in Sample 4 9.36%, and in Sample 5 8.02% of respondents said they had participated in the last three months.[21]

Experimental Manipulation of Learned Helplessness. While learned helplessness has been widely studied in the experimental context for animal behavior, fewer studies have focused on human learned helplessness in the laboratory. Since previous studies have focused on a laboratory context, even fewer have considered learned helplessness in a survey context, let alone an online survey context. Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) note that laboratory investigations of the helplessness reformulations are underutilized due to wider interest in personality dimensions like explanatory style, outside of laboratory applications. Further, they reinforce that it is difficult to study

---

[21] In wave three of Sample 4, the weighted percentage for the protesting and rallying measure was 9.7% in the last 3 months. In the post-election wave of Sample 5, the weighted percentage for rallying and protesting was 6.4% in the last 6 months.

individual differences in conjunction with situational manipulations in laboratory experiments, since the manipulations of situational factors must be strong enough to affect dependent measures but not so strong as to swamp the effect of individual differences (1993: 168-169). Thus, prior studies have focused on the random assignment of respondents to conditions where they experience repeated successes or failures, to induce feelings of learned helplessness (for further discussion, see Dyck, Vallentyne, and Breen 1979; Mikulincer 1988, 1994; Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, and Hibscher 1976). Yet, these studies demonstrated less than reliable results in producing differential effects of small and large amounts of helplessness on anger, sadness, or stress.

Thus, the learned helplessness manipulation used in this dissertation takes a different approach and is modeled after self-affirmation manipulations from Steele (1988) and Cohen, Aronson, and Steele (2000). Traditional self-affirmation manipulations often have respondents bolster their self-esteem through acknowledgement of a characteristic or value that is important to them and having them write a brief paragraph about a personal experience in which that characteristic or value made them feel good about themselves. Rather than have the respondents bolster their self-esteem, this manipulation had respondents write a brief paragraph about a time that they repeatedly tried to do something and failed to succeed. The specific wording of the manipulation may be found in Appendix E. This experimental manipulation appears in Sample 2 and wave 2 of Sample 4. The next section discusses the results from the formal hypothesis tests. To test the hypotheses stated above, bivariate and multivariate analyses were utilized to test whether learned helplessness impacts exit or voice through political participation.

Results

Helplessness' Consequences on Exit and Voice: Hypothesis 1

As a politically consequential measure, this chapter seeks to evaluate how general learned helplessness influences the ways in which people engage in instrumental and expressive political activities. Turning to the first hypothesis, H1, tests the direct effects of the disaffection measures on the various ways people choose to exit or voice their opinions and grievances with the conventional, institutionalized political system. The *helplessness hypothesis* expects that people who experience higher levels of learned helplessness will be more likely to exit and thus, less likely to participate in politics through outcome-oriented, instrumental participation, e.g. voting.

This hypothesis stems from the learned helplessness literature, assuming that learned helplessness leads to passive behavior. People how experience learned helplessness may feel as if the political system around them is uncontrollable, meaning that they do not and cannot get what they want or need from it. It is expected that they would not support that system, and consequently disengage, or exit, by choosing to not participate in behavior that supports that political system, i.e., through voting behavior. To test the main effects of helplessness on instrumental participation, three different measures may be considered: vote confidence, vote likelihood, and voter turnout.[22]

---

[22] Results discussed below include only the control condition when the analyses are conducted on the cross-sectional waves that include survey experiments. Further, all Sample 4 and Sample 5 analyses are weighted to approximate national representativeness.

First, to test how disaffection explains engagement in voting behavior, a dichotomous vote likelihood or vote intent measure was regressed upon the measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. Before the 2016 election, vote likelihood was measured across Samples 1-4, and vote intent was measured in Sample 5. Taking the social desirability of these responses into account, vote likelihood has been dichotomized, where 1 represents "Extremely likely to turnout" and 0 represents the response options less than extremely likely to turnout. Table 3.1 shows the logistic regression models, with consistent effects of learned helplessness and interest. In these models, it is expected that as learned helplessness increases, the probability of being likely to turnout will decrease. Across the samples, learned helplessness and interest are the only two consistent predictors.

[Insert Table 3.1 Here]

As with many likelihood and turnout models, we would expect interest to be a significant predictor of vote likelihood. People who are interested in politics are more likely to be invested in the campaign, and interested in is outcome. For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of being extremely likely to vote increase by 26.64 in Sample 1, 144.97 in Sample 2, 14.43 in Sample 3, 439.36 in Sample 4, and 1.34 in Sample 5. With a one-unit increase in interest, the percentage increase in the probability of being extremely likely to vote is sizeable across samples (Sample 1 = 2,564%; Sample 2 = 14,397%; Sample 3 = 1,343%; Sample 4 = 43,836%; Sample 5 = 34%).

As for learned helplessness, a one-unit increase in learned helplessness changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by .23 in Sample 1, .03 in Sample 2, .06 in

Sample 3, and .001 in Sample 4 Wave 2. Since it is expected that higher learned helplessness to decrease the probability of being extremely likely to vote, for a one-unit increase in learned helplessness the percentage decrease in the probability of being extremely likely to vote is fairly consistent across samples (Sample 1 = 77%; Sample 2 = 97%; Sample 3 = 94%; Sample 4 = 99.9%). However, learned helplessness did not significantly predict vote intent in Sample 5, which utilized the five-item brief measure of learned helplessness.

Notably, the measures of disaffection are not consistently significant across the samples. Internal efficacy is significant in Samples 1, 3, and 5, but not 2 and 4. It is possible that is the case because these are the smallest samples where vote likelihood was collected. In Sample 1, the odds of being extremely likely to vote change by 1.50 in Sample 1, 8.80 in Sample 3 and 8.54 in Sample 5. For a one-unit increase in internal efficacy the percentage increase in the probability of being extremely likely to vote is 50% in Sample 1, 780% in Sample 3 and 754% in Sample 5. External efficacy and trust are not significant in any of the samples predicting vote likelihood. Additionally, as all of the measures are scaled to range from 0 to 1, it is interesting to note that while significant, the relative odds of learned helplessness, compared to interest and internal efficacy are smaller than the other two significant disaffection measures.

[Insert Figure 3.1 Here]

Second, as with vote likelihood, for individuals who experience higher levels of learned helplessness, it is expected that they will feel less confident about their vote choice. As with vote likelihood, reported vote confidence is expected to be inflated due to

social desirability. Taking the potential biases of these responses into account, vote confidence has been dichotomized, where 1 represents "Extremely confident" and 0 represents the response options less than extremely confident. To test how the measures learned helplessness and disaffection, explain vote confidence, the dichotomous vote confidence measure was regressed on the LHS and measures of disaffection, as well as the demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 3.2 shows these logistic regression models from Samples 3 and 4, with consistent effects.[23] Coefficients reflect log likelihoods, rather than odds ratios. Learned helplessness and internal efficacy are the two consistent significant predictors across the three samples. As internal efficacy measures beliefs about people's own competence to understand and participate effectively in politics, it is expected that it would play an important role in predicting confidence in selecting a candidate. Thus, for a one-unit increase in internal efficacy, the odds of being extremely confident would change by 7.60 in Sample 3, 2.24 in Sample 4 Wave 1, and 2.57 in Sample 4 Wave 4, post-election. This translates to a 660% increase in the probability of being confident in ones' vote choice in Sample 3, and a 124% increase in Sample 4 Wave 1 pre-election. Interestingly post-election, we see a slightly larger 157% increase in the probability of being confident in ones' vote choice in Sample 4 Wave 4.

[Insert Table 3.2 Here]

External efficacy and trust were not significant predictors of vote confidence in Samples 3 or 4. However, interest was significant in Samples 3 and 4 prior to the

[23] Vote confidence was measured in Sample 4 at wave 1, before the 2016 election and at wave 4 during the post-election wave.

election. For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of being extremely confident would change by 4.10 in Sample 3, and 3.60 in Sample 4 Wave 1. This indicates an expected 310% increase in the probability of being extremely confident in ones' vote choice in Sample 3, and a 260% increase in Sample 4 Wave 1. While it is expected that people who are more interested in politics would be more confident in their vote, it is interesting that interest is not a significant predictor following the election.

There are also consistent, albeit relatively smaller, statistically significant effects for learned helplessness on vote confidence. It is expected that as learned helplessness increases, the probability of being confident in ones' vote would decrease. For a one-unit increase in learned helplessness, the odds of being extremely confident would change by .28 in Sample 3, .14 in Sample 4 Wave 1, pre-election, and .18 in Sample 4 Wave 4, post-election. This indicates an expected 72% decrease in the probability of being extremely confident in ones' vote choice in Sample 3, and an 86% decrease in Sample 4 Wave 1. Looking post-election, we see the same pattern. For a one-unit increase in learned helplessness, we would expect a 72% decrease in the probability of being extremely confident in one's vote choice. Figure 3.2 illustrates the predicted probability of being extremely confident in one's vote choice, across the levels of learned helplessness for the two samples pre- and post-election.

[Insert Figure 3.2 Here]

Lastly, since Samples 4 and 5 are panel studies, it is possible to examine whether learned helplessness predicts post-election reported turnout. Table 3.3 shows the logistic regression models predicting turnout. As with vote likelihood, both interest and learned

helplessness are significant predictors in both samples. However, the measures of disaffection, internal efficacy, external efficacy (only measured in Sample 4), and trust are not. Trust is only significant in Sample 4, such that for a one-unit increase in trust, the odds of turning out to vote increase by .006 and there is an unusual 99.4% decrease in the probability of turning out to vote

For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of turning out to vote increase by 22.02 in Sample 4 and 5.81 in Sample 5. With a one-unit increase in interest, the percentage increase in the probability of turning out to vote is sizeable across samples (Sample 4 = 2,102%; Sample 5 = 481%). Turning to learned helplessness, the effect sizes are smaller than interest, but consistently significant. For a one-unit increase, the odds of turning out to vote change by .0005 in Sample 4 and .07 in Sample 5, which translates to a 99.95% decrease in the odds of turning out to vote in Sample 4 and 93% in Sample 5. Figure 3.3 demonstrates the change in predicted probability of turning out to vote across the learned helplessness scale. It should be noted that the confidence intervals are quite large in Sample 4 at the highest values of the learned helplessness scale, as there were few individuals at the highest end of the LHS.

[Insert Table 3.3 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.3 Here]

Taking this evidence together for vote likelihood, vote confidence, and reported turnout, there is clear support for the first hypothesis. Learned helplessness performs as a consistent, significant predictor of exiting from in political participation, expressive before and after the 2016 presidential election.

Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1a

As noted above, it is causally challenging to untangle temporally the potential cyclical nature of helplessness, disaffection, and political marginalization, given the largely observational data collected for this dissertation. Focusing on learned helplessness, it is possible that the effects of learned helplessness on voting behavior may be moderated by perceptions of being on the winning or losing side of politics, being a member of a historically or systemically marginalized group, or by income level. As such, H1a expects that the effect of learned helplessness on exit or disengagement from voting behavior may be moderated by loser perceptions, racial identification, ethnic identification, gender or income. Exit is expected since attachment to the existing system may be more tenuous for those who have perceive repeated political losses, systemic marginalization, or lack of representation.

First, it is expected that the effect of learned helplessness on voting behavior will be moderated by loser perceptions. Thus, for those who feel, for issues that matter to them, that they are on the losing side of politics more than on the winning side, it is expected that learned helplessness will decrease their probability of engaging in instrumental political behavior. However, for those who perceive themselves to be on the winning side, it is expected that learned helplessness will not have an effect on instrumental voting behaviors, i.e. vote likelihood and turnout.

In order to test whether this is the case, the loser perception dummy variable was interacted with learned helplessness to predict both vote likelihood and turnout. Table 3.4 illustrates the conditional effect of learned helplessness and loser perceptions on vote

likelihood, whereas Models 1 and 2 in Table 3.9 demonstrates this effect on turnout. In both tables, for Sample 4, it is the case that the interaction statistically significantly predicts both vote likelihood ($b=13.72$, $p<.05$) and turnout ($b=22.76$, $p<.01$), controlling for all measures of disaffection and demographics. For vote likelihood, the marginal effect for those who perceive themselves on the winning side is significant ($b=-1.73$, $p<.001$), but not for losers. Similarly, for turnout, the marginal effect for winners is significant ($b=-1.66$, $p<.001$) but not for losers ($b=-.15$, n.s.). Figure 3.4 shows these conditional relationships graphically.

[Insert Table 3.4 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.4 Here]

Interestingly, this result is not in the expected direction. Rather, there is little effect of learned helplessness for losers in regard to whether they are likely to vote or report actually turning out to vote. It is possible that perceiving oneself as on the losing side of politics serves at its own demobilizing factor. However, for those who perceive themselves as on the winning side of politics, but are high in learned helplessness, they may not feel motivated to support the conventional, institutionalized political system and are thus more likely to exit, resulting in lower probability of vote likelihood and turnout.

Second, some marginalized identities may affect the experiences of learned helplessness on disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. As two examples, we can look at the moderating role of racial or ethnic identity. It is expected that the effect of learned helplessness will be moderated by whether people identify as being from a non-dominant racial or ethnic group.

Thus, for those who identify as non-White or as being Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, it is expected that learned helplessness will decrease their probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior and will be more likely to exit. However, for those who identify as being from a dominant racial or ethnic group (i.e., White or not Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish), it is expected that learned helplessness will not have an effect on instrumental voting behavior. To test whether these expectations are observed in the data, the White/non-White racial dummy measure and the dummy measure for Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish identity were interacted with learned helplessness to predict vote likelihood and turnout. Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the interactions predicting vote likelihood across the five samples, whereas Models 3 through 6 in Table 3.9 show the interactions predicting reported turnout.

Regarding vote likelihood, the White/non-White dummy variable interaction is not statistically significant across the samples. However, this dummy variable collapses multiple racial identities, which may mask the significant effect. As Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) identify, individuals from Black and African American communities are expected to experience some learned helplessness due to historical and systemic marginalization. Thus, if the interaction is assessed between Black and African American respondents and White respondents, rather than collapsing all non-white respondents, the interaction between race and learned helplessness is statistically significant ($b=14.84$, $p=.10$), controlling for all measures of disaffection and demographics in Sample 4. The interaction was not significant in the other samples. However, this is likely due to not

having enough Black or African American respondents in the other samples. Figure 3.5 illustrates the conditional relationship for White compared to Black respondents.

In Figure 3.5, as learned helplessness increases in Sample 4 for White respondents, the probability of being extremely likely to vote decreases. The marginal effect is statistically significant (b=-1.06, p<.01). As learned helplessness increases for Black or African American respondents, the probability of being extremely likely to vote increases. However, the marginal effect is only significantly different at the highest end of learned helplessness (b=.69, n.s.). However, looking at actual reported vote behavior reported in Table 3.9, rather than vote likelihood, the interaction between race and learned helplessness is statistically significant (Sample 5, Model 4, Table 3.9: b=6.76, p<.05). Figure 3.6 illustrates this conditional effect on reported turnout. The marginal effect of being White on learned helplessness is statistically significant for White respondents only (b=-.31, p<.01), as the marginal effect for non-White respondents is not significant (b=-.04, n.s.). From Figure 3.6, it looks like as learned helplessness increases, the probability of turning out to vote does decrease. Yet, the confidence intervals are quite large at the highest levels of learned helplessness, and they do overlap, suggesting that the effect of learned helplessness for non-White respondents is not different from that for White respondents. This result is not as expected, as the significant effects are for the dominant identity group, rather than the marginalized or subordinated racial groups.

[Insert Table 3.5 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.5 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.6 Here]

Third, identifying as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish may moderate the effect of learned helplessness on the probability of exiting and disengaging from instrumental voting behavior. Table 3.6 shows the interaction between an ethnicity dummy measure and learned helplessness, predicting vote likelihood. The conditional relationship is only marginally significant in Sample 2 ($b=-29.75$, $p<.10$). The marginal effect of learned helplessness for those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish is statistically significant ($b=-2.46$, $p<.001$) and larger than the marginal effect for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish ($b=-.49$, $p<.10$). Figure 3.7 shows this conditional relationship. For those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, as learned helplessness increases, their probability of being extremely likely to vote decreases significantly, approximately to zero. For those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, an increase in learned helplessness also decreases the probability of being extremely likely to vote, but the effect is not as severe as it is for those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. These conditional effects are not significant for turnout, as evidenced in Models 5 and 6 in Table 3.9. This result is as hypothesized, in the expected directions. Interestingly, the effect of learned helplessness is still marginally significant for the dominant identity group, as it has been for those who identify as being on the winning side of politics, and who identify as White.

[Insert Table 3.6 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.7 Here]

Fourth, gender may play a role in moderating the effect of learned helplessness on disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. Considering how gender may impact

the ways in which men and women engage in voting behavior, women who experience learned helplessness may also be more likely disengage than men who experience learned helplessness. To test this, the female dummy measure was interacted with learned helplessness to predict vote likelihood (Table 3.7) and turnout (Table 3.9: Models 7 and 8). While the conditional effects are not significant for actual reported turnout, for vote likelihood in Samples 1 and 3 we see significant, but slightly different effects. Figure 3.8 shows these two opposite conditional effects.

In Sample 1, the marginal effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood is significant for females ($b=-.36$, $p<.05$), but not significant for males ($b=-.13$, n.s.). Thus, in Sample 1, as learned helplessness increases, there is no effect on the probability of being extremely likely to vote for males, but learned helplessness does decrease the probability of being extremely likely to vote for females. On the other hand, in Sample 3, the marginal effect of learned helplessness for males is larger for males ($b= -.88$, $p<.001$) than for females (-.27, $p=.10$). Thus, the effect of learned helplessness in Sample 3 has a demobilizing effect for both men and women, but the effect is larger for men. The effect for women is in the expected direction but, the effect for men in Sample 3, is unexpected.

[Insert Table 3.7 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.8 Here]

Lastly, it is conceivable that income level may moderate the effect of learned helplessness on disengagement. It is expected that for those who are at the lower levels of income, learned helplessness will decrease the probability that respondents will be extremely likely to vote or report having turned out. However, for those who are at higher

levels of income, it is expected that learned helplessness will not impact their engagement in instrumental voting behavior.

As such, to test whether this is the case, learned helplessness was interacted with the measure of income across all five samples. Surprisingly, for vote likelihood, level of income did not condition the effect of learned helplessness as evidenced in Table 3.8. However, for turnout, income did condition the effect of learned helplessness, demonstrated in Models 9 and 10 in Table 3.9 for both Samples 4 and 5 ($b=-24.34$, $p<.10$ and $b=-5.27$, $p<.05$, respectively). Figure 3.9 shows the average marginal effect of learned helplessness across the levels of income on the probability of turning out to vote. Interestingly, learned helplessness in both samples had the greatest impact in decreasing the probability of turning out to vote for those at the higher levels of income. However, the confidence intervals are extremely large, as there are very few respondents who are high in income and learned helplessness. Again, we see some of the strongest effects of learned helplessness for the dominant group, rather than for the marginalized group.

[Insert Table 3.8 Here]

[Insert Table 3.9 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.9 Here]

Taken together, the evidence in support of Hypothesis 1a is mixed, with some strong demobilizing effects of learned helplessness on dominant groups, rather than marginalized or subordinated groups. First, for those who perceive themselves to be on the losing side of politics, learned helplessness did not decrease the probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior, but it did for those who identify as being on the

winning side of politics. Second, for those who identified as non-White (or Black or African American in Sample 4), learned helplessness actually increased the probability of being extremely likely to vote for Black or African American respondents and decreased the probability of being extremely likely to vote or turnout for White respondents. Third, in support of the hypothesis, the effect of learned helplessness decreased the probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior for those who identified as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. These effects were also significant for those who did not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, but to a lesser extent. Fourth, also in support of the hypothesis, the effect of learned helplessness on disengagement for females was significant in both Samples 1 and 3, but the effect was greater for males in Sample 3. Last and unexpected, the effect of learned helplessness on disengagement was greatest for those at the higher levels of income. It is possible that for those in marginalized and subordinated groups, there is a ceiling of experienced learned helplessness, such that there is less variation across the levels of learned helplessness. However, for those in dominant groups, there is greater variation of learned helplessness, which allows for clearer statistical analysis.

Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1b

The resources literature expects that income is one of the most robust predictors of whether an individual is likely to turn out to vote (see Rosenstone and Hansen; Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and Brady 2012; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Additionally, it is one of the most consistent and robust predictors of learned helplessness (see Chapter 2, as well as Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993).

Since cross-sectional and limited panel observational data make it more difficult to determine the true relationships in the population. The following hypothesis suggests that there may be a different relationship between income and learned helplessness than the moderated relationship tested above. Thus, H1b explores whether learned helplessness may mediate the relationship between income and voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout.

To test this relationship, Imai's mediation package in Stata 14, medeff, was used to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between income and vote likelihood across the five samples, as well as reported turnout in Samples 4 and 5. Regarding vote likelihood in Samples 1-4 and vote intention pre-election in Sample 5, learned helplessness does significantly partially mediate the relationship between income and vote likelihood or intention.[24] Across the samples, between 10% and 25% of the total effect is mediated by learned helplessness. Figure 3.10 shows the path diagrams for all five samples.

[Insert Figure 3.10 Here]

Similarly, since reported turnout was measured in Samples 4 and 5, it is possible to test whether learned helplessness partially mediates the relationship between income and reported voting behavior. In both Samples 4 and 5, learned haplessness does mediate the relationship, mediating just over 14% in Sample 4 and nearly 15% in Sample 5 of the

[24] As with the previous results, these mediation models are limited to the control conditions or waves without experimental conditions. Additionally, all analyses from Samples 4 and 5 are weighted.

total effect. Figure 3.11 illustrates the path diagrams for turnout in Samples 4 and 5. The effect of income when learned helplessness is added to these models is significant across all samples for vote likelihood and turnout.

[Insert Figure 3.11 Here]

Before concluding that the resources model is missing a psychological component tied to helplessness in explaining voting behavior, the measures of political disaffection should also be tested. Accordingly, the mediation models were conducted for the measures of disaffection, internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest. None of these measures of disaffection perform as consistently across the five samples and across both vote likelihood and turnout as does learned helplessness. External efficacy only partially mediates the effect of income on vote likelihood in Sample 3 (8% of the total effect mediated). Trust only partially mediates the effect of income on vote likelihood in Samples 1 and 3 (5% and 8% of the total effect mediated, respectively).

Interest partially mediated the effect of income on vote likelihood in Samples 1, 4 and 5, as well as on reported turnout in Samples 4 and 5. However, the amount of the total effect mediated was inconsistent. For vote likelihood, in Sample 1, less than 6% of the total effect was mediated, but in Sample 4 18% was partially mediated and in Sample 5, 31% of the total effect was mediated. For turnout, in Sample 4, 20% of the total effect was mediated and in Sample 5, 18% of the total effect was mediated. The stronger effect of interest is somewhat expected, as it has been shown to be a strong predictor of voting behavior (see Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960; Lane 1959; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948, Milbrath and Goel 1977; Schlotzman, Lehman, Verba, and

Brady 2012; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Interest has also been shown to perform as a measure of resources with greater effects on political engagement than other resource measures, e.g. income, knowledge, and partisan strength (Verba et al. 1995). These mediation models suggest that the relationship between income and interest as measures of resources may be more interconnected, such that interest may actually mediate the effects of income on instrumental voting behavior.

Lastly, internal efficacy, the closest measure to learned helplessness, partially mediates the effect of income on instrumental voting behavior in Samples 1, 4 and 5 for vote likelihood and in Samples 4 and 5 for reported turnout. For vote likelihood, internal efficacy mediates 25% of the total effect in Sample 1, 11% in Sample 4 and nearly 30% in Sample 5. For reported turnout, internal efficacy mediates 12% of the total effect in Sample 4 and nearly 18% in Sample 5. In comparing learned helplessness and internal efficacy, the measures of learned helplessness are generally larger and more consistent across the samples. Some of the inconsistency across the models may be possibly due to some measure differences across the samples. However, it cannot be denied that there is a partially mediated effect of internal efficacy.

These mediation models present at least some initial evidence that is contrary to the participation literature pointing to the overwhelming effect of resources, particularly income, as the most important predictors of participation. Often, this work uses income, and sometimes race, as stand-ins for measures of resources. However, taking the evidence above for hypothesis 1 and 1a, along with these mediation models, while race and income may capture resources, this chapter has provided evidence that there is likely

a missing psychological component tied to learned helplessness, which helps to more fully explain voting behavior.

Yet, as discussed in Chapter 2 and the introduction of this chapter, people do not participate only in limited voting related behavior. Possibly as an attempt to reassert control over a perceived uncontrollable political system, people may seek to voice their opinions and grievances outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system. Thus, the next section and hypothesis 1c turns to questions related to engagement in more expressive forms of political behavior, i.e. marching, rallying, and protesting.

Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1c

For individuals who are removed, marginalized, or subordinated from the conventional, institutionalized democratic system, the previous hypotheses have demonstrated that they tend to exit from the system by disengaging from voting behavior because they have learned that they are unable to get what they need or want from the conventional political system. However, it is conceivable that in an attempt to reassert some control, they may turn to activities outside of the institutionalized political system to voice their opinions and grievances, through more expressive political activities such as rallying, marching, or protesting behavior. Thus, H1c expects that as learned helplessness increases, people will turn to one type of more expressive participation, e.g., rallying or protesting, to voice their opinions and grievances, particularly if they come from marginalized or subordinated communities.

As identified by Hirschman (1970), *voice*, encapsulates action taken by customers of a firm or members of an organization when they are dissatisfied. They may express their opinions to management or even to anyone who cares to listen. Yet, *voice* is a messy concept as "it can be graduated, all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest" (Hirschman 1970: 16). Further, Hirschman's theory is focused more on instrumental motives and outcomes. However, in the U.S. context, options for voicing opinions or grievances may differ for those who come from or identify as being from a historically or systemically marginalized or subordinated group. Tied to learned helplessness, for those who have learned that the conventional political system does not serve them well, rather than trying to change the conventional political system through instrumental voting activities, they seek to regain some control by going outside of the institutionalized political system and turning to more expressive actions, e.g., rallying or protesting.

To test whether this is the case, a dummy variable measuring whether respondents said they had participated in a rally in support of or in opposition to a political issue or political candidate in the last three months was regressed upon learned helplessness, the measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 3.10 shows these models for all five samples. One caveat to note is that the measures of protesting and rallying in Sample 4 was collected during wave 3, shortly before the 2016 presidential election, and the measure in Sample 5 was collected during the post-election wave. Measuring the reported protesting behavior following the presidential election may have impacted the social desirability of reporting, as well as the opportunity for the

behavior itself. These main effects models are limited to the control conditions or waves without experimental conditions, and analyses from Samples 4 and 5 are weighted.

[Insert Table 3.10 Here]

For the protesting models presented in Table 3.10, learned helplessness, internal efficacy, interest, and age are statistically significant across three or more samples in the expected directions. For a one-unit increase in age, the odds of rallying or protesting decrease by .13 in Sample 1, .01 in Sample 2, .10 in Sample 3, and .19 in Sample 4. With a one-unit increase in age, the percentage decrease in the probability of having rallied or protested is slight across samples (Sample 1 = 87%; Sample 2 = 99%; Sample 3 = 90%; Sample 4 = 81%). Thus, for Samples 1-4, as age increases, the probability of having engaged in rallying or protesting behavior decreases.

For a one-unit increase in interest, the odds of having engaged in rallying or protesting behavior increase by 11.40 in Sample 1, 11.49 in Sample 4, and 32.85 in Sample 5. For a one-unit increase in interest, the percentage increase in the probability of participating in this expressive political activity is considerable (Sample 1 = 1,040%; Sample 4 = 1,049%; Sample 5 = 3,185%). Similar to evidence in the previous section showing that those who are more politically interested are more likely to engage in voting behavior, those who are more politically interested are also more likely to engage in protesting behavior.

As a measure of disaffection, it is expected that as internal efficacy, or the belief that one has the ability and comprehension to participate in politics, increases that the probability of having participated in protesting behavior to increase. For a one-unit

increase in internal efficacy, the odds of having rallied or protested increase by 8.00 in Sample 1, 5718.55 in Sample 2, 60.13 in Sample 3, and 71.93 in Sample 5. This translates to very sizable percentage increases for each one-unit increase in internal efficacy (Sample 1 = 700%; Sample 2 = 571,755%; Sample 3 = 590.13%; Sample 5 = 7,093%). This would follow expectations that internal efficacy may serve as a motivating factor, such that those who believe they have the ability and comprehension to participate will participate in both instrumental and expressive political activities.

On the flip side, it is expected that as learned helplessness increases, the probability of participating in protesting behavior will increase, rather than decrease as would be expected for exit and disengagement from instrumental voting behavior. It is expected that this may be the case because learned helplessness results in feelings of loss of control and expressive political behavior may be one way for people to reassert some control. For a one-unit increase in learned helplessness, the odds of having participated in protesting or rallying activities increases by 9.81 in Sample 1, 334.64 in Sample 2, and 9.61 in Sample 4. This converts to a percentage increase in the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior across the samples (Sample 1 = 881%; Sample 2 = 33,464%; Sample 4 = 861%). Thus, those who experience greater learned helplessness are more likely to turn to these expressive political activities to voice their opinions and grievances outside of the institutionalized, conventional political system.

Although the main effects models help to further our understanding of those who are likely to engage in instrumental versus expressive political activity, given the main effects for learned helplessness increasing protesting behavior, these effects should be

investigated in more depth. It is possible that like the conditionality of instrumental voting behavior presented under H1a, the effect of learned helplessness on protesting and rallying may also be conditional. To whether the effect of learned helplessness is moderated, learned helplessness was interacted with the dummy measure of whether one perceives themselves to be on the winning versus the losing side of politics, a White vs. non-White dummy measure, a Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish ethnic identity dummy, a gender dummy, and income. First, unlike with the conditional effect of loser perceptions on voting behavior, the effect of learned helplessness is not conditional upon loser perceptions. These logistic regression models are reported in Table 3.11.

[Insert Table 3.11 Here]

However, the effect of learned helplessness may be exacerbated by racial and ethnic identification, with the expectation that learned helplessness will increase the probability of engaging in protesting behavior for those who identify as non-White or as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. Given this expectation, it is also expected that learned helplessness will not have an effect on probability of engaging in protesting for those who identify as White or not as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish. The models showing the interaction between race and learned helplessness are reported in Table 3.12 and the models showing the interaction between Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish identity and learned helplessness are reported in Table 3.13. While the interaction between race and learned helplessness is statistically significant ($b=12.64$, $p<.05$), the conditional effect is only marginally significant for White respondents, not for non-White respondents in Sample 4. Figure 3.12 shows the conditional effect of learned helplessness by race. As learned

helplessness increases, the probability of having participated in protest behavior increases for White respondents, but there is no effect of learned helplessness for non-White respondents. However, the confidence intervals do overlap with one another. This finding is unexpected and not in the direction of the moderation expectations.

[Insert Table 3.12 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.12 Here]

There is a possibility that non-White respondents felt greater learned helplessness than White respondents, and thus hit a ceiling, which would explain no difference of learned helplessness on protesting behavior for non-White respondents. In Sample 4, where this conditional effect was significant, average learned helplessness is significantly greater for non-White respondents than for White respondents (mean diff. = .04, $p<.05$).

Table 3.13 reports the logistic regression models testing the conditional effect of ethnicity on learned helplessness. The interaction is marginally significant in Sample 4 and significant at $p<.01$ in Sample 5. Breaking these interactions down further, Figure 3.13 shows the conditional effect of ethnicity and learned helplessness on the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. In Sample 4, the marginal effect of learned helplessness for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino or Spanish is not statistically significant (b=.27, n.s.), but the marginal effect is significant for those who do identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (b=1.35, $p<.05$). Similarly, in Sample 5, the marginal effect of learned helplessness for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish is not statistically significant (b=.01, n.s.), but is significant for those who do identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish (b=.42, $p<.001$). Figure 3.13 illustrates that the

effect of learned helplessness increases the probability of having protested or rallied increases for those who identify as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, but learned helplessness has no effect for those who do not identify as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish. This result is in line with expectations for the conditional effects of learned helplessness.

[Insert Table 3.13 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.13 Here]

The effect of learned helplessness on protesting behavior may also be conditioned by gender. Table 3.14 shows the logistic models for the interaction between gender and learned helplessness. The conditional effect is only significant in Sample 5 ($b=-3.75$, $p<.05$). However, in looking at the marginal effects, the effect of learned helplessness for males and females is unexpected, such that the marginal effect is only significant for men ($b=.13$, $p<.01$), but not for women ($b=-.07$, n.s.). Thus, unexpectedly, as learned helplessness increases for men, the probability of engaging in protesting or rallying activities increases. Figure 3.14 illustrates this interaction further, such that there is also no effect of learned helplessness for females on the probability of having engaged in protesting or rallying activity.

[Insert Table 3.14 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.14 Here]

Last, it is possible that the effect of learned helplessness on protesting and rallying activities may differ based upon respondents' level of income. Thus, it is expected that the effect of learned helplessness at lower levels of income will increase the probability of engaging in protesting behavior and there will be no effect of learned helplessness for

those at higher levels of income. Table 3.15 displays the logistic regression models with the interaction between income and learned helplessness. Interestingly, there are opposite conditional effects on protesting behavior before (Sample 4) and after the 2016 presidential election (Sample 5). Figure 3.15 shows the conditional effect of income on learned helplessness for protesting behavior for Samples 4 and 5.

[Insert Table 3.15 Here]

[Insert Figure 3.15 Here]

The effect of learned helplessness is different across levels of income when the rallying and protesting questions are asked before the presidential election (Sample 4) compared to being asked after the presidential election (Sample 5). In Sample 4 before the election, the effect of learned helplessness for those at the lower levels of income increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior, but decreased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior for those at higher levels of income. However, in Sample 5, following the election, the effect of learned helplessness for those at lower levels of income decreased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior, but increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior for those at higher levels of income. These opposite results before and after the presidential election are puzzling.

It is likely that the opposite effects are context specific, as following the election of Donald Trump, a number of marches, rallies, and protests across the country took place to demonstrate dislike and disapproval of the election outcomes. Further, the Women's March and the March for Science were placed on the calendar nationwide. It is estimated that more than 1 in 100 Americans participated in the Women's March on the

second day of President Trump's Administration (Chenoweth and Pressman 2017). Where many marchers were middle class and upper middle class White women, this march reified intersectional boundary tensions between class, race, and gender where non-White participants sought greater voice and space from their White co-marchers (Grigby Bates 2017). Further, this may provide an example of the conditional effect of learned helplessness following the presidential election for those at the higher levels of income. Regardless, the highlighted intersectional tensions from the Women's March are only one example of the complexity behind exit and voice, suggesting that future work necessitates deeper investigation into intersectional experiences across income, gender, race, ethnicity (and possibly immigration status), and age.

Consequences of Learned Helplessness – Hypothesis 1d

As there may be multiple origins of learned helplessness, one method of testing its effects is to experimentally manipulate it. Thus far, learned helplessness has been discussed as operating more like a predisposition, but it is likely more of a state than a trait, shaped by particular experiences and potentially made salient in different contexts. Given this, it is worth considering what happens in the political context. For example, what happens to voting and protesting behavior when helplessness is made salient? When people are reminded of their failures or inability to access or change the institutionalized, conventional political system, how does helplessness impact people's motivation to engage? Further, does the salience of learned helplessness impact the way people view the democratic system within which they live? For example, is it possible for campaign

adds, news stories that remind people of voter suppression, or losing poll projections to make learned helplessness salient, subsequently driving down motivation to turn out or motivation to rally or protest? Before these specific contexts can be tested in future work, the first step is to determine whether it is possible to experimentally manipulate learned helplessness. Hypothesis 1d expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, the tendency to exit through lower reported instrumental voting behavior will increase and expressive behavior, like rallying or protesting will increase.

Did the manipulation work? To evaluate whether the learned helplessness manipulation actually did exacerbate the learned helplessness, difference of means tests were conducted for the learned helplessness scale between the un-manipulated control condition and manipulated condition. First, in Sample 2, respondents who received the learned helplessness manipulation did score marginally significantly higher on learned helplessness than those who were in the control condition and did not receive the manipulation (mean diff.=-.02; p=.06). However, in Sample 4, respondents who received the learned helplessness manipulation did not score significantly higher on the learned helplessness scale than those who were in the control condition (mean diff.=-.002; n.s.). This could have been due to noise created by all of the other experimental manipulations with which respondents interacted. Further, when placed in a linear regression format controlling for the other investigators' experimental conditions and weighting the model, a treatment dummy variable for the learned helplessness manipulation was still not statistically significant (b=.01, n.s.).

Testing Hypothesis 1d. Considering that learned helplessness ended up not being not experimentally manipulated in Sample 4, it is only possible to test H1d in Sample 2. However, manipulated learned helplessness did not significantly impact reported voting or protesting behavior, reported in Table 3.16.

[Insert Table 3.16 Here]

This raises a handful of questions about the experimental manipulation and the ability to manipulate learned helplessness. Peterson, Maier, and Seligman (1993) note, learned helplessness is difficult to study in the laboratory context because the manipulations of situational factors that induce learned helplessness have to be strong enough to affect dependent measures, but not too strong as to overwhelm the effect of individual differences. As such, it is possible that the learned helplessness manipulation was not strong enough to make learned helplessness sufficiently salient for the respondents. Alternatively, it is possible that learned helplessness is an experience so strongly incorporated into one's identity, that it will not be easily manipulated. Future work will look at learned helplessness experimentally where respondents will engage in experiences of winning or losing to make helplessness salient, similar to the experiments conducted in prior learned helplessness work (e.g., Dyck, Vallentyne, and Breen 1979; Mikulincer 1988, 1994; Wortman, Panciera, Shusterman, and Hibscher 1976).

Discussion

This chapter sought to expand the study of disaffection in the political context by accounting for perceptions of repeated failure and loss of control that become part of

individuals' self-identity, and further impact the way in which they engage in political activities, utilizing exit or different forms of voice. By incorporating learned helplessness, we may better understand the effects of experiencing repeated failure and persistent losses of control that contribute to political disaffection, and consequently, affecting the ways in which people voice exit or voice. These feelings of repeated failure and loss of control may stem from experiences with repeated political losses, systemic marginalization, feelings of being un- or underrepresented, or even from negative experiences with the legal system or government services and thus, should be incorporated into our study of disaffection and political behavior. This chapter has shown that those who experience greater learned helplessness are less likely to engage in instrumental behavior (i.e., vote likelihood, vote confidence, and reported turnout), but are more likely to engage in expressive behavior (i.e., reported rallying and protesting).

It is important to note that across the models predicting different forms of voice, outside of learned helplessness, the measures of disaffection are less consistent. Overall, internal efficacy, the closest measure to learned helplessness was only a consistent predictor of increased probability of vote confidence and protesting behavior. Internal efficacy, unlike learned helplessness, less consistently predicted vote likelihood across the samples, and was not significant in either Sample 4 or 5 in predicting reported turnout. Alternatively, political interest was a consistent predictor of increased probability of vote likelihood and turnout, but not less so for vote confidence or protesting behavior. External efficacy was not predictive of any of the measures of voting behavior, but was inconsistently predictive in Samples 1 and 3 for protesting behavior. Similarly, trust was

only predictive of turnout in Sample 4 and of protesting in Samples 1 and 5. Taking these main effects together, this chapter reinforces the need for capturing the concept of learned helplessness so as to better explain and understand political exit and voice through (dis)engagement. Yet, the chapter also tells a more nuanced story behind exit, and voice.

While Chapter 2 explored the numerous potential explanations for what causes helplessness and disaffection, this chapter began to explore the ways that helplessness and disaffection impact instrumental and expressive political behavior. While level of income consistently was shown to shape learned helplessness, this chapter also demonstrated that learned helplessness consistently partially mediates the relationship between income and the probability that someone will be likely to vote or report as having actually voted. Further, a few of the measures of disaffection also partially mediate the relationship between income and voting behavior, i.e. internal efficacy and political interest. However, these measures less consistently mediate the relationship than learned helplessness. The evidence from these mediational models presents an addendum to the broader resources literature on political participation, such that it is not just the level of income alone that predicts whether someone is likely to or will actually turn out to vote, but that the way in which that level of income makes them feel and experience disaffection, particularly an aspect of helplessness related to class experiences. Further questions related to this inquiry are explored in the next chapter.

While the chapter explores both the mediational and conditional effect of income and learned helplessness on examples of instrumental and expressive political behavior, the results of the mediational models are stronger than the moderation results.

Additionally, while strong experimental evidence for learned helplessness was not found, future work plans to investigate alternative experimental tests of learned helplessness, e.g., making repeated losses salient through repeatedly losing or winning at a game with financial incentives. Taken together, this chapter has provided evidence that learned helplessness is a consistent predictor of both *exit* and *voice*. However, the effect of learned helplessness on exit and voice was conditional upon particular marginalized identities, some of which were unexpected and opposite from what was hypothesized.

First, unexpectedly, there was no effect of learned helplessness on voting or protesting behavior for those who felt that they were on the losing side of politics. Since feeling like one is on the losing side of politics on issues that matter to them is tied more clearly to direct outcomes from elections, it is not surprising that loser perceptions are not tied to protesting and rallying behaviors, as they are less tied to specific actors and outcomes. However, in Sample 4, for those who felt that they were on the winning side of politics, learned helplessness drove down the probability of being extremely likely to vote, as well as the probability of turning out.

Second, in assessing how the effects of learned helplessness on voting and protesting behavior might be moderated by subordinated racial and ethnic identities, the results uncovered some interesting, and again unexpected, effects. Before summarizing the results, it is worth noting that utilizing survey work to assess the complex role of race and ethnicity can leave the interpretation of the results as less rich, as survey items restrict the measurement of these identities down to simple response items in order to quantify these identities with only a few items. It must be acknowledged that this identity

reduction is a drawback of the survey approach utilized here. Consequently, in making conclusions about these flat and restricted measures of racial and ethnic identity, the evidence should be considered with a critical eye.

First, while it was expected that the effect of learned helplessness for Black and African American respondents would decrease the probability of engagement in voting behavior, in Sample 4, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood for Black and African American respondents actually increased the probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior. Additionally, when using the White/non-White measure, again unexpectedly, learned helplessness decreased the probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior, i.e., both vote likelihood and turnout in Samples 4 and 5 and increased the probability of engaging in more expressive behavior, i.e., reported protesting and rallying behavior in Sample 4 for White respondents.

Second, for respondents who identify ethnically as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, the effect of learned helplessness on voting and protesting behavior operates as hypothesized. It was expected that for those who identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish, that the effect of learned helplessness would decrease the probability of engaging in instrumental voting behavior, but increase the probability of engaging in more expressive protesting behavior. However, in regard to protesting, the effect of learned helplessness for those who do not identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish does decrease the probability of engaging in voting behavior, but to a much lesser extent.

Third, the conditional effects of learned helplessness by gender were a bit mixed. It was expected that learned helplessness for females would decrease the probability of

engaging in instrumental voting behavior, and increase the probability of engaging in more expressive protesting and rallying behavior. While in Samples 1 and 3, the effect of learned helplessness for females did decrease vote likelihood and turnout, the effect of learned helplessness also decreased vote likelihood for males. Additionally, in Sample 5, while the effect of learned helplessness did not increase the probability of protest for females, it did increase the probability of protest, unexpectedly, for males.

Last, given challenges with observational data, this chapter also tested whether the effects of learned helplessness on political behavior were moderated by income. For engagement in instrumental voting behavior, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood was not moderated by income. However, for turnout in Samples 4 and 5, the effect of learned helplessness was moderated, but only significantly for those at the higher levels of income, which is not what was expected. Additionally, for protesting behavior, the conditional effect of learned helplessness flipped after the election, compared to results before the election. In Sample 4 before the election, the effect of learned helplessness for low income respondents increased the probability of protesting behavior, but in Sample 5, following the election, the effect of learned helplessness for low income respondents decreased the probability of protesting. The exact opposite occurred for high income respondents, such that in Sample 4 before the election, the effect of learned helplessness for high income respondents decreased the probability of protesting, but increased the probability of protesting after the election. These results, as well as the gender results, could be in part due to the timing of when the questions were asked in relation to the presidential election and advertisement of political marches

following the 2016 presidential election. More work, particularly intersectional work, is needed to elucidate the conditional effect of gender on learned helplessness for *exit* and *voice*.

In seeking to further the study of feelings of uncontrollability as it relates to political behavior, this chapter introduced the concept of learned helplessness with the expectation that it would help explain people's choice to exit and disengage from the existing political system (choosing not to vote), or explain their selection for voice utilizing instrumental or expressive political participation (voting or protesting). While the traditional learned helplessness literature focuses on passivity, and is thus a nice match with explaining when people disengage from voting behavior, this dissertation diverges from the helplessness literature by using learned helplessness to explain action in more expressive forms of political behavior. This chapter posits that engagement in protesting and rallying behavior may be one way those experiencing helplessness may seek to reassert control over their experience with the political system.

At its root, learned helplessness stems from experience. What this chapter did not determine is the other factors that might also shape the experiences that effect overall feelings of learned helplessness, disaffection, and choices for voice and exit. It is possible that environmental contexts within which people experience the political system may shape the way learned helplessness is incorporated into people's self-concept. As the literature is still debating whether helplessness is more of a state or trait, shaped my unexpected experiences or uncontrollability, it is possible that other contextual factors that influence helplessness may spill over to influence political behavior. The next two

chapters begin to explore two dominant contemporary contexts shaping the way in which people experience the political environment, i.e., income inequality and elite polarization. These chapters examine the role context plays in shaping helplessness, and impacting exit or voice. The next chapter, Chapter 4, explores the impact of income inequality, whereas the following chapter, Chapter 5, explores the role of elite polarization.

Chapter 4

Reification of Inequality: Helplessness, Disaffection, and Financial Insecurity

When was the last time you or your household worried about your finances or "making ends meet"? If you have, you are not alone. In 2015, nearly 60% of American households reported worrying about their finances over the last year ("Americans' Financial Security…" 2015). More acutely, financial distress affecting Americans who fall below the poverty line is undebatable, and pervasive across the country.

The National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) found in a recent report that the wage a full-time worker makes is not enough to rent a two-bedroom apartment or house anywhere in the country, and in more than 99% of American counties, it is not even enough to make a one-bedroom affordable (NLIHC 2017a). Thus, "in no state can a minimum wage worker afford a one-bedroom rental home at the average Fair Market Rent, working a standard 40-hour work week, without paying more than 30% of their income (NLIHC 2017a). Moreover, the report shows that an extremely low income (ELI) household, whose income is less than the poverty level or 30% of their area's median, cannot afford the average cost of a modest one-bedroom rental home in any state. In a related report, NLIHC also found that many low-income households - more than 20 million renter households live in housing poverty - cannot afford to meet their other basic needs like food, transportation, medical care, and other goods and services after they pay for their housing (NLIHC, 2017b). Taken together, this means that many Americans are

spending as much as half of their income on housing, struggling to not sacrifice other basic necessities.

Yet, these strains and experienced poverty do not encapsulate a wide range of concerns with financial distress experienced by the middle and upper-middle class, as well. Concerns about job loss and insecurity, the cost of children's education, and healthcare, and acquired debt are only a part of this financial distress. It is assumed that as people climb the income ladder, material shortages become less predominant and consumer power grows.

However, there may be greater access to purchasing "'things'—goods, houses, and, most importantly, education—to show for their higher earnings, but they do not have healthy finances. Having those 'things' is of course an improvement over not having them, but only for the very, very rich (or the very, very unusual) is there any real escape from the pressure-cooker of American household finances" (Rosen 2016). According to the Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) conducted annually by the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs, a sizable number of American adults are struggling with regular expenses and coping with unexpected hardships.[25] For example, the survey in 2016 found that approximately 25%

---

[25] Since October 2013, the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs has conducted a Survey of Household Economics and Decisionmaking (SHED) and released a Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households. The statistics above reflect the Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2016 released in May 2017, based on 6,634 respondents who completed

of American adults are not able to pay all of their current month's bills in full, and 44% say they could not cover an emergency expense costing $400 or would have to cover it by selling something or borrowing money. The Americans' Financial Security Pew survey also found that 83% of those worried about their finances are worried about their lack of savings and 69% feel they do not have enough money to retire.

These surveys identify a tension between experienced financial distress and actual growing income inequality. Schlozman, Verba, and Brady (2012) illustrate that economic inequality is possibly more unequally distributed now than at any point in several generations up to this point in U.S. history. Over the past thirty years, the U.S. income distribution has shifted toward the wealthy, leading it to be the most unequal among advanced democracies (Luttig 2013; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006). Some have argued that American income inequality may be higher today than it has ever been, pointing to technological change and globalization as particularly responsible for widening the gap between skilled workers and less-educated workers (Guo 2016). Using the Survey of Consumer Finance, as well as estate and income tax returns, Saez and Zucman (2016) that wealth inequality has grown in in the last 30 years due to the upsurge of top incomes (the 0.1% of wealth share) and an increase in saving rate inequality. They also show that the top 0.1% of wealth share has risen from 7% in 1978 to 22% in 2012, which is

---

the 2016 survey. For the full report, see: https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201705.pdf

commensurate with levels of income inequality in 1929 at the start of the Great Depression.

While it is clear that income inequality has grown, and previous chapters have emphasized the role of respondents' income level, this chapter is most interested in perceptions of income inequality and their consequences for engagement in voting and protesting behavior. Page and Jacobs (2009) find that most Americans are at least aware of and unhappy about high and increasing economic inequality, and they support a range of government solutions when their well-being or opportunity is threatened. Along similar lines, Bartels (2008) shows that most people support economic equality, at least in the abstract, but that political ideology and attention to politics condition this support, such that highly aware conservatives are much less concerned, highly aware liberals are much more concerned about inequality. Harkening back to Converse (1964) and Zaller (1992), Bartels (2008) reinforces that people may or may not have crystalized attitudes about inequality, such that the uninformed are unlikely to grasp the political relevance of their beliefs and values, whereas informed people may distort the facts that are contrary to their beliefs. This may end up preserving a "false consistency between their beliefs about the causes, extent, and meaning of inequality in contemporary American society on one hand and their ideological or partisan predilections on the other" (Bartels 2008: 129).

Tied to broader attitudes about economic inequality and insecurity, Hacker, Rehm, and Schlesinger (2013) argue that more work is needed in the post-Great Recession era to examine the sources of economic uncertainty and loss and how these experiences translate into politically relevant attitudes and behavior. Using the Survey of

Economic Risk Perceptions and Insecurity (SERPI) survey that they constructed to be administered as part of the 2008-2009 Panel Survey of the American National Election Study (ANES), they find evidence of widespread economic worries, ranging from concerns about employment, medical care, familial arrangements, and wealth. They conclude that Americans deeply value their economic security, particularly during times of economic shock and upheaval, and construct expectations based on their own experiences and the experiences of those around them. These expectations shape how people consider their own economic experiences, as well as about government's role in making their economic experiences more secure (Hacker et al. 2013: 44).

The differences in experienced income and perceptions about income inequality are quite consequential. Inherent within the historical and contemporary U.S. democracy, with its competitive two-party system, there has been a clearly identified upper-class bias in regard to political involvement, influence, and representation (Gilens 2012; Leighley and Nagler 2014; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). While early work on participation (e.g., Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) concluded voters were representative of nonvoters on policy issues, consensus among scholars in the contemporary political environment is that this is no longer the case. Gilens (2012) suggests that adoption of policy outcomes favored by the affluent persisted for the affluent but disappeared for the middle class and the poor. This suggests that political representation functions reasonably well for the affluent, but leaves the middle-class and the poor unrepresented (unless they share the preferences of the well-off).

In particular, Leighley and Nagler (2014) demonstrated voters hold different attitudes than nonvoters on economic and redistributive issues, and affluent citizens continue to turn out at considerably higher rates than poor citizens. This research has identified that voters tend to be from privileged groups regarding race, gender, education and income (i.e., voters are likely to be white, male, more educated, and affluent). And, racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic resources and rootedness in the community do not explain overall group differences in participation (Logan, Darrah, Oh 2012). To quote Schattschneider, "the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent." (1960, p. 35). This all has the potential to introduce considerable representational biases and blind spots among elected officials as a result from the participation of "some" and not "all" (Griffin and Newman 2005).

These biases and blind spots among elected officials might be due to political inaction among the middle-class and poor. Levine (2015) points to the perceptions of economic insecurity issues at the "root political inaction" (Levine 2015: 161). Economic insecurity is classified in four forms: 1) threat of involuntary job loss, 2) health care costs, 3) retirement insecurity, and 4) college costs. This classification of economic insecurity goes beyond the broad set of concerns those at or near the poverty line face. Rather, economic insecurity has a broader reach throughout the U.S populace. For Levine (2015), political inaction is classified as not devoting time or money, e.g., attending political meetings, volunteering with campaigns or other political groups, or donating money to a campaign or political group, rather than more instrumental voting political behavior. This is justified with the argument that voting behavior only provides a blunt

communicative tool for the electorate, opportunities take place too infrequently, and voting often communicates little precise information (Levine 2015: 25). With similar reasoning provided in Chapter 2 in this dissertation, it is possible that concerns with economic insecurity may also influence engagement in more expressive political action, i.e., marching, rallying, and protesting behavior.

Thus, this chapter turns to a discussion of the role context plays in shaping feelings of learned helplessness. Langer (1983) found that the perception of helplessness can be inferred from the environment, without direct experience of failure. In addition to the exploration of political polarization as an important political context that could shape learned helplessness discussed in Chapter 5, this chapter evaluates how salience of income inequality may shape feelings of learned helplessness and political behavior.

While people want to regain control in their lives. Poverty, and arguably economic insecurity, can create a perpetual feedback loop of uncontrollability, as well as restrict or eliminate options for reasserting control. Having the repeated experience with the lack of control over one's economic situation, or even being labeled as incompetent to make more money or save more for retirement, reinforces that they may not be able to be effective now or in later actions. Kane (1987) emphasizes the long term attitudinal and motivational implications of poverty tied to learned helplessness, such that regardless of how much someone may desire a particular outcome, the expectancy that one's action can help attain it motivates the action or inaction. For example, "No matter how much an individual would like to work, he or she will not look for employment unless there is a reasonable expectation that a job can be found" (Kane 1987: 410).

American society has long promised the idea of equality of opportunity and social mobility. Yet:

> … the emphasis of American society on equality of opportunity and social mobility coexists well with income inequalities between different strata, which are as sharp in the United States as in other societies and which, in the view of some analysts, are by no means likely to decrease…income inequality between different educational and occupational strata, even between skilled and unskilled workers, functions as an incentive for achievement and high economic performance. When this happens, individuals at the bottom of the social hierarchy find themselves penalized by the system of incentives; moreover, they feel socially useless. (Di Palma 1970: 191)

Further tied to income inequality, the American educational system, and political participation, Bruch and Soss (forthcoming) find that for youth who have negative school-authority experiences, e.g., suspension, being singled out for punishment, or perceptions of unfair treatment, are strongly associated with later patterns of political engagement through lower electoral participation, and less trusting perceptions of government. Of note, students who experience these negative school authority experiences are more likely to be lower SES, Black, and male. The authors conclude that American schools function as powerful sites of experiential learning, reinforcing early on that the system is unfair and unequal, which has a considerable impact on later engagement.

Growing economic inequality has been identified as relating to lower political participation and civic engagement (Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012). This chapter argues that learned helplessness can stem from experiences with inequality, particularly income inequality, which in turn has the ability to impact the ways in which people select different forms of exit and voice to support or oppose the political system within which they live. Learned helplessness scholars hypothesized that repeated experiences with uncontrollable outcomes interfere with the ability to seek out and recognize opportunities for exercising control. Kane (1987) identifies that being aware of being labeled as helpless, inferior, or incompetent may lead people to assume helpless behaviors even without experiencing failure first.

Given this, and the issues presented by our current systems of economic inequality, the question must be considered: if we do not better understand the disaffected, how can we engage their voices to solve problems that disproportionally effects this segment of the population? Thus, this chapter seeks to experimentally manipulate perceptions of income inequality. The next section reviews the hypotheses tested and then moves to a discussion of the results and their implications.

Hypotheses

Considering the important role context may play in affecting feelings of uncontrollability through learned helplessness, this chapter tests three hypotheses regarding the role income inequality plays for exacerbating learned helplessness, and in turn, how that may impact engagement in voting and protesting behavior. Using a survey

experiment to manipulate perceptions of income inequality, H2, the *inequality hypothesis,* expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned helplessness. Second, as a number of scholars have identified economic inequality as impacting engagement in voting behavior, (e.g., Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), H2a expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate respondents' choice to exit and disengage from voting behavior. As the inequality survey experiment allows this chapter to test whether the reason context, i.e., income inequality, affects participation is because it causes learned helplessness, it also allows for an assessment of how political disaffection then, in turn, impacts political participation and civic disengagement. Thus, H2b expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, high income inequality is likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior.

Procedure

Data

The inequality survey experiment was only included Sample 3. Analyses below focus on the 2,230 respondents who participated in the control condition or one of the two conditions of the income inequality experiment.[26] Additional information on the

[26] This data collection effort also included another survey experiment on political polarization discussed in Chapter 5. However, respondents were not assigned to overlapping survey conditions, so the second survey experiment does not have any bearing on the experimental results reported on the polarization experiment.

sample is available in Chapter 2, as well as in Appendix A. The experimental treatments, as discussed below, are available in Appendix C.

Manipulation and Measures

Experimental Manipulation of Income Inequality Perceptions. While individual level of income will be measured, the dissertation work proposed here seeks to experimentally make income inequality and income distributions salient. To test the impact of income inequality salience, a three-condition, between-subjects, framing experiment was conducted, where respondents were randomly assigned to the control condition or to be exposed to one of two income inequality treatments. Subjects were presented with a table of information about income inequality and the U.S. income distribution.

The first condition had respondents enter their household income and then were asked to find what percentage of U.S. households make less than the value entered. They were then encouraged use the table to answer a few questions about other incomes to experience the income distribution information available. For example, subjects were asked to answer questions like, "What percentage of households earns less than $85,000?" The second condition had subjects interact with an information table in a similar way, but the values provided reflect what the U.S. income distribution would look like today if economic growth since 1980 had been evenly shared across the income distribution, i.e., had income inequality not grown since 1980. Of the 2,230 subjects used in these analyses, 731 were randomly assigned to the control condition. To the first

treatment condition that focuses on current income inequality, 754 were randomly assigned and, 745 were randomly assigned to the second treatment condition that focuses on the gap in current income inequality, compared to what the U.S. income distribution would look like if income inequality had not grown since 1980.

To guarantee the manipulation of perceptions of economic inequality, these manipulations were modeled after those utilized in an online survey experiment by Kuziemko et al. (2013; 2015), first published by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The authors found that the experimental conditions had large effects on views about income inequality in the U.S. Additionally, rather than use interactive sliders like Kuziemko et al. did in the original experiments, Sample 3 utilized a static information board so as to control more of the information to which subjects were exposed, as well as which questions they answered. However, Sample 3 still used what Kuziemko et al. call "omnibus information treatments," in regard to the type of information provided to subjects (2015: 1484-1485).

The information treatments sought to provide a simplified boost to individuals' knowledge about inequality and the U.S. income distribution, rather than giving a long description of the underlying causes of inequality. While the information was presented in a static manner, rather than in an interactive format, the respondents were still asked to interact with the information to answer personal income questions so the treatments were both somewhat interactive and customized to each respondent. From these treatments, it is expected that people who interact with the treatment showing what the current U.S. income distribution would look like if inequality had not grown since 1980 will have a

greater impact on exacerbating learned helplessness than the treatment showing income inequality today. This reasoning stems from an expectation that the former treatment will induce greater feelings of uncontrollability over inequality than the latter treatment, and will thus will induce greater feelings of helplessness.

Manipulation Check. Since the goal of the income inequality experiment was to manipulate perceptions of inequality, Sample 3 utilized nine questions to evaluate whether perceptions of inequality increased as a result of the treatments. First, respondents were asked about whether they thought everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed. On a 1-4 scale, response options ranged from 0 "Everyone does" to 4 "No one does." The variable was reverse coded and scaled to range from 0-1, so that higher values correspond to attitudes that everyone has an opportunity to succeed. Second, respondents were asked whether over the last 5-10 years income inequality has increased. On a 1-5 scale, response options ranges from 1 "Increased a great deal" to 5 "Decreased a great deal." This variable was also reverse coded and scaled to range from 0-1, so that higher values correspond to attitudes that income inequality has increased. Third, respondents were asked whether over the next 5 years, would income differences increase. Response options ranged from 1 "Increase a great deal" to 5 "Decrease a great deal." This variable was reverse coded and scaled to range from 0-1 so that higher values reflected perceptions that income differences will increase. Fourth, respondents were asked about whether they thought income inequality currently was a serious problem. Response options ranges from 1 "Serious problem" to 4 "Not a problem at all" and the

variable was reverse coded and scaled 0-1 so that higher values reflect perceptions that income inequality is a more serious problem.

Beyond specific questions using language about income inequality, respondents were also asked about perceptions of upward mobility, and their personal economic situation. These questions were borrowed from the 2007 Maxwell Poll on Citizenship and Inequality. This poll is one of the few national surveys that focuses on income inequality, experiences with government programs, and political engagement.[27]

First, respondents were asked about how much upward mobility (children doing better than the family they came from) do they think there is in America. The response options ranged from 1 "A great deal of upward mobility" to 5 "No upward mobility at all." The responses were reverse coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1, so that higher values reflected perceptions of greater mobility. Second, respondents were asked whether over the last several years had their economic situation improved. Response options ranged from 1 "Greatly improved" to 7 "Greatly worsened." Responses were reverse coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1. Higher values reflect perceptions of improvement. Third, respondents were asked if they thought their economic situation is likely to

---

[27] The Maxwell Poll on Citizenship and Inequality is directed by Professor Jeff Stonecash, through the Maxwell School in the Campbell Public Affairs Institute at Syracuse University. The survey asks questions about engagement in political affairs and other aspects of civic life, as well as views on social and economic inequality in the United States. More information on the Maxwell Poll may be found at: https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/programs/The_Maxwell_Poll/

improve over the next several years, with response options ranging from 1 “Greatly improve” to 7 “Greatly worsen.” These responses were also reverse coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values reflect perceptions of improvement. Fourth, respondents were asked, compared to their parents, are they better off economically. The response options ranged from 1 “Much better off” to 5 “Much worse off” and were reverse coded and rescaled to range from 0 to 1 so that higher values correspond to perceptions of being better off. Lastly, respondents were asked about how their personal economic situation compared to how others are doing. Response options ranged from 1 “Much better than average” to 5 “Much worse than average.” Responses were reverse coded and scaled to range from 0 to 1. Higher values reflect perceptions of doing better than average.

Disaffection Measures: As with chapters 2 and 3, the same disaffection measures are utilized: learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. All measures are coded to range from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding to higher levels of that variable. The question wording of all measures is available in Appendix B and a more extensive discussion of the individual measures is in Chapter 2.

Control Variables. The models presented in this chapter control for the following demographic and attitudinal variables (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female (coded as 1) or male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent

identified as White (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The models also include Republican and Democratic dummy variables, political ideology (extremely liberal is coded as 0 and extremely conservative is coded as 1), as well as a dummy variable for whether respondents view themselves on the losing side of politics.

Political Participation. The analyses below focus on two measures. The first is a measure of instrumental voting behavior, i.e. vote likelihood. The second is a measure of more expressive political behavior, i.e., marching, rallying, or protesting.

Results

Income Inequality: Does context play a role in exacerbating learned helplessness?

The *inequality hypotheses* seek to test whether context affects learned helplessness and political behavior. Before testing H2, which expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned helplessness, it is important to evaluate whether the survey experiment manipulated the intended inequality perceptions. If inequality perceptions can be experimentally manipulated and this changes levels of learned helplessness, this may provide initial evidence of a possible causal relationship between income inequality and learned helplessness.

Did the manipulation Work? Since the goal of the income inequality experiment was to manipulate perceptions of inequality, Sample 3 utilized nine questions to evaluate whether perceptions of inequality increased as a result of the treatments. The expectation is that the treatment showing how the U.S. income distribution would have looked if inequality had not grown since 1980 will elicit greater perceptions of inequality than both

the control condition and the treatment showing the U.S. income distribution today. This expectation is supported in seven of the nine questions. Table 4.1 shows the mean differences on these nine questions between the conditions.

[Insert Table 4.1 Here]

To test the mean differences, three condition dummy variables were constructed. First, two dummy variables were created where the inequality treatment coded "1" and the control condition was coded "0." Second, to compare the two experimental conditions directly with one another, a third dummy variable was created where the inequality since 1980 was coded "1" and the inequality today condition was coded "0."

The first of the nine questions asked about whether they thought everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed. While the inequality since 1980 condition was not significantly different from the control condition, the inequality today condition was significantly higher than both the control condition (diff= -.03, t= -2.18) and the inequality today condition (diff=.04, t= 2.89). Second, respondents were asked whether over the last 5-10 years, income inequality has increased. The inequality since 1980 condition was significantly higher than the control condition (diff=-.08, t=-5.08) and the inequality today condition (diff=-.11, t= -6.95). Additionally, the inequality today condition was significantly lower than the control condition (diff=.03, t=1.82). The inequality today treatment decreased perceptions of recent income inequality, and importantly, the inequality since 1980 treatment increased the perception that income inequality has increased.

Third, respondents were asked whether over the next 5 years, would income differences increase. There was not a significant difference between the income inequality today condition and the control condition (diff=.00, n.s.). However, the income inequality since 1980 condition was significantly higher than both the control condition (diff=-.06, t=-4.40) and the income inequality today condition (diff=-.06, t=-4.15). Again, the inequality since 1980 treatment increased perceptions of income inequality, particularly here that income inequality will increase over the next 5 years.

Fourth, respondents were asked about whether they thought income inequality currently was a serious problem. The inequality since 1980 condition is significantly higher than both the control condition (diff=-.04, t=-3.08), and the inequality today condition (diff=-.06, t=-4.72). Additionally, the inequality today condition is significantly lower than the control condition (diff=.02, t=1.67). The inequality since 1980 condition increased perceptions that income inequality is a serious problem, but, the inequality today condition decreased perceptions that income inequality is a serious problem.

Fifth, respondents were asked about how much upward mobility they think there is in America. The expectation here is that the inequality since 1980 condition will decrease perceptions of upward mobility. In fact, the inequality since 1980 condition is significantly lower than both the control condition (diff=.03, t= 2.25) and the inequality today condition (diff=.05, t=4.21). The inequality today condition was also significantly higher than the control condition, such that it raised perceptions of mobility (diff=-.02, t=-1.91).

Sixth, respondents were asked whether over the last several years had their economic situation improved. There were no differences between the conditions Additionally, respondents were asked if they thought their economic situation is likely to improve over the next several years. Again, there were no significant differences between the conditions. While the expectation was that the income inequality since 1980 condition would decrease perceptions of how economic situations have improved or will improve, the treatments did not affect these perceptions.

Eighth, respondents were asked, compared to their parents, are they better off economically. The expectation here is that the income inequality since 1980 condition will decrease perceptions of how well off people are compared to their parents, and that the inequality today condition will increase these perceptions. While the inequality today condition is not significantly different from the control condition (diff=.00, n.s.), the inequality since 1980 condition is significantly lower than both the control condition (diff=.03, t=1.96) and the inequality today condition (diff=.04, t=2.18).

Ninth, respondents were asked about how their personal economic situation fares compared to their perception of how others are doing, on average. The inequality today condition is significantly higher than both the control condition (diff=-.03, t=-2.28) and the inequality since 1980 condition (diff=.03, t=2.24). However, the inequality since 1980 condition is not significantly different form the control condition (diff=.00, t=n.s.).

Taken together, the condition exposing people to information about what the U.S. income distribution would look like if income inequality had not changed since 1980 exacerbated perceptions of inequality, and the inequality today condition seemingly has

people feeling more hopeful and less concerned. Interestingly, however the treatments did more to affect attitudes about income inequality, and inequality more generally, but did less to affect perceptions of respondents' own economic situation. This is something to which the discussion returns in the conclusion Now that the effectiveness of the treatments has been established, the next section turns to the more formal tests of the hypotheses.

Testing Hypothesis 2. In order to evaluate whether income inequality salience exacerbates learned helplessness, the inequality survey experiment to manipulate perceptions of income inequality, and H2, the *inequality hypothesis,* expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate learned helplessness. More specifically, it is expected that learned helplessness will be greater for respondents who were in the "income inequality since 1980" condition than it will be for those in the "income inequality today" condition or the control condition. To initially test whether the inequality treatments affected learned helplessness, difference of means tests were conducted. Table 4.2 shows the results of the difference of means tests between conditions for learned helplessness, as well as the measures of disaffection for comparison.

[Insert Table 4.2 Here]

Importantly, Table 4.2 shows that learned helplessness did not differ, on average, between the conditions. However, the inequality since 1980 condition did elicit higher average learned helplessness than both of the other two conditions, approaching marginal significance in the expected direction (diff=-.01, t=-1.10). While there were not

expectations for the measures of disaffection, the treatments did result in mean differences for internal efficacy and interest, but not for external efficacy or for trust.

For internal efficacy, the treatment conditions were not significantly different from one another, but the inequality today condition was marginally significantly larger than the control condition (diff=-.01, t=-1.61). Additionally, the inequality since 1980 condition was significantly larger than the control condition (diff=-.02, t=-2.19). The treatments' effect on internal efficacy is a bit puzzling, as it appears that making income inequality salient, regardless of which treatment, increased respondents' feelings of internal efficacy.

As for interest, the inequality today condition was not significantly different from the control condition. However, the inequality since 1980 condition was significantly larger than the control condition (diff=-.02, t=-1.69), and marginally larger than the inequality today condition (diff=-.02, t=-1.50). As with internal efficacy, it is not entirely clear why the inequality since 1980 condition would have elicited greater average interest. It is possible that this could be less of an effect and more of an anomaly of the respondents in the conditions based on their level of interest. However, since the respondents were randomly assigned to the conditions, this should not be the case.

The expectation of increased learned helplessness due to income inequality salience stems from prior work that people may acquire feelings of helplessness from observing the uncontrollability of an environment around them (Langer 1983) or from experiencing repeated failed attempts personally to improve one's economic situation. As the income inequality treatments did not affect perceptions of respondents' own

economic situations in two out of four questions, it is possible that the income inequality manipulations were not strong enough to induce feelings of personal uncontrollability. It might also be that respondents felt relatively like they were doing better than others, thus buffering against feelings of helplessness that may have arisen. Additionally, it is possible that respondents' actual level of income impacted how they were effected, but again as respondents were randomly assigned to the conditions, levels of income should be nearly evenly distributed across the conditions. Table 4.3 demonstrates that respondents' income is evenly distributed across the conditions.

[Insert Table 4.3 Here]

While difference of means tests are a simple bivariate way to test H2, the impact of the conditions may also be tested in the regression format, controlling for the measures of disaffection, as well as demographic and attitudinal measures. Thus, Table 4.4 shows the results for an OLS regression model regressing learned helplessness on the measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls. To run this model, two additional condition dummy variables were constructed. For the first, the inequality since 1980 condition was coded as "1" and the control and inequality today conditions were coded as "0." For the second, the inequality today condition was coded as "1" and the control and inequality since 1980 conditions were coded as "0," so that when included in the model, the reference category is the control condition.

[Insert Table 4.4 Here]

From this model, when controls and the measures of disaffection are included, it is clear that the inequality since 1980 treatment did have a marginally significant effect

on feelings of uncontrollability through learned helplessness (b=.011, p<.10), relative to the control condition. This model provides support, albeit weak support, that the salience of income inequality may influence feelings of helplessness, above and beyond the predictors discussed in the previous chapter (see Table 2.19). Given this slight support for H2, the chapter turns to questions of whether income inequality salience impacts engagement in political behavior, as well as possibly of a mediational relationship.

Testing Hypothesis 2a. Moving to the second hypothesis, since economic inequality and their concerns have been identified as decreasing engagement in voting behavior, (e.g., Levine 2015; Putnam 2000, 2015; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2012), H2a expects that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate respondents' choice to exit and disengage from voting behavior. Specifically, it is expected that being exposed to the experimental treatment showing what the U.S. income distribution would look like today if income inequality had not changed since 1980 will exacerbate respondents' choice to exit, and be less likely to engage in voting behavior, e.g., likelihood of voting.

To test H2a, the dichotomous measure of vote likelihood was regressed on the condition dummy variables and the measures of disaffection, as well as the demographic and attitudinal controls. Additionally, as there were not overwhelmingly strong experimental effects on the measures of disaffection, the condition dummy variables were interacted with learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection to determine whether their effect on voting behavior is moderated by inequality salience. Table 4.5

shows the effects of the inequality conditions on the measures of disaffection for vote likelihood.

[Insert Table 4.5 Here]

Model 1 in Table 4.5 shows the main effects of the inequality conditions. As expected, the inequality since 1980 condition is marginally significant (b=-.23, p<.10). This means that the inequality since 1980 condition, relative to the control condition, changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by .79. Alternatively stated, the salience of what the U.S. income distribution would look like today if income inequality had not changed since 1980 decreases the probability of being extremely likely to vote by 21%. While the models for internal efficacy, external efficacy, trust, and interest do not show a conditional relationship between the income inequality conditions and disaffection for vote likelihood, Model 2 in Table 4.5 does show that there is a marginally significant interaction between learned helplessness and the income inequality since 1980 condition. Figure 4.1 shows the effects of learned helplessness on vote likelihood by experimental condition.

[Insert Figure 4.1 Here]

When we look at the marginal effects of learned helplessness by condition on vote likelihood, we see that the effect of learned helplessness has a significant effect on decreasing the probability of being extremely likely to vote in the control condition (b= -.45, p<.001) and in the income inequality since 1980 condition (b=-.38, p<.001), but not in the income inequality today condition. The strongest effects of learned helplessness on the probability of being extremely likely to turn out are still in the control condition,

however. Taken together, these results present evidence that when income inequality is made salient, specifically the extent of what the U.S. income distribution would be had income inequality not increased, engagement in voting behavior declines.

While not directly hypothesized, it is possible that the experimental conditions had an effect on reported retrospective, expressive political behavior. To test whether this is the case, the dichotomous measure of having participated in rallying or protesting behavior was regressed on the condition dummy variables, learned helplessness, the measures of disaffection, and the demographic and attitudinal controls. Table 4.6 shows the main effects and interactive models predicting the probability of having reported as participating in rallying or protesting behavior.

[Insert Table 4.6 Here]

Examining retrospective behavioral measures in the experimental context can be difficult. Retrospective behavioral measures are largely subject to social desirability bias. However, it is still possible that the experimental conditions affected how people reported whether or not they had participated in a rally in support or opposition of a particular issue or candidate in the previous 3 months. Looking first at Model 1 in Table 4.6, there are no evident main effects of the experimental conditions on the probability of having engaged in protesting or rallying. Models 2 through 6 in Table 4.6 show the interactive models between the condition dummy variables, learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection. In Models 4-6 do not show any conditional effects of external efficacy, trust, or interest on the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. However, Models 2 and 3 show significant conditional effects of learned helplessness and internal

efficacy. Looking at the marginal effects of learned helplessness by condition in Model 2, the effect of learned helplessness has a significant effect on increasing the probability of reporting as having engaged in protesting behavior in the income inequality today condition only (b=.36, p<.001). Figure 4.2 illustrates this interactive relationship.

[Insert Figure 4.2 Here]

The marginal effects of internal efficacy by condition in Model 3 show that internal efficacy only has a significant effect on increasing the probability of reporting as having engaged in protesting behavior in the control condition (b=.35, p<.001), as well as in the income inequality since 1980 condition (b=.45, p<.001). Figure 4.3 shows the effects of internal efficacy by condition. While the effects are significant, the confidence intervals do overlap, indicating that the conditions are not significantly different from one another.

[Insert Figure 4.3 Here]

Setting the retrospective protesting models aside, the vote likelihood models provide some evidence in support of H2a, such that income inequality salience suppresses the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Additionally, H2 showed that income inequality salience exacerbated feelings of helplessness. Thus, if the results from H2 and H2a are brought together, it is possible, then, that learned helplessness may mediate the relationship between income inequality salience and voting behavior. Hypothesis 2b turns to testing whether there is any evidence in support of this potential mediational relationship.

Testing Hypothesis 2b. The income inequality survey experiment provides an opportunity to test, experimentally, whether the reason context, i.e., income inequality affects participation is because it causes learned helplessness, which then affects people's choice of exit and voice. Specifically, H2b expects that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, high income inequality is likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior.

To test this hypothesis, the medeff package in Stata 14 was used to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between the income inequality since 1980 and vote likelihood. With models that include the measures of disaffection, as well as demographic and attitudinal controls, learned helplessness does partially mediate the relationship between the income inequality salience induced in the income inequality since 1980 condition and vote likelihood. However, learned helplessness mediates only 7% of the total effect (95% CI 3-40% mediated). The measures of disaffection, internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest, do not partially mediate the relationship. Thus, this provides only weak evidence in support of H2b.

Furthermore, the weak partial mediation raises an important distinction between the experimental conditions' inducement of income inequality compared to people's experienced, actual level of income. It is important not to conflate perceptions about income inequality and experienced level of income. This distinction brings the discussion of mediation models back to the mediation models presented in Chapter 3, which illustrated the robust partial mediation of learned helplessness between level of income and voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout. Thus, the more powerful of the

mediated effects are those stemming from personal experience and personal concern of income level and economic security, rather than broader perceptions of income inequality. And, the income inequality conditions only moved two out of the four questions that measured respondents' perceptions of their own economic wellbeing, overall and in reference to others, on average.

This raises an additional question of what role perceived personal economic wellbeing might play for predicting learned helplessness and voting behavior. Using the two questions about respondents' economic wellbeing that were not moved by the income inequality treatments, Table 4.7 illustrates that in the control condition, perceptions that one's own economic situation has improved (Model 1, $b=-.04$, $p<.05$) or will improve over the next several years (Model 2, $b=-.10$, $p<.01$), learned helplessness is significantly decreased. These results follow what would be expected from the learned helplessness literature, such that feelings of uncontrollability about one's economic situation would largely induce helplessness. However, if the economic situation has improved or one believes that the economic situation will improve, this perception serves as a buffer against feelings of helplessness.

[Insert Table 4.7 Here]

Further, it is possible that the perceptions of one's own economic situation may impact vote likelihood. Using logistic regression, Table 4.8 demonstrates that while the perception that one's economic situation has improved is not significant in predicting the probability of being extremely likely to vote ($b=.33$, n.s.), the perception that one's economic situation will improve is marginally significant ($b=.88$, $p<.10$). Perceiving that

one's economic situation will improve changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by 2.41. A one-unit increase in belief that one's economic situation will improve increases the probability of being extremely likely to vote by 141%.

[Insert Table 4.8 Here]

As beliefs about the future shape feelings of helplessness, and helplessness impacts likelihood of voting, it is possible to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between perceptions that one's future economic situation and engagement in voting behavior. Again, using the medeff package in Stata 14, as well as full models with the measures of disaffection, and demographic and attitudinal controls, learned helplessness partially mediates 31% of the total effect (95% CI 18%-100%). Thus, taking the mediation models from Chapter 3 and the mediation model using perceptions of one's future economic situation, experiences and personal beliefs, rather than perception of income inequality, have the greatest effects on learned helplessness and impact on voice and exit in regard to voting behavior.

Discussion

With the pervasiveness of concern about financial security among American households, it is important for scholars to continue to seek to better understand how these concerns affect the ways in which they engage in their communities, beyond consumer engagement. There is a growing literature speaking to the impact that income inequality and economic insecurity have on political attitudes and political participation. This chapter sought to go beyond observational evidence to experimentally manipulate the

salience of income inequality to assess the role income inequality plays for exacerbating learned helplessness, and in turn, how that may impact engagement in instrumental voting and expressive protesting political behavior.

The first hypothesis, H2, expected that when made salient, income inequality would exacerbate learned helplessness. Through the use of difference of means tests, the income inequality treatments did not appear to have a significant effect on perceptions of learned helplessness. However, when placed in a regression format, controlling for the measures of disaffection, as well as demographics, the income inequality did marginally affect learned helplessness. Specifically, in the condition that made income inequality salient by showing how current income inequality fairs compared to what the U.S. income distribution would look like if income inequality had not grown since 1980. This condition marginally increased learned helplessness.

The second hypothesis, H2a expected that when made salient, income inequality will exacerbate respondents' choice to exit and disengage from voting behavior. In support of the hypothesis, the income inequality since 1980 condition significantly decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood. The income inequality since 1980 condition did significantly moderate the effect of learned helplessness on the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Additionally, the inequality today condition did significantly moderate the effect of learned helplessness on the probability of having engaged in protesting or rallying behavior. Yet, the experimental effects, when significant, were not overwhelming, and they did not affect the probability of having engaged in expressive political action, e.g., protesting.

Since there was at least some weak evidence in support of both H2 and H2a, expected that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally, when made salient, income inequality (the income inequality since 1980 condition) is likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior and this relationship will be mediated by learned helplessness. The mediation model using the experimental conditions, found that learned helplessness does partially mediate the relationship between income inequality salience and voting behavior. However, this partial mediation, while statistically significant, is quite small.

Consequently, the chapter evaluated whether perceptions of one's economic situation in the past and perceptions of it in the future would shape both learned helplessness and vote likelihood. Perceptions of one's economic situation in the past and for the future did significantly predict feelings of learned helplessness, and perceptions of future improvements significantly predicted the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Taking these significant results, the chapter also tested whether learned helplessness mediated the relationship between perceptions of one's future economic situation and vote likelihood. This mediation model demonstrated that learned helplessness does partially mediate this relationship.

This last set of analyses raises a few notes of caution regarding the findings. First, these results are from only one convenience sample. While the condition sizes were fairly large, approximately 700+ respondents in each condition, the sampling procedure was not nationally representative and survey weights were not used in these analyses. Second, the experimental manipulations impacted perceptions about income inequality in the

expected directions, as intended. However, they did less to manipulate perceptions of respondents' personal economic situation.

Moreover, additional questions arose from this investigation, which call for extensions of the findings within this chapter. For example, based on differences in perceptions of inequality identified by Bartels (2008) across ideology and political knowledge, it is possible that highly aware conservatives may be less concerned (and less easily experimentally manipulated), whereas highly aware liberals may be more concerned about inequality (and thus, more sensitive to the experimental manipulations). Thus, future work must reconcile the differences in perceptions about income inequality, perceptions of one's economic situation, and personal experiences with inequality and level of income. Additionally, income inequality is not the only context within which the U.S. populace functions. The next chapter turns to questions concerning the role of political context, e.g., elite polarization, plays in impacting feelings of learned helplessness, as well as how people utilize exit and voice through instrumental and expressive political action.

Chapter 5

Helplessness and Disaffection in a Polarized Context: Does Polarization Matter?

Previous chapters have focused on the causes and consequences of learned helplessness and disaffection and the impact disaffection has for political exit and voice. Yet, the dimensions of political disaffection may be shaped not only by the demographic and attitudinal factors already discussed, but by additional factors. Scholars have posited that disaffection may be shaped by inherited cultural bias and ideological political identities exogenous to the current political context or by "endogenously primed-reaction to current political events and to the actual behaviour of political elites and parties" (Segatti 2006: 267).[28] Thus, it is possible that in the U.S. context, the various aspects of disaffection may be shaped by the polarized political environment, reinforced by critical evaluations of political institutions, representatives, and the political process.

This chapter is the second to explore whether context effects feelings of learned helplessness as a measure of disaffection and how that impacts the ways in which people engage in political activities. In the contemporary U.S. political environment, polarization has come to overwhelm both elite and mass politics. This chapter examines the role perceived elite polarization may play for feelings of learned helplessness. As such, it is expected that contexts of high elite polarization may exacerbate people's perceptions of

---

[28] Segatti (2006) argues that at least in the Italian case, political disaffection is shaped by strong cultural bias and in particular circumstances, the bias can be disproved or confirmed depending on political context.

uncontrollability, and possibly impact the ways in which they engage in their political environment through instrumental and expressive political action.

As it is difficult to survey respondents in a political environment that is not highly polarized, the following analyses evaluate perceived elite polarization, as well as experimentally manipulated elite polarization, where high or low elite polarization is made salient. Particularly, when high polarization is made salient, this chapter tests whether learned helplessness is exacerbated and how that may impact how they exit or voice in regard to instrumental political behavior, i.e. voting behavior, or more expressive political action, i.e. rallying and protest.

While the least-engaged or disengaged are likely to be the least polarized themselves, they still experience politics in a polarized environment. For many, witnessing elite polarization may turn them away from politics. Polarization presents a unique context in which decision-makers are gridlocked and unwilling to change or compromise. Consequently, polarization is likely to reinforce the uncontrollability of the political system and potentially increase feelings of helplessness, and may be likely to discourage them from being politically engaged in voting behavior, but may encourage them to engage in more expressive forms of political behavior like protesting or even violence. For example, following the shooting in Virginia during a baseball practice for a group of Republican members of Congress, "It seems likely that a sense of political frustration or helplessness also contributes to a political situation in which people talk, joke, and even act on the idea of solving political differences with violence" (Azari 2017). This raises questions about the benefits and drawbacks of a political environment

where its elites are affectively and ideologically polarized, and the public is responding to the polarization.

As scholars continue to debate the relative extremity and consistency of Americans' policy preferences and party affiliations, they generally agree that relations between America's two major political camps have become increasingly acrimonious. At the elite level, polarization is evidenced by greater ideological homogeneity among partisans, increased divisions on major policy dimensions in politics, and less competitive elections (Abramowitz et al. 2006; Hetherington 2001; Layman and Carsey 2002; McCarty et al. 2006; see Webster and Abramowitz 2017 for a discussion of affective and ideological polarization alignment related to social welfare). Scholars have identified that elite polarization in the U.S. is at an all-time high since the American Civil War (Hare, Poole, and Rosenthal 2015; McCarty 2015).

Where elite polarization serves to clarify where the parties stand on important issues and to allow voters to adopt more consistent attitudes between their ideological and partisan preferences (Levendusky 2010), it can also increase interest and motivation of members of the active public to vote and participate in other political activities, thereby increasing the size of the engaged public (Abramowitz 2010). While the ideological divisions are not limited to party activists, the deepest ideological divisions have been found among the most interested, informed, and active citizens (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Yet, in considering those who experience the greatest learned helplessness, it is less clear what impact polarization has on learned helplessness, and whether polarization helps or hinders political engagement for these individuals.

The parties have played an active role in demobilizing the electorate, flying in the face of the usual view that party competition inevitably leads to the expansion of electoral participation e.g., Schattschneider (1960). However, demobilizing parties have an incentive to collaborate in the construction of legal and procedural obstructions which narrow the electorate (Piven and Cloward 2000), which is reinforced by political extremity and polarization. The composition of the electorate, and those who are mobilized, is an important distinction.

Considering the way in which loyalty attachments may function through attachment to a political party, it would follow that when independents are reminded that they have less in common with or are further away from the Republican and Democratic political parties in the high polarization conditions, they are likely to feel greater learned helplessness. It is expected that independents will be less attached to the political parties, potentially experiencing greater learned helplessness and less likely to engage in instrumental voting behavior.

Harkening back to early voting behavior work, independents have long been expected to be the least likely to turn out (Campbell et al. 1960). However, in the contemporary political context, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) have begun to elucidate the complexity behind identifying as an independent and what that may mean for engagement and American politics more broadly. Beyond true independents, as a result of partisan disagreement and negative traits associated with the Republican and Democratic parties, many partisans are going “undercover,” so to speak and identifying

as independents rather than with their preferred parties (Klar and Krupnikov 2016).[29] They authors show that while independents may prefer compromise and dislike partisan disagreement, they also dislike when their preferred party gives up ground to the opposite party for the sake of compromise. As the acrimony and disagreement between the parties grows, independents are identifying less with their preferred parties. The hesitancy to express partisanship may also carry implications for feelings of uncontrollability to influence the parties, their policies, and the political system at large. This chapter begins to explore how party identification (or the lack thereof) may influence feelings of loss of control and attachment to the political system through learned helplessness, with the expectation that independents may experience greater learned helplessness than partisans.

Learned helplessness has not been applied to explain political behavior, let alone in a polarized political context. Additionally, only a few of the indicators of disaffection (e.g., interest and political trust) have been studied in the polarized context. Polarization has been shown to make politics less appealing, particularly decreasing interest among independents (McClurg et al. 2015). As affective polarization (i.e., mutual dislike, distrust, and disrespect between America's major political parties), makes politics more contentious and intense, trust also declines (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995). Further, in a political system dominated by affective

---

[29] The term "undercover partisan" was utilized in *The American Voter* originally to describe political independents who have clear partisan preferences but choose to hide them. Klar and Krupnikov (2016) also utilize this term.

polarization, political trust started to decline in the late 1960s and has reached a record 60-year low (Hetherington and Rudolph 2015).

As political elites have polarized and the extreme views of activists and primary voters have led the major parties to take up more extreme issue positions, many Americans feel left out and let down (King 2000). "It is not simply a question of which politicians are closer to you as much as how far away they are from your basic concerns" (King 1997: 174). Rather, the public's mistrust of government is unlikely to be reversed unless and until politicians and their parties stage a concerted return to the sensible center. The politics of polarization *is* the politics of mistrust" (King 1997: 156). As depressed trust levels have been shown to be at least partially due to political polarization, it is possible then that polarization has impacted the measures of disaffection in the mass public. However, there is something unique about learned helplessness in the polarized context as it is tied to partisanship and feelings of attachment and control and may exacerbate how which people utilize exit or voice through instrumental and expressive political behavior. Thus, examining helplessness in a polarized context may help to shed light on the pervasiveness of disengagement.

Hypotheses

This chapter sets out to test five hypotheses. As elite polarization has led many to feel left out, let down, or disgusted with the acrimony between the political parties, it is worth investigating the potential role context may play in influencing feelings of disaffection, particularly feelings of uncontrollability. Thus, H3, the *polarization*

hypothesis expects that when made salient, high elite polarization will exacerbate learned helplessness.

However, Klar and Krupnikov (2016) have demonstrated that many people have become "undercover partisans" because they do not want to identify with the negative traits now associated with the major political parties and do not seek to participate in support of their preferred party. Accordingly, it is possible that the salience of high polarization may affect those who identify as partisans differently than it does for those who identify as independents. Since partisanship can serve as a form of loyalty, impacting the way in which people utilize exit or voice, H3a expects that when made salient, high elite polarization may reduce learned helplessness for partisans, as they will be able to clearly identify with the parties, the policy positions presented, and thus, may feel more certainty or control. However, for independents, learned helplessness is expected to be greater than for partisans, as they are less clearly connected to the parties, the policy positions presented, and may be less certain or feel like they have less control over their own influence. For H3b, on the other hand, it is expected that when presented with low polarized context, learned helplessness should not differ significantly between partisans and independents.

Making polarization salient may also impact the ways in which people engage in politics. H3c expects that when made salient, high polarization is likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. Lastly, with the expectation that polarization may exacerbate learned helplessness, and may impact the ways in which people engage in political behavior, it is possible that learned helplessness may actually

mediate the relationship between polarization and participation. As such, H3d hypothesizes that when high polarization is made salient or when perceived polarization is high, helplessness will be exacerbated and voting behavior will decrease.

Procedure

Data

The polarization experiment was conducted across three of the dissertation samples (Samples 2, 3, and 4). Additional information about these samples may be found in Chapter 2, as well as Appendix A. The analyses from Sample 2 focus on the 600 respondents surveyed. Respondents participated in a survey experiment and then were asked the various variables of interest and control questions discussed below.[30] Of the 600 respondents who did not participate in the learned helplessness experiment (816 were collected in this sample), 191 were randomly assigned to the low polarization condition, 308 were assigned to the high polarization condition, and 201 were randomly assigned to the control condition. The analyses for Sample 3 focus on the 731 respondents randomly assigned to the control condition, 736 assigned to the low polarization condition, and 730

[30] Respondents in Samples 2 and 4 were also randomly assigned to an experimental manipulation of learned helplessness. Analyses discussed below are limited to only respondents who did not participate in the experimental manipulation of learned helplessness. Hypothesis H3c tests the impact of experimentally manipulating learned helplessness and making it salient on perceptions of polarization.

assigned to the high polarization condition.[31] The analyses for Sample 4 focus on the wave two respondents not randomly assigned to the learned helplessness experiment, where 179 respondents in were randomly assigned to the control condition, 168 were assigned to the low polarization condition, and 168 were assigned to the high polarization condition.

Respondents who participated in Sample 2 were prevented from participating in subsequent MTurk surveys and thus, were not allowed to participate in the pre-election survey, Sample 3. It is important to note that the polarization experiment on wave 2 of Sample 4 was one of multiple experiments to which the respondents were exposed. Where appropriate, the analyses below do control for the conditions of the other experimental manipulations. All three samples discussed here include the same polarization experiment described below (see Appendix D for the polarization manipulations used across the three samples).

Manipulation and Measures

Experimental Manipulation of Elite Polarization. To test the causal impact of the salience of elite polarization on learned helplessness, a three-condition, between-subjects, framing experiment was conducted, where respondents were randomly assigned to the

[31] This data collection effort also included a second survey experiment on income inequality discussed in Chapter 4. However, respondents were not assigned to overlapping survey conditions, so the second survey experiment does not have any bearing on the experimental results reported on the polarization experiment.

control condition or to be exposed to either a high or low polarized condition. Through hypothesis 3, it was posited that high polarization will exacerbate learned helplessness, and by extension, disaffection. Respondents in the control condition did not receive additional information about political elites, or polarization. For the sake of this experiment, frames are defined as alternative conceptualizations of an issue or event. The use of frames in experimental work has been shown to subtly or substantially influence individuals' attitudes (Chong and Druckman 2007; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013) and framing effects can take place when individuals "arrive at different positions on the issue, depending on the priority given to various considerations" within the frame (Druckman and Nelson 2003: 730). The experiment seeks to examine the framing effect that takes place when respondents are presented with a high or low polarized frame.

As with any experimental design, it is necessary to address concerns about external validity. As that applies to this experiment, the goal was to provide information that would make elite polarization salient. In a political environment where it would be difficult to find naturally occurring low polarized political contexts, this study manipulated the information respondents received about elite polarization. The manipulations are modeled after those used in Levendusky (2010) and Luttig (2016), as well as Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013), which have demonstrated effective perception induction of elite polarization. Levendusky (2010) illustrated elite polarization, providing respondents with a picture of the positions of members of

Congress distributed on issue positions as being either polarized or not.[32] Alternatively, Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) utilized verbal descriptions of elite polarization on issues for the purpose of more accurately mimicking the type of information respondents receive via media and internet. Luttig (2016), as well as the current project, combine both the picture illustrating high or moderate elite polarization and verbal descriptions of members of Congress' positions on particular issues to more closely reflect the respondents' typical information environment.

As Levendusky (2010) explains, the difference between the moderate (his low polarized condition) and polarized conditions is represented by the degree of elite polarization depicted, illustrating both the ideological distance between the parties and the ideological homogeneity of each party.[33] Subjects are presented with descriptions of

---

[32] The manipulations from Levendusky (2010) are inspired by and modeled after Mutz's (2005) study of social trust. The depictions of low and high polarization modeled after Levendusky (2010). As both Levendusky and Mutz acknowledge, there are a number of factors beyond the manipulation that could alter the target of the experiment. Here, there are other factors that could have influenced respondents' perceptions of polarization. However, even though the manipulations do not mimic real world polarization, the manipulations here do change perceived levels of elite polarization. See Anderson and Bushman (1997), Berkowitz and Donnerstein (1982), and Carlsmith, Ellsworth, and Aronson (1989) for further discussion of experimental realism and external validity.

[33] "In the polarized elites condition, the parties are both ideologically distinct from one another and relatively internally ideologically homogeneous (e.g., Democrats are liberals,

four policy proposals being considered by members of congress. These descriptions were paired with images of elite polarization on each issue. The same four policy areas used in Luttig (2016) were presented and described in either a high or low polarized context. The issues are: 1) mining, 2) Medicaid, 3) affirmative action in college admissions, and 4) global warming. Following each issue frame and image, subjects are asked about their support or opposition for the proposal discussed. However, these issue-specific questions are not utilized within this dissertation. Additionally, after respondents completed viewing the full manipulation with all four issues, they received a manipulation check question to assess perceived polarization. See Figure 5.1 for image examples and Appendix D for the full manipulations.

[Insert Figure 5.1 Here]

In using experimental manipulations of elite polarization, Levendusky (2010) finds that elite polarization allows people to adopt more consistent attitudes, and Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus (2013) find that elite polarization changes the way in which people form opinions, such that polarization intensifies the impact of party

---

Republicans are conservatives, and there is essentially no overlap between the two). Elites in this polarized elites condition mimic the elites of the 1990s and 2000s. In the moderate elites condition, elites look more like they did in the 1960s and 1970s. The parties are more heterogeneous (e.g., some Democrats are conservative, some Republicans are liberal), and the parties' positions are less ideologically distinct from one another. Comparing subjects' behavior in these two conditions will allow me to draw inferences about the effect of elite polarization on citizens' attitudes" (Levendusky 2010: 117).

endorsements on opinions, decreasing the impact of substantive information. Thus, it is expected that when high elite polarization is made salient in the current study, polarization will intensify feelings of learned helplessness and disaffection, particularly for independents who may not have strong attachments to a particular party or to the broader political system.

Manipulation Check. A manipulation check was included following the manipulation which asked, "On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being least polarized and 7 being most polarized, how polarized would you say the parties are in America today?" The perceptions of polarization were thus coded accordingly, with 1 coded as "least polarized" and 7 being coded as "most polarized."

Disaffection Measures: As with previous chapters, the same disaffection measures are utilized: learned helplessness, internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. All measures are coded to range from 0 to 1 with higher values corresponding to higher levels of that variable. The question wording of all measures is available in Appendix B and a more extensive discussion of the individual measures is available in Chapter 2. The average scores on these disaffection measures are shown in Figure 5.2, illustrating that the distribution of these measures was quite consistent across the three samples of interest in this chapter.

[Insert Figure 5.2 Here]

Control Variables. As in other chapters, the models presented in this chapter also control for the following (all coded to range from 0-1): education, income, gender (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as female (coded as 1) or

male (coded as 0), age, ethnicity (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as Latino, Spanish, or Hispanic (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0), and race (with a dummy variable to represent whether the respondent identified as White (coded as 1) or not (coded as 0). The models also include Republican and Democratic dummy variables, political ideology (extremely liberal is coded as 0 and extremely conservative is coded as 1), as well as a dummy variable for whether respondents view themselves on the losing side of politics.

Political Participation. The analyses below focus on two measures. The first is a measure of instrumental voting behavior, i.e. vote likelihood. The second is a measure of more expressive political action, i.e., marching, rallying, or protesting.

Results

Elite Polarization: Does context play a role in exacerbating learned helplessness?

The *polarization hypotheses* grapple with the question of whether context affects disaffection and political behavior. Before moving to test the impact on behavior, H3 expects that when made salient, high elite polarization will exacerbate learned helplessness. In order to test whether context has the expected effects, a survey experiment manipulating perceptions of elite polarization was conducted across Samples 2, 3 and 4. If perceptions of elite polarization can be manipulated and this changes levels of learned helplessness, it may be possible to point to a causal relationship between polarization and learned helplessness.

Did the manipulation work? Before getting into the formal test of the hypothesis, it is necessary to illustrate that the polarization manipulations had the intended effect on perceptions of polarization. Using the manipulation check question about perceived polarization, we can evaluate whether the manipulations change perceptions of elite polarization in the expected directions. Figure 5.3 shows the average perception of polarization, on a scale from 1 "Not at all polarized" to 7 "Extremely polarized," for each condition by sample. The high polarization manipulation consistently garnered the highest means of perceived polarization within the three samples (Sample 2 mean = 5.8; Sample 3 mean = 5.6; and Sample 4 mean = 5.1), whereas the low polarization manipulation garnered the lowest means of perceived polarization within the three samples (Sample 2 mean = 5.2; Sample 3 mean = 5.3; Sample 4 mean = 4.7). Further, the mean differences between the three conditions are all statistically significant at the $p<.05$ level for Samples 2 and 3.[34] However, for Sample 4, the low and high conditions are not significantly different from the control condition, but are significantly different from each other. With any framing experiment, this may indicate that while the differences are statistically significantly different each other, the differences are not overwhelmingly

[34] The mean differences for the conditions across the three samples are as follows: Sample 2: low vs. control .26 ($t= 1.86$, $p<.05$); high vs. control -.29 ($t= 2.06$, $p<.05$); low vs. high -.55 ($t= 4.05$, $p<.001$); Sample 3: low vs. control .17 ($t= 2.38$, $p<.01$); high vs. control -.15 ($t= 1.98$, $p<.05$); low vs. high -.32 ($t= 4.44$, $p<.001$); and Sample 4 (unweighted): low vs. control .22 ($t= .98$, n.s.); high vs. control -.22 ($t= 1.01$, n.s.); low vs. high -.43 ($t= 1.93$, $p<.05$).

large, substantively. This may tie to the external validity of the manipulation, which is further addressed at the end of the chapter.

[Insert Figure 5.3 Here]

Another question as to whether the manipulations worked is whether the manipulations affected perceived polarization of partisans and independents differently. Using difference of means tests for each condition to test the average mean of perceived polarization between partisans and independents, we see some interesting effects. In the control conditions, there is no difference in perceived polarization between partisans and independents (Sample 2, diff=.36, n.s.; Sample 3, diff=.12, n.s., Sample 4, diff=-.12, n.s.). In the low polarization conditions, partisans score higher on perceived polarization than independents in Samples 2 and 3 (Sample 2, diff=.39, t=1.33; Sample 3, dif=.45, 3.03; Sample 4, diff=.08, n.s.). In the high polarization conditions, partisans also score higher than independents on perceived polarization, but in Samples 2 and 4 (Sample 2, diff=.47, t=1.83; Sample 3, diff=.10, n.s.; Sample 4, diff=.78, t=1.69). Overall, partisans seemingly perceive greater perceived polarization than independents in both of the polarization conditions.

Testing Hypothesis 3. To test the *polarization hypothesis*, and whether polarization increases learned helplessness, two dummy variables were created where the low or high polarization condition was coded as "1" and the control condition was coded as "0." To compare the two experimental conditions directly with one another, a third dummy variable was created where the high polarization condition was coded as "1" and the low polarization condition was coded as "0."

To evaluate whether polarization exacerbates learned helplessness and disaffection, multiple Tukey-Kramer tests were conducted to evaluate post-hoc pairwise comparisons between conditions. Multiple difference of means tests were also conducted. The significance tests showed that learned helplessness did not significantly differ between conditions, with the exception of the difference between the high polarization and control conditions in Sample 3. This marginally significant mean difference indicates that making high elite polarization salient increased average learned helplessness, compared to the control condition (diff= -.01, t=-1.43). However, Samples 2 and 4 do not provide consistent evidence of this effect. Figure 5.4 illustrates the lack of mean differences between conditions across the three samples.

[Insert Figure 5.4 Here]

As learned helplessness has been shown to operate differently than the measures of disaffection, it is possible that the polarization manipulations affected internal efficacy, external efficacy, trust, and interest. To test whether this was the case, additional Tukey-Kramer and formal difference of means tests were conducted. These significance tests of the mean differences between conditions showed that the measures of disaffection did not consistently significantly differ between conditions across the three samples in a consistent manner. Table 5.1 shows the mean differences for the measures of disaffection across the three samples.

However, there were a few exceptions where the mean differences were significant in two of the three samples. Regarding internal efficacy, the differences between the low polarization and control conditions, as well as the differences between

the high polarization and control condition were statistically significant in Samples 2 and 3. However, the results from Sample 2 are reversed from Sample 3, such that in Sample 2, average internal efficacy for the low polarization condition was lower than the control condition (diff=0.04, t=1.99), but average internal efficacy was higher than the control condition in Sample 3 (diff=-0.02, t=-2.19). Similarly, in Sample 2, average internal efficacy for the high polarization condition was lower than the control condition (diff=0.03, t=1.46), yet average internal efficacy was higher than the control condition in Sample 3 (diff=-0.01, t=-1.46).

As for external efficacy, there were inconsistent difference of means tests in Samples 3 and 4 between low polarization and control conditions, as well as the high and low polarization conditions. First, in Sample 3, the mean difference between the low polarization condition and the control condition was marginally statistically significant, such that average external efficacy was significantly lower in the low polarization condition than the control condition (diff=0.02, t=1.46). Second, in Sample 3, average external efficacy was lower in the low polarization condition than in the high polarization condition (diff=-0.02, t=-1.91). However, in Sample 4, average external efficacy was statistically higher in the high polarization condition than the low polarization condition (diff=0.05, t=2.05). Again, there is a reversal of the results across Samples 3 and 4.[35]

[35] The lack of mean differences in Sample 4 wave 2 could be due to the multiple survey experiments to which respondents were exposed prior to encountering the polarization experiment. The other experiments could have created noise or diluted the experimental effects of the polarization conditions.

[Insert Table 5.1 Here]

The lack of a consistent experimental effect on learned helplessness or disaffection could be due to three possibilities. First, related to the small, but significant, effects of the manipulations on perceived polarization, the manipulations may not have fully induced contextual salience of low and high polarization or there may have been differential effects on partisans and independents. Second, this could be due to the samples being high in political knowledge.[36] Third, it is possible that learned helplessness and disaffection are not moved by a polarized elite context. Thus, support for H3 that polarization exacerbated learned helplessness was not found.

Testing Hypotheses 3a and 3b. As noted above, attachment to one party over the other, or lack of an identified party attachment, may affect the way in which people experience learned helplessness. As there were not strong main effects of the manipulations on learned helplessness, or even on the measures of disaffection, Hypotheses 3a and 3b posit that the effects of the manipulations will differ for independents and partisans. Despite the evidence that the measures of disaffection are all distinct, as Hetherington and Rudolph (2015) found that political trust polarizes along

---

[36] The samples were quite politically knowledgeable. Respondents in these samples were asked a range of questions about U.S. politics and institutions, as well as current international affairs. First, in Sample 2, half of the sample got 80% or 12 or more questions correct out of 15 asked. In Sample 3, 49% of the sample got 77% or 10 or more questions correct out of 13. Lastly, in Sample 4, 60% of the sample got three or four questions correct out of the 4 questions asked.

partisan lines, it is possible that the salience of high polarization may affect helplessness and disaffection differently for partisans than it does for independents. Particularly related to party attachment and learned helplessness, as "undercover partisans" may not want to identify with negative traits now associated with the major political parties and do not seek to participate in support of their preferred party (Klar and Krupnikov 2016), it is possible that the salience of high polarization may affect those who identify as partisans differently than it does for those who identify as independents.

Thus, H3a expects that when made salient, high elite polarization may reduce learned helplessness for partisans, as they will be able to clearly identify with the parties, the policy positions presented, and thus, may feel more certainty or control. However, for independents, learned helplessness is expected to be greater than for partisans, as they are less clearly connected to the parties, the policy positions presented, and may be less certain or feel like they have less control over their own influence. For H3b, on the other hand, it is expected that when presented with low polarized context, learned helplessness should not differ significantly between partisans and independents.

To test Hypotheses 3a and 3b, an additional difference of means tests were conducted to compare the means for partisans and independents within the experimental conditions. In the three datasets, a dummy variable was created from the party identification measure such that independents were coded as "1" and partisans, including party leaners, were coded as "0." Table 5.2 shows the mean differences between partisans and independents within the three conditions for each sample across the disaffection measures. In the control and low polarization conditions, there are not statistically

significant differences in average learned helplessness between partisans and independents, which provides evidence in support of H3b. However, in the high polarization conditions, across Samples 2 and 3, independents demonstrate statistically significantly higher average learned helplessness than partisans do, as expected from H3a (Sample 2 diff=-0.06, t=-2.48; Sample 3 diff=-0.02, t=-1.40).[37] If we conduct a more stringent test in the regression format, we find that in Sample 2, the interaction between independents and the experimental control condition is statistically significant (b=.09, p<.05).

Figure 5.5 demonstrates that independents in the high polarization condition are significantly higher in learned helplessness than independents in the low polarization and control conditions. However, these interactions were not significant in Samples 3 and 4, which were collected at the height of the contentious Presidential campaign. Given the results for Sample 2, there is at least initial evidence that making high polarization salient may exacerbate learned helplessness for independents, in support of H3a. Further, there is some evidence that the salience of low polarization does not exacerbate learned helplessness for independents or partisans, in support of H3b. Considering the possibility that loyalty, as conceptualized by Hirschman (1970), may function through attachment to a political party, it would follow that when independents are reminded that they have less

[37] In the high polarization condition in Sample 4, independents did show greater average learned helplessness than partisans, but the difference was not statistically significant at p<.05.

control over, have less in common with, or are further away from the major political parties in the high polarization conditions, they feel greater learned helplessness.

[Insert Table 5.2 Here]

[Insert Figure 5.5 Here]

Table 5.2 also demonstrates that the polarization experiment may have also impacted feelings of helplessness and disaffection for partisans and independents differently. For each of the four measures of disaffection, independents present significantly lower average internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest, in the control condition of at least one of the samples, and across the three conditions. What this suggests is that partisans are generally more likely to feel greater internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest, whereas independents, on average, experience less internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest that partisans, regardless of polarized condition.

However, we can also assess whether the conditions affected partisans and independents by testing the mean differences between conditions for partisans and independents separately. In further support of both H3a and H3b, in Sample 2, independents had significantly higher learned helplessness in the high polarization condition than in the control condition (diff=-0.08, t=-2.31) or the low polarization condition (diff=-0.06, t=-1.83) at $p<.05$.

In conducting the same type of difference of means test for the measures of disaffection, there were not consistent mean difference for independents or for partisans between the conditions across the three samples. For example, in Sample 3, partisans scored higher external efficacy in the high polarization condition than in the low

polarization condition (diff=-0.02, t=-1.77), but in Sample 4, partisans scored lower external efficacy in the high polarization condition, compared to the low polarization condition (diff=0.05, t=1.84). What this may suggest, is that the polarization conditions did not have a particularly unique effect on partisans scoring generally higher on internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest than independents.

Testing Hypothesis 3c. Making polarization salient may also impact the ways in which people engage in politics. H3c expects that when made salient, high polarization is likely to increase the tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. To test this hypothesis, dichotomous measure of vote likelihood was regressed on, using logistic regression, the condition dummy variables, the measures of disaffection, and the demographic and attitudinal controls. Additionally, the condition dummy variables were interacted with learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection for comparison to determine whether their effect on voting behavior is moderated by polarization salience.

As the focus for Hypothesis 3c is on political behavior, Tables 5.3-5.5 reports logistic regression models testing whether polarization moderates the effect of learned helplessness on reported vote likelihood in Samples 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Vote likelihood is used here as the measure of interest because it is the only measure of participation consistent across the three samples. In the three tables, Model 1 shows the main effects for the polarization conditions. Notably, there are no consistent significant main effects of the manipulations on vote likelihood. From these models, only the low polarization condition, relative to the control condition, significantly affected the probability of being extremely likely to vote. The salience of low polarization in Sample

4 changed the odds of being extremely likely to vote by 2.29. Alternatively stated, the having low polarization made salient compared to being in the control condition, corresponds to a 129% in being extremely likely to vote. From these models, there is no evidence that high polarization salience decreases engagement in voting behavior.

Models 2-6 in Tables 5.3-5.5 tested whether polarization salience might moderate the effect of learned helplessness, internal efficacy, external efficacy, trust and interest on vote likelihood. For the condition interactions with learned helplessness, in Samples 3 and 4, the interaction between the high polarization condition, relative to the control condition, is marginally statistically significant, indicating that learned helplessness has different effects on reported vote likelihood in the high polarization condition than it does in the control condition (log-likelihood coefficients: Table 5.4, Model 2, $b=2.07$, $p<.10$; Table 5.5, Model 3, $b= 5.26$, $p<.10$). Figure 5.6 demonstrates this interaction graphically. Notably, the control conditions demonstrate the same results observed under the first set of hypotheses in Chapter 3. The strongest effects of learned helplessness on the probability of being extremely likely to turn out are in the control condition (Sample 3, $b= -.45$, $p<.001$; Sample 4, $b=-.91$, $p<.001$). However, there were no significant effects of learned helplessness in the low and high polarization conditions (Sample 3, low: $b= -.15$, n.s., high: $b=-.13$, n.s.; Sample 4, low: $b=-.22$, n.s., high: $b=-.23$, n.s.). Both the low and high polarization treatments have seemingly mitigating effects on learned helplessness's effect on vote likelihood. It is unclear why the treatments may have had this moderating effect on learned helplessness for vote likelihood.

[Insert Table 5.3 Here]

[Insert Table 5.4 Here]

[Insert Table 5.5 Here]

[Insert Figure 5.6 Here]

Interactions between the polarization conditions and the measures of disaffection, i.e., internal and external efficacy, trust, and interest were also conducted (Models 3-6, Tables 5.3-5.5). Most of the interactions were not significant, and none of the interactions with internal efficacy were significant across the three samples. However, there were a few examples. The high polarization condition, relative to the control, significantly interacted with external efficacy in Sample 2 (Table 5.3, Model 4, b=2.27 p<.10), trust in Sample 2 (Table 5.3, Model 5, b=3.19, p<.10), and interest in Sample 4 (Table 5.5, Model 6, b= -2.50, p<.10). In Sample 2, there was no significant effect of external efficacy for the control condition or for the low polarization condition (b=-.01, n.s.; b=.01, n.s., respectively). However, for the high polarization condition, external efficacy significantly increased the probability of being extremely likely to vote (b=.35, p<.01). Similarly, for trust in Sample 2, there was no significant effect of trust for the control condition or for the low polarization condition (b=-.16, n.s.; b=-.05, n.s., respectively). For the high polarization condition, however, trust marginally significantly increased the probability of being extremely likely to vote (b=.36, p<.10). Lastly, in Sample 4, interest had a significant effect across all three conditions (control: b= .63, p<.01; low: b=.48, p<.01; high: b=.37, p<.01), with the greatest effect in the control condition, and the smallest effect on the probability of being extremely likely to vote in the high polarization condition.

One last possibility for H3c is that the since the polarization treatments affected perceived polarization differently for partisans and independents, that engagement in vote confidence or vote likelihood may differ for partisans and independents by condition. Figure 5.7 shows the effect of the experimental conditions on vote confidence and Figure 5.8 shows the effect on vote likelihood separately for independents and partisans.[38] First for Figure 5.7, notably in the high polarization condition, when high elite polarization is made salient in Sample 3, independents are significantly less confident in their vote choice than partisans. Alternatively, in Figure 5.8, in the high polarization condition for Sample 2, when high elite polarization is made salient, independents are not more likely to vote than partisans. However, they are more likely to say they plan on turning out in both the low and high polarization conditions than in the control condition. There is no difference in the probability of being extremely likely to vote for partisans across the conditions. The high polarization results from these models and figures do not provide further evidence for H3c, such that it would be expected that independents would be more likely to engage in voting behavior when low polarization is made salient (which is evident in the figure), but would be expected to be less likely to engage in voting behavior when high polarization is made salient. Yet, Figure 5.8 shows that at least in Sample 2, this is not the case.

---

[38] Vote confidence is not used in the other models because it is only measures in Sample 3 in relation to the survey experiment. Vote confidence was measured in Sample 4, but during wave 1, which preceded the survey experiment in wave 2 and is thus, not subject to experimental effects.

[Insert Figure 5.7 Here]

[Insert Figure 5.8 Here]

As there continues to be a lack of strong manipulation effects, the next step is to examine whether perceived polarization, rather than manipulated polarization, affects reported political behavior. the effects of perceived polarization, learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection, on instrumental voting behavior, using the manipulation check question of perceived polarization that is consistent across the three samples. Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show main effects for perceived polarization and interactive logistic regression models predicting vote likelihood.[39] As the manipulations did significantly affect perceived polarization, these analyses only focus on the control conditions, so as to not introduce false results.

First, Model 1 in Tables 5.6-5.8 report the main effect of perceived polarization and the disaffection measures on the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Perceived polarization did not have a direct effect of the probability of being extremely likely to vote in Samples 2 or 4. However, it did impact the probability of being

[39] Table 5.8 includes a control dummy for one of the treatment conditions from one of the other experimental conditions conducted by a colleague, Brianna Smith, on wave 2 of Sample 4. Models controlling for the other conditions from the other experiments were conducted and are available upon request. However, only one condition was significant in previous vote likelihood models. This condition presented respondents with a vignette discussing an inevitable immigration threat. Thus, a dummy variable for this condition has been included.

extremely likely to vote in Sample 3 (Model 1, Table 5.7), such that higher perceived polarization changes the odds of being extremely likely to vote by 1.23, and for a one unit increase in perceived polarization, increases the probability of being extremely likely to vote by 23%.

Second, to evaluate whether the effects of the disaffection measures were moderated by perceived polarization, Models 2-6 in Tables 5.6-5.8 demonstrate the interactive relationships between the measures of disaffection and perceived polarization. Across the three samples, the measures of disaffection were not moderated by perceived polarization. However, in Sample 4 wave 2 (Model 6 in Table 5.10) the effect of interest on vote likelihood was moderated by perceived polarization ($b = -1.37$, $p < .05$). Broken down, at the lower levels of perceived polarization, interest significantly increases the probability of being extremely likely to vote. However, at the higher levels of perceived polarization, interest does not have a significant effect on the probability of being extremely likely to vote.

[Insert Table 5.6 Here]

[Insert Table 5.7 Here]

[Insert Table 5.8 Here]

In previous chapters, we have also discussed engagement in expressive political action, such as rallying or protesting behavior. While it is unlikely that the experimental manipulations would affect reported retrospective behavior, it is possible to evaluate whether perceived polarization may impact engagement in protesting behavior. Additionally, expressive political behavior in Sample 4 was measured in wave 3, and is

not subject to lasting experimental effects. As such, the analyses below from Sample 4 focus on perceived polarization and protesting behavior measures from the third wave, not the wave that experienced the experimental treatments.

Table 5.9 reports the main effects models for the three samples with perceived polarization, learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection predicting protesting behavior. As in previous chapters evaluating protesting behavior, the dependent variable in Table 5.9 is coded 1 where respondents indicated they had participated in a rally in support or opposition of a political candidate or issue in the last three months and coded 0 for respondents who indicated that they had not. Models 1 and 2 for Samples 2 and 3 reflect only the control conditions, since perceived polarization was impacted by the experimental treatments. As noted above, the dependent variable in Model 3, for Sample 4, was measured November 2016, prior to the presidential election (wave 3), approximately 6 weeks following Sample 2 and the polarization experiment.

[Insert Table 5.9 Here]

Table 5.9 shows the main effects in Samples 3 and 4, where higher perceived polarization decreases likelihood of engaging in protesting or rallying behavior. The same main effects models appear as Model 1 in Tables 5.10-5.12 for their respective samples. Again, to evaluate whether the effects of the disaffection measures were moderated by perceived polarization, Models 2-6 in Tables 5.10-5.12 demonstrate the interactive relationships between the measures of disaffection and perceived polarization. Across the three samples, most of the measures of disaffection were not moderated by perceived polarization, and none were in a consistent manner. However, there were a few

exceptions. First, in Sample 2, the perceived polarization x external efficacy interaction was marginally statistically significant (Table 5.10, Model 4: b= 4.47, p<.10). At the lower levels of perceived polarization, external efficacy significantly increased the probability of having engaged in protesting, but at the highest levels of perceived polarization, external efficacy did not have an effect on probability of having protested.

[Insert Table 5.10 Here]

[Insert Table 5.11 Here]

[Insert Table 5.12 Here]

Additionally, in Sample 4, the interactions between learned helplessness and perceived polarization, as well as between internal efficacy and perceived polarization were both marginally significant (Table 5.12: Model 2, b=2.71, p<.10, Model 3, b=-.36, p<.10, respectively). For learned helplessness, at the lower levels of perceived polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having engaged in protesting. However, at the higher levels of perceived polarization, learned helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting. For internal efficacy, only at the lowest levels of perceived polarization does internal efficacy have an effect. At the higher levels of perceived polarization, internal efficacy does not have a significant effect on the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior.

Further, in Sample 4, the interaction between trust and perceived polarization was statistically significant (Table 5.12: Model 5, b=-3.04, p<.01). Again, at the lowest levels of perceived polarization, trust has a significant effect in increasing the probability of

having engaged in protesting behavior. However, at the highest levels of perceived polarization, trust has no significant effect on the probability of having protested.

Overall, the marginal effects of perceived polarization are mostly only significant at the lowest values of perceived polarization. Interestingly, however, for the learned helplessness interaction visualized in Figure 5.9, for those who perceive low polarization and experience low learned helplessness, they have a greater probability of engaging in protesting behavior than those who experience high learned helplessness and perceive low polarization. Yet, on the other hand, those who perceive high polarization and experience high learned helplessness, they have a greater probability of engaging in protesting behavior than those who perceive low polarization and experience high learned helplessness. Thus, perceiving greater polarization and experiencing greater learned helplessness may actually increase the probability of voicing ones' opinions and grievances through rallying or protesting behavior.

[Insert Figure 5.9 Here]

To summarize, Hypothesis 3c set out to test whether making polarization salient would impact prospective political behavior. The hypothesis expected that if learned helplessness is exacerbated experimentally in a polarized context, high polarization would increase the likelihood people would exit through lower prospective voting behavior. In regard to the experimentally manipulated polarization conditions, the polarization treatments did not impact engagement in vote likelihood. However, high polarization did moderate the effect of learned helplessness vote likelihood in Samples 3 and 4, as well as interest in Sample 4, and external efficacy and trust in Sample 2.

Since there were not strong manipulation effects consistent across the samples, H3c also tested the impact of perceived polarization on vote likelihood, and retrospective rallying and protesting behavior. First, perceived polarization did impact vote likelihood, such that higher perceived polarization was found to increase the probability of being extremely likely to vote. Second, while not directly hypothesized, it was expected that perceived polarization might increase the probability of engaging in more expressive political behavior, i.e., rallying and protesting. For protesting behavior, higher perceived polarization was found to decrease the likelihood of engaging in this form of voice in Samples 3 and 4. Additionally, perceive polarization moderated the effect of learned helplessness on the probability of having protested, such that for those who perceive low polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having protested, but for those who perceive high polarization, learned helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. Taken together, there is at least partial support that a polarized political context impacts how people utilize exit and voice.

Testing Hypothesis H3d. Lastly, with the expectation that polarization may exacerbate learned helplessness, rather than moderate its effects, and may impact the ways in which people engage in political behavior, it is possible that learned helplessness may actually mediate the relationship between polarization and participation. As such, H3d hypothesizes that when high polarization is made salient or when perceived polarization is high, learned helplessness will be exacerbated and engagement in voting behavior will decrease. To test this hypothesis, the medeff package in Stata 14 was used

to evaluate whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between high polarization and vote likelihood in the three samples.

Regarding vote likelihood in Samples 2-4, helplessness does not significantly mediate the relationship between experimentally manipulated polarization and vote likelihood. However, using perceived polarization, learned helplessness does significantly partially mediate the relationship between polarization and vote likelihood. The mediation models are limited to the control conditions. Learned helplessness mediates 14% of the total effect in Sample 2, 8% of the total effect in Sample 3, and 10% of the total effect in Sample 4. Thus, there is some preliminary support across these three samples that learned helplessness may partially mediate the relationship between perceived polarization and voting behavior.

It is also possible that similar to the vote likelihood models conducted in Chapter 3 that the measures of disaffection could potentially partially mediate the relationship between polarization and voting behavior. To evaluate if that is the case, the same mediation models using the medeff package in Stata 14 were conducted across the three samples for each of the measures of disaffection. External efficacy and trust did not partially mediate in any of the samples. Internal efficacy, partially mediated the relationship between perceived polarization and vote likelihood in Samples 3 and 4. Internal efficacy mediates 21% of the total direct effect in Sample 3 and 18% in Sample 4. Interest also partially mediated the relationship. In Sample 3, interest mediates 40% of the direct effect, and in Sample 4, interest mediates 28%.

These mediation models do not include the evaluation of a manipulated mediator, since the brief analyses of H1d showed in Chapter 3 that the learned helplessness manipulation did not have strong effects. Scholars in the field have raised concerns about threats to inference in mediation analysis, particularly related to experiments, such that mediation analyses with unmanipulated mediators may be prone to bias (Bullock, Green, and Ha 2010). Future evaluation of the role disaffection might play in mediating the relationship between political context, such as polarization, and voting behavior. This should allow for the analyses to take advantage of the mediation best practices outlined by Imai, Tingley, and Yamamoto (2013) for the evaluation of experimental designs and causal mechanisms (see also Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010).

Discussion

This chapter sought to evaluate whether the political context of high elite polarization impacts feelings of learned helplessness, as well as the ways in which people engage in instrumental and expressive political activities. As the samples were all collected in 2016, largely at the height of the contentious 2016 presidential election campaign, it was extremely difficult to identify a political environment not considered as politically polarized. Thus, this chapter examined the effects of elite polarization, both experimentally and observationally. It was expected that when high polarization is made salient, feelings of disaffection, particularly learned helplessness, would be exacerbated, and would directly impact the ways in which respondents engaged in exit or voice,

disengaging from instrumental behavior or voicing their opinions and grievances through expressive political action.

Beginning with H3, the *polarization hypothesis*, which expected that when made salient, high elite polarization would exacerbate learned helplessness, the significance tests showed that learned helplessness did not consistently differ between conditions, nor did the measures of disaffection. Yet, considering how the polarization conditions may have been interpreted differently by partisans and independents, H3a and H3b tested whether learned helplessness differed for partisans and independents within polarization conditions. H3a expected that high elite polarization would reduce learned helplessness for partisans but increase it for independents; whereas H3b expected that there would not be any differences when low elite polarization is made salient. In support of both hypotheses, in the high polarization condition, independents demonstrate statistically significantly higher average learned helplessness than partisans do, and in the control and low polarization conditions, there are no significant mean differences between partisans and independents.

Before evaluating whether learned helplessness mediates the relationship between polarization and voting behavior, H3c tested whether polarization impacted political behavior. H3c tested both whether experimentally manipulated elite polarization or perceived polarization negatively impacted people's tendency to exit through lower reported voting behavior. First, in regard to the polarization experiment and vote likelihood, there were no consistent significant main effects of the manipulations on vote likelihood. However, the high polarization condition did moderate the effect of learned

helplessness (Samples 3 and 4), external efficacy (Sample 2), trust (Sample 2), and interest (Sample 4). With the focus on learned helplessness, the polarization conditions seemingly mitigated the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood, which is a puzzling result.

Second, since there were not strong manipulation effects, perceived polarization between the Republican and Democratic parties was used rather than manipulated elite polarization. Perceived polarization did demonstrate a direct effect on vote likelihood, such that higher perceived polarization increased the likelihood of voting in Sample 3 only. Additionally, perceived polarization did not moderate the effects of any of the disaffection measures in any of the samples. Further, in testing how perceived polarization impacts people's engagement in expressive methods of voicing their opinions and grievances, the main effect of perceived polarization decreased the likelihood of engaging in protesting or rallying behavior. However, perceived polarization did moderate the effects of learned helplessness in Sample 4, such that for those lower in perceived polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having engaged in protesting, but for those higher in perceived polarization, learned helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior.

Last, it was expected that context actually might exacerbate feelings of learned helplessness, such that high polarization might exacerbate learned helplessness, which might drive engagement in instrumental political participation down. Thus, learned helplessness might partially mediate the relationship between context and voting behavior. Across the three samples, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate

the relationship between polarization and voting behavior. However, this was only the case for perceived polarization, not for the experimentally manipulated polarization.

These tests did not provide support for H3, and only partial support for H3c. Stronger support was found for H3a, H3b, and H3d, but despite some significant effects, these tests are far from conclusive. Further, given that the experimental manipulations worked to manipulate perceived polarization, there remains concern that the experimental effects were not strong enough, particularly to cause strong experimental effects on learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection in the expected directions. This could be due to a number of possibilities. First, it is important to consider the implications of the validity of the manipulations. It is possible, that the manipulations were not strong enough or realistic enough to get respondents to consider that political elites are not polarized under the current political environment. In regard to the small, but significant, effects of the manipulations on perceived polarization, the manipulations may not have fully induced contextual salience of low and high polarization. Second, the samples utilized here are convenience samples and fairly high in political knowledge, which may have made it more difficult to manipulate perceived polarization. Third, it is possible that learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection are not actually moved by a polarized context. Fourth, these samples were all collected during and immediately following the 2016 presidential election, which was particularly negative and polarized, making the inducement of a low polarized context more difficult.

By examining the role of context, experimentally and observationally, this chapter sought to grapple with the relationship between elite polarization and learned

helplessness in an attempt to explain why disengagement from voting behavior is as pervasive as it is and why it is so difficult to get the civically disengaged to engage. Given the experimental and observational results, it is clear that more work is needed. While it is considered to be fundamental to the workings of democracy for citizens to participate in the political process and engage in their communities, Easton (1965) stressed that when voting and civic engagement falls below a certain minimum, the persistence of the entire system will be endangered (see also Finifter 1970). This chapter, and the dissertation more broadly, seeks to benefit society by expanding our understanding the effects that learned helplessness, disaffection, and polarization have on political behavior in the U.S.

Growing political disaffection has contributed to the widening of the gap between citizens and their representatives, growing political inequalities, and increasing political apathy, leading to lower levels of political and community involvement. Polarization has led to acrimony between the political parties, increased divisions on major policy dimensions, and created less competitive elections. Thus, it is possible that disaffection has been exacerbated by political polarization (and growing economic inequality, explored within the broader dissertation, but not in the current project). If political disaffection is at the root of the low participation rates and decline in social capital in the U.S., it is possible that it also carries implications for the electoral system and representational biases, which is often a consequence of low civic engagement. Yet, income inequality from Chapter 4, and elite polarization discussed here, are not the only two contexts within which the U.S. democracy is functioning. The conclusion turns

briefly to discuss other important contexts that may be affecting feelings of helplessness and disaffection in the contemporary political environment.

Chapter 6 – Conclusion

Helplessness and Disaffection in the Contemporary U.S. Context

The experience of being a member of the American populace in today's political environment is complex, and multilayered. Consequently, there is no one single experience, historically, or in the contemporary context. Experiences of repeated political losses, of feeling as if one's side is consistently playing from behind, of feeling that elected officials do not listen, care, or represent one's preferences, of negative experiences with the justice system or government services, or experiences of being politically historically and systemically marginalized and excluded, all contribute to broader feelings of disaffection and malaise with the contemporary political system. These experiences also impact the ways in which the public engages with the broader political system through instrumental and expressive political participation.

The extant literature on disaffection, or negative attitudes toward democracy, has centered on attitudes of lack of trust and confidence in political authorities and institutions to address the concerns of the people (Di Palma 1970; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Torcal and Montero 2006), as well as how interested and effectual people believe they are to involve themselves with political authorities and institutions. However, the disaffection literature is overly focused on attitudes about institutions, and not attentive enough to how personal experiences shape perceptions of uncontrollability and resulting behavior. Thus, conceptually and methodologically, this dissertation has argued and sought to demonstrate that the existing work on disaffection neglects an additional

dimension tied to repeated or consistent feelings of inability, failure, and loss of control, which in turn shapes the ways in which people utilize political exit and voice, engaging through instrumental and expressive political actions.

Thus, the chapters herein have applied the concept of learned helplessness to explain the deeper feelings of disaffection associated with feelings of uncontrollability in regard to the political system. Utilizing the *exit*, *voice*, and *loyalty* framework from Hirschman (1970), the dissertation has used learned helplessness to illustrate how people feeling helpless and disaffected are attached to the conventional U.S. democratic system and how these have feelings become incorporated into people's identity and ability/willingness to engage in (or disengage from) political behavior, specifically instrumental or expressive political action, i.e. voting behavior or protest behavior, respectively.

The dissertation has largely taken the lead from learned helplessness scholars in psychology to explain political passivity, or exiting behavior from voting behavior. It was posited that the passivity exhibited in people's removal from voting is part of learned helplessness, as reflective of the passivity resulting from feelings of not being able to control, influence, or get what is needed from the conventional, institutionalized political system. However, where this dissertation separates itself from the existing learned helplessness literature is that the dissertation also posits that feelings of helplessness may also contribute to engagement in political action outside of the conventional, institutionalized political system. Particularly for those who feel un- or under-represented, marginalized by, or underserved by the conventional political system, they

may seek out action beyond the conventional, institutionalized system to voice their opinions and grievances in a manner that would help them reassert control over their helplessness or to deal with events and situations that are difficult to deal with or understand. Thus, for people who are helpless, and not getting what they need from the existing conventional, institutionalized political system, they may choose to engage in more expressive political action to reassert power or status, rectify injustices, or to restore a desired state of affairs.

As this dissertation is the first to explore learned helplessness in the political context, it only begins to scratch the surface of the ways in which the concept is related conceptually and methodologically to measures of disaffection, as well as how general learned helplessness is politically consequential and may further our understanding of the lasting effects of lived experiences with the conventional political system and government institutions. Chapter 2 sought to illustrate how learned helplessness, using the learned helplessness scale from Quinless and McDermott Nelson (1988), is conceptually and methodologically distinct from measures that have been used to study disaffection, i.e., internal and external efficacy, trust, and political interest. Theoretically, it is expected that learned helplessness occurs prior to disaffection. However, the dissertation samples are unable to assess causality without longitudinal panel data. Across the five survey samples utilized in the dissertation, the results suggest that helplessness is empirically linked to, but distinct from the measures of disaffection.

Importantly, there are likely numerous potential explanations for what causes learned helplessness. Chapter 2 delved into some of the expected main demographic,

attitudinal, and experiential predictors of learned helplessness. Across the five samples, the most robust and consistent predictors of learned helplessness were income and age. Learned helplessness is higher for youths or for those at the lower end of the income distribution. It is expected that earning potential, employment, ability to save for retirement, and other aspects of class have a lasting impact on feelings of economic security and ability to improve one's situation. As learned helplessness stems from experiences with uncontrollable situations, Chapter 2 also demonstrated that not only does being low income impact feelings of helplessness, being from a historically or systemically marginalized and subordinated group, or experiencing repeated political losses could also affect learned helplessness. Moreover, in Sample 3, experiences with government institutions, such as negative experiences with law enforcement and experiences with government assistance programs, like means-tested welfare programs, also shape feelings of learned helplessness.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 turned to questions of not only how context might shape learned helplessness, but how feelings of helplessness impact engagement with instrumental and expressive political participation. Political participation provides the mechanism by which citizens communicate information about their interests, preferences, and needs and generate pressure to respond, and choices to participate have been shown to stem from the motivation and capacity to take part politically (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). However, this dissertation illustrates that the motivation and capacity to participate may be more complicated than originally conceived, as they both relate to feelings of helplessness.

First, the analyses in Chapter 3 illustrated that those who experience greater learned helplessness are less likely to engage in instrumental political activities (i.e., vote likelihood, vote confidence, and reported turnout), but are more likely to engage in more expressive political activities (i.e., reported rallying and protesting). The chapter explored both mediational and conditional effects of income and learned helplessness on instrumental and expressive political behavior, the results of the mediational models are stronger than the moderation results. Across the five samples, for multiple measures of instrumental voting behavior, i.e., vote likelihood and turnout, learned helplessness consistently mediated the relationship between income and voting behavior, such that as decreases in level of income increased feelings of learned helplessness, which in turn decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior.

While Chapter 3 provided evidence that learned helplessness is a consistent predictor of both exit, through disengagement from voting behavior, and voice, through engagement with protesting, the effect of learned helplessness on exit and voice was shown to be conditional upon particular marginalized identities, some of which were unexpected and opposite from what was expected. First, unexpectedly, there was no effect of learned helplessness on voting or protesting behavior for those who felt that they were on the losing side of politics. Rather, in Sample 4, only for those who felt that they were on the winning side of politics, did learned helplessness drive down the probability of being extremely likely to vote, as well as the probability of turning out.

Second, opposite from what was hypothesized, in Sample 4, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood for Black and African American respondents actually

increased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, and, for White respondents, learned helplessness decreased the probability of engaging in voting behavior, but increased the probability of engaging in protesting behavior. Third, for respondents who identify ethnically as Latino, Hispanic, or Spanish, the effect of learned helplessness decreases the probability of engaging in voting behavior and increases the probability of engaging in protesting or rallying. However, learned helplessness also decreases the probability exiting from voting behavior.

Fourth, the effects for gender were mixed, and not quite as expected. While in Samples 1 and 3, the effect of learned helplessness for females did decrease vote likelihood and turnout, the effect of learned helplessness also decreased vote likelihood for males. Additionally, in Sample 5, while the effect of learned helplessness did not increase the probability of protest for females, it did increase the probability of protest, unexpectedly, for males.

Lastly, for income, the effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood was not moderated by income. However, for low income respondents, learned helplessness increased the probability of having reported participating in protesting and rallying behavior before the election, but after the election, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having reported participating in protesting or rallying behavior. The exact opposite pattern was found for high income respondents before and following the 2016 presidential election. These results, as well as the gender results, could be in part due to the timing of when the questions were asked in relation to the presidential election and advertisement of political marches following the 2016 presidential election in response to

the election outcome. These findings clearly call for greater investigation, particularly into the ways in which intersectionality across race, gender, ethnicity, class, immigration status and other subordinated identities lead to further exclusion, marginalization, subordination, and disenfranchisement.

Given the results in Chapter 3, Chapters 4 and 5 sought to address questions about political context and how the surrounding contextual environment might contribute to learned helplessness. To evaluate two important contexts, Chapters 4 and 5 utilized experimental methods, with the goal of inducing the salience of two important contexts within which contemporary U.S. politics operates. Chapter 4 investigated the first context of income inequality and Chapter 5 explored the context of elite polarization.

With Chapter 4's focus on income inequality, a tension arose with the findings between manipulated perceived income inequality, and personal perceptions about one's own economic situation. While both were shown to increase learned helplessness, and the probability of exiting, the more powerful measure was the un-manipulated measure of respondents' economic situation, particularly perceptions that respondents' economic situation will improve. For respondents who perceive that their economic situation will not improve, they experience greater learned helplessness and are less likely to engage in voting behavior.

Further in Chapter 4, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate the relationship between uncontrollable income inequality and voting behavior. Learned helplessness was also shown to partially mediate the relationship between perceived economic improvement and voting behavior, such that as perceptions of improvement

increased, learned helplessness declined and increased the probability of being likely to turnout to vote. A key takeaway from this chapter is the reinforcement of the influence uncontrollable situations, regardless of whether respondents are reminded experimentally of the uncontrollability of the drastic income inequality growth since 1980, or whether respondents feel a lack of control over improving their economic situation. A second takeaway is a reminder of the impact of experience on learned helplessness and how that influences resulting behavior. This was expected from the learned helplessness literature, but had yet to be demonstrated in regard to political behavior. However, Chapter 4 utilized data from only one convenience sample, Sample 3, so greater investigation into these effects is needed.

Yet, income inequality and financial security are not the only contexts within which the American populace experiences politics. In the contemporary U.S. political environment, polarization largely occupies both elite and mass politics. Chapter 5 examined the role elite polarization may play for inducing feelings of learned helplessness, and whether that would impact how people utilize exit and voice. Since it is difficult to find a political context in U.S. politics that is not polarized, this chapter utilized an experiment to manipulate the salience of high and low elite polarization in three samples, Samples 2-4.

Experimentally, there was a lack of strong evidence that high polarization exacerbated learned helplessness. However, considering attachment to political parties and feelings of ability to influence the political system, high polarization affected partisans and independents differently, such that high polarization decreased helplessness

for partisans, but increased these feelings for independents. As Klar and Krupnikov (2016) demonstrate, many undercover partisans are identifying as independents because they do not want to identify with the negative traits now associated with the major political parties, exacerbated by polarization. Since party identification may serve as a form of *loyalty*, it is possible that partisans in the high polarization condition felt more able to more clearly identify with the manipulation, the policy positions presented, and were thus felt more certainty and control. On the flip side, however, for independents who are less clearly connected to the parties and the policy positions presented, and possibly even adversely so, they may have felt less certain or as if they had less control.

As for polarization's impact on exit and voice, the experimental conditions did not present any main effects for voting behavior. There were some conditional effects, however. The high polarization condition moderated the effect of learned helplessness (Samples 3 and 4), external efficacy (Sample 2), trust (Sample 2), and interest (Sample 4) on voting behavior. Specifically regarding helplessness, the polarization conditions unexpectedly mitigated the effect of helplessness on vote likelihood, which is puzzling.

Since there were not strong experimental effects, Chapter 5 also investigated the effects of perceived polarization, which did demonstrate a direct effect on vote likelihood, such that higher perceived polarization increased the likelihood of voting in Sample 3 only. Perceived polarization decreased the likelihood of engaging in protesting or rallying behavior. Perceived polarization also demonstrated some conditional effects, such that it moderated the effects of learned helplessness in Sample 4, such that for those lower in perceived polarization, learned helplessness decreased the probability of having

engaged in protesting behavior, but for those higher in perceived polarization, learned helplessness increased the probability of having engaged in protesting behavior. Lastly, across the three samples, learned helplessness was shown to partially mediate the relationship between polarization and voting behavior. However, this was only the case for perceived polarization, not for experimentally manipulated polarization.

Taking these chapters together, there is evidence that experiences with uncontrollability and repeated losses increase learned helplessness. This evidence also points to some clear implications for how people utilize exit and voice. Specifically, helplessness increases the utilization of exit, disengagement from the conventional, institutionalized political system, and decreases in voting behavior, such as being likely to vote or actually turning out to vote. Further, as a mechanism of coping with helplessness, by reasserting power or status, rectifying injustices, or restoring a desired state of affairs, people utilize voice outside of the conventional, institutionalized system through more expressive political action, like engaging in marches, rallies, or protests. This duality carries implications, as well, for broader political consequences.

Broader Implications of Political Helplessness

First, in regard to voting behavior and its goal for selecting and informing elected officials, if those who feel helpless are not participating, and they are more likely from disadvantaged groups, their preferences and interests will likely continue to be un- or underrepresented. Second, one alternative to getting all who are eligible to actually vote is to change election administration laws to force a compulsory voting system. This

change would require eligible citizens to register for and participate in federal elections. While this may require people to participate, if any penalties are incurred financially for not participating, it would be expected to disproportionately impact those who feel helpless and as if their participation will not affect an uncontrollable system. Additionally, making participation involuntary may actually worsen the loss of control, rather than grant greater control to those who feel politically helpless, and may make participating less desirable overall.

Additionally, the broader narrative within this dissertation continued to circle back to experience and the way in which different experiences affect helplessness. As for political helplessness' implications for social policy, more attention, by scholars and policymakers, should be paid to the experiences that shape helplessness. Many scholars have concerned themselves with studying and proposing solutions alleviating feelings of injustice, systemic marginalization, perpetual poverty, and feelings of economic insecurity and instability. Some policymakers have concerned themselves, similarly, with solutions, however, in a polarized context, parties rarely agree on interventions and programs, particularly when helplessness serves to demobilize electoral opposition. Regardless, much more work is necessary to further the investigation of the political causes and consequences of helplessness and disaffection.

Future Work

As with many dissertations, the investigations within these chapters raised nearly as many questions as they answered. Extensions of the dissertation include the collection

of more representative data, investigation of the psychological complexity behind helplessness, additional important contextual effects, and implications for the reduction of learned helplessness.

Who Doesn't Want More Data?

First, through additional data collection, the observational findings should be replicated. Only two of the dissertation samples utilized raked survey weights so that the results would be approximately nationally representative. Additionally, one of these two samples, the CCES module, was only able to include a brief measure of learned helplessness, rather than the full scale. The other three samples were online convenience samples collected through Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk (MTurk). While MTurk is considered to be more representative of U.S. adults than a college student sample, it is still a convenience sample. More representative samples that include full measures of learned helplessness, and the measures of disaffection, are greatly needed to further this work, as helplessness measures are not included on any of the representative national surveys, such as the American National Election Study or the General Social Survey.

Beyond representativeness, the data collected for this dissertation was obtained leading up to and immediately following the 2016 presidential election. This presidential election was particularly contentious, which may have affected not only the observational effects, but also may have affected the survey experiments. None of the survey experiments provided strong evidence in favor of any causal arguments. However, helplessness scholars acknowledge the difficulty with causal ambiguity behind

uncontrollable events (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993), so further experimental investigations are needed to determine whether some causal clarity may be gained. Particularly, further experimentation is necessary to test the potential causal effects of income inequality, economic insecurity, and polarization. Additionally, while strong experimental evidence for learned helplessness was not found, future work plans to investigate alternative experimental tests of learned helplessness, e.g., making repeated losses salient through repeatedly losing or winning at a game with financial incentives.

Moreover, additional data that is not collected cross-sectionally or during a single election season are needed to assess the more complex relationships behind helplessness and the measures of disaffection. Additional datasets, particularly longitudinal datasets, are needed in the survey context. It is also important to note that learned helplessness assessed through a battery of survey items is only one method of evaluating learned helplessness. Accordingly, in-depth interviews and focus groups are needed to get at the deeper experiences at the root of political helplessness and effects of intersectionality, particularly as those who are the most helpless are exceedingly difficult to access through online surveys. Further, the nuances and richness of people's personal experiences with governmental policy, policing, and the criminal justice system, in addition to their broader life histories are not easily captured through survey work.

Psychological Complexity

While there is still some debate behind whether learned helplessness has more state or trait characteristics, there is no question that more investigation into how learned

helplessness is causally prior to disaffection. First, more work across additional samples is needed to assess the underlying concepts of helplessness and political disaffection. More specifically, additional work is needed to assess whether the disaffection measures used in this dissertation consistently load on a single disaffection factor beyond the five samples studied here.

Second, the dissertation raises questions about the individual relationships and temporal ordering of learned helplessness and the measures of disaffection, particularly internal efficacy. As it is theoretically posited that general helplessness occurs prior to disaffection, more longitudinal panel data is necessary to test the causal relationship between helplessness and disaffection. Overall, internal efficacy, is the closest measure to learned helplessness. While it behaved similarly to learned helplessness to predict vote confidence and protesting behavior, it did not consistently predict vote likelihood or turnout. Yet, it is conceivable that these two measures are related, where learned helplessness is a broader feeling of ability and knowledge, and internal efficacy is a more specific feeling of ability and knowledge related to participation. Thus, extensions of this hypothesis should be tested with additional data, particularly in a panel dataset over a longer period of time, to determine whether internal efficacy may actually mediate the relationship between learned helplessness and exit and voice. Initial mediation models from the dissertation samples show evidence that internal efficacy may partially mediate between 21% and 45% of the total effect of learned helplessness on vote likelihood, and between 20 and 35% of the total effect of learned helplessness on turnout. However, because these measures were largely collected in the same wave, panel data with these

measures collected at multiple waves over a longer period of time are needed before making further conclusions about these results.

Contextual Effects

Social problems do not occur singularly or in isolation. Rather, they co-occur, and when they do, "it may well be the result of one problem exacerbating another, as opposed to learned helplessness being at the root of all of them individually" (Peterson, Maier, and Seligman 1993: 262). As noted above, additional experimental investigations are needed to test the contextual effects of income inequality, economic insecurity, and polarization discussed within the chapters of this dissertation. However, there are other contemporary contexts that might exacerbate or mitigate learned helplessness. Particularly, there are implications of learned helplessness for social and political networks.

Learned helplessness scholars have identified a number of factors of learned helplessness that do not have parallels among animal learned helplessness. One of these factors has been identified by Simkin, Lederer, and Seligman (1983), who found that small groups can be made helpless by asking the group as a whole to work at unsolvable problems. The group helplessness carries over to later tasks, where they fail to solve problems readily mastered by other groups that were not previously exposed to uncontrollability and failure. Similarly, Peterson and Stunkard (1989) have developed a theory of collective control versus collective helplessness. Collective control is conceived as a norm about the way that a group works, what it is that the group can and cannot accomplish. Putting these two together, considering how helplessness may affect a

particular social network or broader community, there are implications for potential diffusion of disengagement. This could be assessed at both the individual level and at the network level.

First in regard to community level variables, this line of work will seek to tie helplessness to work on the politics of resentment, particularly rural resentment. Either feelings of personal or community helplessness would be expected to predict engagement in particular communities, e.g., communities that have experienced declines in unions, loss of jobs due to loss of industries or technology, areas deeply affected with racial tensions, or overwhelming challenges with the opioid epidemic. Follow-up studies are planed with a fellow University of Minnesota graduate, Geoff Sheagley, who has constructed survey items to measure rural resentment, to get at concerns with redistributive injustices and other issues of rural resentment discussed by Cramer (2016), Additional community-level will be collected to assess contextual variables of different community experiences, inspired by Hochschild (2016) and Vance (2016).

Further, scholars of political behavior have long investigated the social influences of participation and political attitudes. From early work, e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet (1944) and Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee (1954) which emphasizes that sociological factors, particularly family, shape the political interests and preferences individuals hold, to later mobilization models emphasizing mobilization by contact from candidates/campaigns and political organizations (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 2003; Uhlaner 1989), scholars have both directly and indirectly addressed social pressures underlying political behavior. Later mobilization models have focused on ways to boost

turnout through Get Out the Vote (GOTV) field experiments that either induce social pressure to overcome low interest in elections and increase turnout by using direct mail GOTV campaigns sharing neighbors' voting records (Green and Gerber 2008; Gerber, Green, and Larimer 2008) or by matching GOTV canvassers' race and ethnicity with the demographic background of potential voters (García Bedolla and Michelson 2012). Building on this area of work, models have turned to incorporate, more formally, the ways in which social networks impact political behavior in the mass public (McClurg 2003; Sinclair 2012; Sokhey and McClurg 2012), evaluating how social networks condition mobilization effects and resulting turnout in high vs. low salience elections (Rolfe 2012).

As some of the latest work on social networks and political participation has demonstrated, people tend to conform to the social norms of their networks. Sinclair (2012) illustrates through field experiments and survey work that there is a significant social component of voting. Specifically, explicit behaviors such as turning out to vote or donating money to a campaign are driven by social norms and can succumb to social pressure. She finds that individuals are more likely to turnout when a local canvasser delivers a mobilization message, and are more likely to turnout when the recipient lives with others who vote consistently, which carries implications for the role of social pressure within one's network as a mechanism of influence. Further, Sokhey and McClurg (2012) find that networks facilitate connections between individuals' vote decisions and underlying preferences when networks communicate clear signals regarding the candidates, assisting voters in making correct voting decisions. Thus,

people are influenced by their discussion networks, and those who are directly contacted by candidates or political parties are more likely to turnout, particularly if subjected to social pressures. However, these findings do not highlight the more specific differences among those who may feel disaffected and helpless or those who live in a disaffected and helpless social network.

Sinclair (2012) demonstrates that voters do not select their networks for ideological similarity, but by other factors, e.g., age, gender, race, education level, or religion. Thus, considering some of the findings regarding collective helplessness, how might networks made up of highly disaffected or highly helpless individuals engage in voting behavior? Alternatively stated, how might negative network structures create social pressure for individuals to exit and disengage from voting behavior, or potentially create social pressure to voice opinions and grievances through more expressive political action. These studies could be conducted observationally and experimentally.

Helplessness Reduction and Resilience

Lastly, given the effects learned helplessness has on engagement in voting behavior, it may be important to determine whether political helplessness can be mitigated. Additional studies examining the mitigation of learned helplessness could include the use of self-affirmation studies (e.g. Steele 1988), which may boost subjects' self-esteem and helping them to deal with the feelings of uncontrollability and potentially lessening the effect of learned helplessness. However, self-affirmation studies are not known for lasting effects of the boosts to self-esteem.

Alternatively, (Seligman 1981) suggests potential preventive or ameliorative interventions for helplessness and resulting depression, that may be able to be adapted to address political helplessness. Some of these effects stem from the role of emotions in dealing with anger and threat as coping mechanisms to reduce feelings of helplessness (Mikulincer 1994). Other coping mechanisms found to be effective for reducing feelings of helplessness in the laboratory context include retroactive reevaluation of the helplessness experience, or additional processing of the feelings of uncontrollability and failure (Cemalcilar et al. 2010). However, many of the coping mechanisms found to be effective have only been conducted in the laboratory environment. Additional investigation into whether potential interventions and social programs that may mitigate the experiences from which helplessness stems may be a more practical place to test helplessness mitigation.

Lastly, there is tension between temporary helplessness and more permanent helplessness. For individuals who experience situations that induce perpetual uncontrollability, but happen to be more resilient, are expected to be less likely to experience permanent or long-term helplessness. Thus, future work also plans to test the relationship between helplessness and resilience. A re-contact study of the control condition of Sample 3 is currently underway to assess two questions. First, what is the impact of actually winning or losing an election on learned helplessness (as opposed to just the perception of being on the winning or losing side of politics), as learned helplessness will be measured before and after the presidential election. Second, does resilience serve as a buffer against prior feelings of helplessness and uncontrollability.

Resilience will be measured using the brief resilience scale (BRS), which was created to assess people's ability to bounce back or recover from stress (Smith et al. 2008). I posit that those who lost the election, but show less helplessness may be more resilient and able to bounce back from loss and uncontrollability.

The potential directions and applications for learned helplessness in the political context abound. The work within this dissertation is timely as the U.S. public is exhibiting malaise and frustration with the current political system, and only one step toward gaining greater understanding of American disaffection. While this may have been exacerbated by a particularly contentious presidential election year, only time, and additional work, will tell whether these feelings of disaffection and dissatisfaction are here to stay or if they are just a blip on the U.S. democratic timeline.

Tables and Figures

Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Weighted Disaffection Trends (ANES Time Series 1960-2016)



Figure 2.2 Kernel Density of Learned Helplessness Across Samples



Figure 2.3 Sample Averages for Disaffection Measures



Table 2.1 Weighted Overtime Disaffection Averages (ANES Time Series 1960-2016)

Measure of Disaffection	Average (0-100)
External Efficacy	50.7
Internal Efficacy	32.7
Trust in Government	47.6
Interest in Elections/Campaigns	58.0
Interest in Public Affairs/Politics	59.0

Table 2.2 Disaffection Measure Sample Means

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	0.36	0.36	0.37	0.38	0.36
Internal Efficacy	0.60	0.64	0.60	0.57	0.59
External Efficacy	0.45	0.44	0.43	0.40	--
Generalized Trust	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.46	0.44
Political Interest	0.64	0.66	0.65	0.65	0.75
N	717	201	726	3529	972

Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for Samples 1-3 and Wave 1 or pre-election weighted means for Samples 4 and 5. *N*s reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.

Table 2.3 Internal Consistency of Multi-Item Measures Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	0.89	0.90	0.87	0.85	0.88
Internal Efficacy	0.84	0.88	0.81	0.37	--
External Efficacy	0.80	0.81	0.84	0.66	--
Generalized Trust	0.58	0.50	0.62	0.70	0.61
Political Interest	--	--	--	--	--

Note: Missing values reflect single-item measures for political interest across the samples, and a single-item measure of internal efficacy and no measure of external efficacy in Sample 5.

Table 2.4 Disaffection Correlates with Learned Helplessness Scale

Correlation of LHS with:	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Internal Efficacy	-0.19	-0.30	-0.18	-0.33	-0.13
External Efficacy	-0.18	-0.16	-0.26	-0.03	--
Generalized Trust	-0.12	-0.20	-0.23	0.01	0.04
Political Interest	-0.13	-0.14	-0.18	-0.24	-0.23
N	718	201	726	3515	972

Table 2.5 Common Predictors of Learned Helplessness Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Income	0.08**	0.08*	0.10**	0.06**	0.12**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Education	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03**	0.06+
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Female	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	0.01+	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age	0.05+	0.11**	0.02	0.09**	0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Latino	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
White	-0.00	0.03	0.02*	-0.00	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Constant	0.59**	0.51**	0.55**	0.54**	0.48**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
N	705	189	708	3422	913
R2	0.035	0.096	0.073	0.062	0.082

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.6 Common Predictors of Internal Efficacy Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Income	0.05+	0.08	0.00	0.04*	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Education	0.13**	0.30+	0.07**	0.06**	0.26**
	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Female	-0.10**	-0.26**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.15**
	(0.02)	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age	0.20**	1.01**	0.03	0.10**	0.14**
	(0.05)	(0.20)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Latino	0.03	0.06	-0.04+	-0.01	-0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.15)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)
White	0.03+	0.13	-0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Constant	0.49**	2.41**	0.58**	0.52**	0.52**
	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)
N	705	189	708	3428	912
R2	0.116	0.179	0.064	0.054	0.192

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.7 Common Predictors of External Efficacy Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Income	0.03	0.11	0.06*	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Education	0.08*	0.14	0.07*	0.09**
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Female	-0.01	0.25*	-0.01	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age	0.01	0.21	0.03	-0.21**
	(0.05)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.03)
Latino	0.05+	0.04	-0.05	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.16)	(0.03)	(0.02)
White	-0.08**	-0.22+	-0.02	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.11)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.46**	2.15**	0.38**	0.46**
	(0.03)	(0.18)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	705	189	708	3429
R2	0.044	0.060	0.026	0.068

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.8 Common Predictors of Generalized Trust Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Income	0.03	0.05	0.06**	0.06**	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Education	0.07**	0.02	0.06**	0.04**	0.04+
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	0.00	0.05*	0.02+	-0.04**	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Age	0.08*	0.05	0.13**	-0.04	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Latino	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
White	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.04**	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Constant	0.32**	0.34**	0.28**	0.40**	0.42**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
N	705	189	708	3422	913
R2	0.034	0.051	0.066	0.047	0.019

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.9 Common Predictors of Political Interest Across Samples

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Income	0.02	0.04	0.00	0.08**	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Education	0.09**	0.05	0.08*	0.11**	0.17**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Female	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.08**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age	0.15**	0.28**	0.24**	0.10**	0.51**
	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Latino	0.04	0.10+	-0.04	0.02	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.06)
White	0.01	-0.03	0.06*	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Constant	0.49**	0.55**	0.53**	0.55**	0.49**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)
N	705	189	708	3420	889
R2	0.037	0.099	0.062	0.076	0.238

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.10 Summary of Common Predictors of Disaffection

	Learned Helplessness	Internal Efficacy	External Efficacy	Trust	Interest
Income	+	+		+	
Education	+	+	+	+	+
Female		-			-
Age	+	+		+	+
Latino		-			
White			-		

Note: The summary reflects where the predictor presented a positive (+) or negative (-) relationship predicting the measure of disaffection across two or more samples.

Table 2.11 Cynicism Sample Means

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Politicians lie	0.67	0.57	0.66	--
Politicians are crooked	0.71	0.67	0.68	0.77
Elections make government pay attention	0.55	0.56	0.57	0.58
N	714	201	725	3,528

Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for Samples 1-3 and Wave 1, pre-election weighted means for Sample 4. *N*s reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.

Table 2.12 Democratic Satisfaction Sample Means

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Democratic Satisfaction	0.45	0.44	0.47	--
N	714	201	725	--

Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for Samples 1-3. *N*s reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.

Table 2.13 Federal Government Feeling Thermometer Sample Means

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Federal Government Attitudes	38.28	37.23	39.83	--
N	684	199	698	--

Note: Means included above reflect unweighted means from control conditions for Samples 1-3. *N*s reflect the smallest sample size for the measures from each sample.

Table 2.14 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of How Often Politicians Lie

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3
Learned Helplessness	0.06	0.11	0.17**
	(0.05)	(0.14)	(0.06)
Income	-0.03	0.03	-0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Education	-0.07*	-0.16**	-0.07**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01	-0.03	-0.06
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.04)
Latino	0.05*	-0.04	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)
White	-0.00	-0.03	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Constant	0.71**	0.65**	0.71**
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.03)
N	705	189	708
R2	0.033	0.056	0.073

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.15 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of How Crooked Are Politicians

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Learned Helplessness	0.14+	0.11	0.21*	-0.07
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.09)	(0.06)
Income	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Education	-0.15**	-0.03	-0.15**	-0.06*
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Female	0.01	-0.00	-0.01	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Age	0.04	-0.06	0.05	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.03)
Latino	-0.04	-0.03	-0.04	-0.04*
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.02)
White	0.01	-0.02	-0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Constant	0.73**	0.67**	0.69**	0.81**
	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N	705	189	708	3414
R2	0.033	0.009	0.039	0.015

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.16 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Whether Elections Make Politicians Pay Attention to the People

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4
Learned Helplessness	-0.18**	-0.18	-0.22**	-0.12*
	(0.07)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.06)
Income	-0.03	0.05	0.05	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Education	0.09*	0.05	0.02	0.05*
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Female	-0.02	0.04	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Age	-0.03	0.04	0.08	-0.06
	(0.05)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Latino	0.03	0.07	-0.05	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.02)
White	-0.08**	-0.08+	-0.05*	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.67**	0.61**	0.65**	0.63**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)	(0.04)
N	703	189	708	3414
R2	0.042	0.045	0.033	0.015

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.17 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Democratic Satisfaction

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3
Learned Helplessness	-0.06	-0.31*	-0.23**
	(0.07)	(0.16)	(0.08)
Income	0.06+	0.14+	0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)
Education	0.05	0.02	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)
Female	-0.00	0.06	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)
Age	0.09+	-0.11	0.02
	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.05)
Latino	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.04)
White	-0.06*	-0.05	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)
Constant	0.44**	0.51**	0.47**
	(0.04)	(0.10)	(0.05)
N	704	189	708
R2	0.025	0.068	0.033

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.18 Learned Helplessness as a Predictor of Feelings Toward the Federal Government

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3
Learned Helplessness	-4.44	-5.33	-17.73*
	(6.81)	(14.67)	(7.98)
Income	-0.02	1.02	-1.77
	(3.20)	(6.90)	(3.58)
Education	8.48*	-1.69	10.08**
	(3.53)	(6.69)	(3.36)
Female	0.76	8.13*	7.79**
	(1.85)	(3.72)	(1.94)
Age	-10.70*	-8.81	1.46
	(5.23)	(8.52)	(5.32)
Latino	-1.09	-0.55	0.47
	(2.99)	(6.20)	(3.85)
White	-6.21**	-2.19	-0.71
	(2.31)	(4.38)	(2.44)
Constant	42.85**	40.34**	37.52**
	(4.28)	(9.87)	(4.96)
N	663	187	686
R2	0.028	0.033	0.043

Standard errors in parentheses
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.19 Common Predictors of Learned Helplessness Across Samples

	(1) Sample 1	(2) Sample 2	(3) Sample 3	(4) Sample 4	(5) Sample 5	(6) Sample 1	(7) Sample 2	(8) Sample 3	(9) Sample 4	(10) Sample 5
Income	-0.07**	-0.08*	-0.10**	-0.06**	-0.11**	-0.06**	-0.06+	-0.09**	-0.05**	-0.12**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Education	0.01	-0.00	-0.00	-0.03*	-0.04	0.03+	0.02	0.01	-0.02+	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Age	-0.07*	-0.12**	-0.02	-0.10**	-0.15**	-0.03	-0.07	0.00	-0.07**	-0.09+
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)
White	0.00	-0.05*	-0.03*	0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.04+	-0.03*	0.00	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Latino	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Female	0.01	-0.00	0.01	-0.02*	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.02**	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Authoritarianism	-0.01	0.02	0.02+	0.01	0.03	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Republican	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Democrat	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.04	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.01	0.05
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Ideology	-0.00	-0.08	-0.02	-0.01	0.06	-0.02	-0.10*	-0.04	-0.01	0.06
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)
Religiosity	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03*	-0.03	-0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)
Loser Perception	0.00	0.01	0.03**	0.02*	0.04+	-0.01	-0.00	0.02	0.02**	0.05*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Internal Efficacy						-0.06**	-0.08**	-0.08+	-0.19**	-0.00
						(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)
External Efficacy						-0.02*	-0.01	-0.08**	0.02	--
						(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	--
Trust						-0.05	-0.12+	-0.08**	0.06**	0.11
						(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)
Interest						0.03	0.09	-0.04+	-0.03*	-0.13**
						(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)
Constant	0.42**	0.50**	0.44**	0.45**	0.41**	0.62**	0.70**	0.56**	0.53**	0.44**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.07)
N	681	177	678	3337	837	681	177	678	3329	825
R2	0.043	0.155	0.092	0.064	0.082	0.116	0.258	0.162	0.172	0.109

Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 are weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 2.4 The Effect of Income Across Values of Learned Helplessness Income



Figure 2.5 The Effect of Age Across Values of Learned Helplessness



Figure 2.6 The Effect of Identifying as White vs. Non-White Across Values of Learned Helplessness



Figure 2.7 The Effect of Identifying as Being on the Losing Side of Politics vs. the Winning Side of Politics Across Values of Learned Helplessness



Table 2.20 Negative Experiences Being Pulled Over Predicting Learned Helplessness

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Negativity	0.06**	0.05**	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Income		-0.10**	-0.09**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		0.00	-0.00
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age		-0.06**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Latino		0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
White		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican		-0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat		-0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology		-0.03*	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Loser Perception		0.02**	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Internal Efficacy			-0.16**
			(0.02)
External Efficacy			-0.07**
			(0.01)
Trust			-0.01
			(0.01)
Interest			-0.01
			(0.01)
Constant	0.34**	0.43**	0.57**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
N	3356	3116	3115
R2	0.012	0.087	0.150

Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.21 Consideration from Government Officials Predicting Learned Helplessness

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Consideration	-0.12**	-0.10**	-0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Income		-0.09**	-0.09**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		0.00	-0.01
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age		-0.06**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Latino		0.00	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
White		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican		-0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat		0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology		-0.03**	-0.03**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Loser Perception		0.02**	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Internal Efficacy			-0.15**
			(0.02)
External Efficacy			-0.07**
			(0.01)
Trust			-0.01
			(0.01)
Interest			-0.01
			(0.01)
Constant	0.45**	0.51**	0.61**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	3626	3365	3364
R2	0.045	0.106	0.155

Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 2.22 Experience with Welfare Predicting Learned Helplessness

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Welfare	0.03**	0.02**	0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Education		-0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Income		-0.09**	-0.09**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Female		-0.00	-0.01+
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Age		-0.06**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Latino		0.01	0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
White		-0.00	-0.00
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican		-0.01	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Democrat		-0.00	0.01
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Ideology		-0.03**	-0.04**
		(0.01)	(0.01)
Loser Perception		0.02**	0.01*
		(0.00)	(0.00)
Internal Efficacy			-0.16**
			(0.02)
External Efficacy			-0.08**
			(0.01)
Trust			-0.02
			(0.01)
Interest			-0.01
			(0.01)
Constant	0.37**	0.46**	0.59**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	3615	3355	3354
R2	0.004	0.081	0.147

Standard errors in parentheses [Sample 3] + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Vote Likelihood or Vote Intent

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	-1.46*	-3.48*	-2.86**	-7.18**	0.15
	(0.71)	(1.73)	(0.89)	(2.66)	(0.85)
Internal Efficacy	0.41*	0.09	2.17*	-1.55	2.15**
	(0.19)	(0.49)	(0.93)	(1.89)	(0.63)
External Efficacy	0.22	0.13	-0.28	0.25	--
	(0.16)	(0.39)	(0.52)	(1.41)	--
Trust	-0.06	-1.59	0.42	1.13	0.14
	(0.65)	(1.44)	(0.69)	(1.74)	(0.94)
Interest	3.28**	4.98**	2.67**	6.09**	1.34*
	(0.53)	(1.52)	(0.48)	(1.42)	(0.57)
Education	0.58+	1.43+	0.94*	1.56	0.97
	(0.32)	(0.79)	(0.37)	(1.00)	(0.63)
Income	0.76*	0.79	0.75*	1.00	0.74
	(0.36)	(0.74)	(0.37)	(1.57)	(0.61)
Female	0.43	0.26	1.23*	2.92+	2.50**
	(0.55)	(0.94)	(0.60)	(1.75)	(0.69)
Age	0.20	0.96+	0.60*	-1.26	-0.18
	(0.23)	(0.50)	(0.25)	(0.83)	(0.44)
Latino	0.23	-0.52	0.37	-0.29	-0.93+
	(0.29)	(0.69)	(0.40)	(0.85)	(0.49)
White	0.64**	0.70	0.09	0.61	-0.31
	(0.19)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.59)	(0.36)
Republican	1.42**	3.36**	0.69*	1.97	0.55
	(0.36)	(0.88)	(0.34)	(1.43)	(0.53)
Democrat	0.95**	2.92**	0.53	1.84	1.06*
	(0.34)	(0.82)	(0.34)	(1.34)	(0.54)
Ideology	-0.73	-1.65	-0.33	-0.32	-0.06
	(0.50)	(1.06)	(0.54)	(1.08)	(0.67)
Loser Perception	-0.12	0.27	-0.13	0.68	0.24
	(0.19)	(0.42)	(0.21)	(0.78)	(0.34)
Constant	-4.90**	-5.92**	-3.06**	-3.58	-2.98**
	(0.87)	(2.08)	(0.85)	(2.64)	(1.14)
N	681	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Figure 3.1 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Vote Likelihood



Table 3.2 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Vote Confidence

	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 1	Sample 4 Wave 4
Learned Helplessness	-1.26+	-1.95**	-1.70**
	(0.75)	(0.44)	(0.62)
Internal Efficacy	2.03*	0.81*	0.95*
	(0.82)	(0.34)	(0.44)
External Efficacy	-0.60	0.41	0.61
	(0.44)	(0.27)	(0.39)
Trust	0.32	-0.09	-0.28
	(0.61)	(0.37)	(0.50)
Interest	1.41**	1.28**	0.29
	(0.43)	(0.27)	(0.33)
Education	0.36	-0.43*	-0.18
	(0.31)	(0.18)	(0.24)
Income	0.36	0.06	0.38
	(0.33)	(0.26)	(0.36)
Female	-0.00	-0.02	0.03
	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.15)
Age	0.32	1.34**	0.86*
	(0.50)	(0.26)	(0.39)
Latino	-0.04	-0.07	-0.56*
	(0.36)	(0.16)	(0.25)
White	0.09	-0.26+	0.22
	(0.23)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Republican	-0.09	0.68**	0.21
	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Democrat	0.09	0.97**	0.49*
	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.25)
Ideology	0.12	-0.17	-0.11
	(0.47)	(0.24)	(0.34)
Loser Perception	-0.19	-0.45**	-0.37*
	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.17)
Constant	-2.45**	-1.57**	-0.32
	(0.76)	(0.47)	(0.61)
N	655	3281	1602

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 3.2 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Vote Confidence



Table 3.3 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Reported Turnout

	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	-7.70*	-2.60*
	(3.50)	(1.10)
Internal Efficacy	-1.77	0.99
	(1.57)	(1.00)
External Efficacy	0.73	--
	(1.28)	--
Trust	-5.10**	-0.86
	(1.89)	(1.29)
Interest	3.09*	1.76*
	(1.39)	(0.79)
Education	0.31	-0.68
	(1.15)	(0.61)
Income	0.91	1.57+
	(1.04)	(0.90)
Female	-0.94	-0.43
	(0.58)	(0.54)
Age	1.31	0.33
	(1.63)	(1.21)
Latino	0.23	1.01
	(0.76)	(0.76)
White	0.19	0.61
	(0.67)	(0.52)
Republican	1.23	-0.18
	(1.01)	(0.78)
Democrat	0.50	-0.58
	(0.90)	(0.68)
Ideology	-4.00**	-1.38
	(1.37)	(0.89)
Loser Perception	0.36	0.35
	(0.63)	(0.56)
Constant	7.55**	2.63*
	(2.89)	(1.15)
N	310	662

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Figure 3.3 Impact of Learned Helplessness on Predicted Probability of Reported Turnout



Table 3.4 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Loser Perception on Vote Likelihood

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	-2.72*	-1.42	-3.38*	-16.67**	-0.18
	(1.34)	(2.18)	(1.37)	(5.28)	(1.06)
Loser Perception	-0.85	2.22	-0.47	-4.50+	0.02
	(0.67)	(1.36)	(0.71)	(2.38)	(0.62)
Learned Helplessness	1.77	-5.23	0.88	13.72*	0.57
X Loser Perception	(1.73)	(3.44)	(1.75)	(6.14)	(1.58)
Internal Efficacy	1.77**	-0.19	2.17*	-2.57	2.13**
	(0.61)	(1.52)	(0.93)	(2.03)	(0.63)
External Efficacy	0.61	0.55	-0.29	0.82	--
	(0.56)	(1.20)	(0.52)	(1.54)	--
Trust	-0.14	-1.53	0.41	1.46	0.16
	(0.72)	(1.44)	(0.69)	(1.82)	(0.96)
Interest	2.77**	4.98**	2.67**	7.06**	1.34*
	(0.58)	(1.54)	(0.48)	(1.64)	(0.58)
Education	0.70+	0.71	0.76*	2.13*	0.75
	(0.41)	(0.74)	(0.37)	(1.01)	(0.61)
Income	0.77*	1.39+	0.94*	0.30	0.97
	(0.36)	(0.79)	(0.37)	(1.16)	(0.63)
Female	0.74**	0.69	0.09	0.51	-0.33
	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.60)	(0.36)
Age	0.03	0.40	1.24*	2.98+	2.49**
	(0.61)	(0.96)	(0.60)	(1.68)	(0.70)
Latino	0.33	-0.50	0.36	-0.29	-0.95*
	(0.32)	(0.68)	(0.40)	(0.95)	(0.48)
White	0.22	1.05*	0.60*	-1.59+	-0.18
	(0.26)	(0.51)	(0.25)	(0.85)	(0.44)
Republican	1.26**	3.54**	0.69*	2.03	0.56
	(0.40)	(0.93)	(0.34)	(1.30)	(0.53)
Democrat	1.17**	3.00**	0.54	1.75	1.04+
	(0.38)	(0.86)	(0.34)	(1.22)	(0.54)
Ideology	-0.25	-1.97+	-0.32	0.10	-0.08
	(0.56)	(1.10)	(0.54)	(1.11)	(0.68)
Constant	-4.03**	-6.29**	-2.87**	-0.19	-2.85*
	(0.93)	(1.96)	(0.93)	(3.15)	(1.12)
N	551	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.5 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Race on Vote Likelihood

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	0.66	-4.24	-4.50*	-2.27	0.94
	(1.72)	(3.59)	(2.00)	(7.30)	(1.29)
White	1.36+	0.58	-0.21	1.42	0.28
	(0.77)	(1.65)	(0.91)	(3.32)	(0.73)
Learned Helplessness	-3.12	0.95	2.04	-6.38	-1.14
X White	(1.98)	(3.91)	(2.21)	(7.63)	(1.64)
Internal Efficacy	1.79**	0.26	2.22*	-1.55	2.10**
	(0.61)	(1.47)	(0.93)	(1.92)	(0.63)
External Efficacy	0.65	0.32	-0.30	0.60	--
	(0.56)	(1.22)	(0.52)	(1.48)	--
Trust	-0.24	-1.57	0.48	0.95	0.11
	(0.72)	(1.45)	(0.70)	(1.79)	(0.95)
Interest	2.83**	5.02**	2.66**	5.97**	1.39*
	(0.58)	(1.53)	(0.48)	(1.44)	(0.59)
Education	0.68+	0.83	0.76*	1.68+	0.72
	(0.41)	(0.76)	(0.37)	(1.00)	(0.62)
Income	0.75*	1.43+	0.92*	0.53	0.99
	(0.36)	(0.79)	(0.37)	(1.14)	(0.63)
Female	0.76**	0.71	0.08	0.61	-0.32
	(0.22)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.58)	(0.37)
Age	0.09	0.25	1.21*	3.04+	2.48**
	(0.62)	(0.94)	(0.60)	(1.78)	(0.69)
Latino	0.37	-0.51	0.38	-0.26	-0.93+
	(0.32)	(0.69)	(0.41)	(0.93)	(0.48)
Republican	1.23**	3.37**	0.68*	1.66	0.54
	(0.40)	(0.88)	(0.34)	(1.51)	(0.54)
Democrat	1.20**	2.92**	0.53	1.57	1.05+
	(0.38)	(0.82)	(0.34)	(1.35)	(0.54)
Ideology	-0.19	-1.67	-0.28	-0.08	-0.05
	(0.56)	(1.06)	(0.54)	(1.11)	(0.67)
Loser Perception	-0.22	0.25	-0.13	0.70	0.20
	(0.21)	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.79)	(0.34)
Constant	-5.32**	-5.39*	-2.44*	-5.44	-3.29**
	(1.03)	(2.28)	(1.09)	(3.79)	(1.17)
N	551	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.6 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Ethnicity on Vote Likelihood

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	-1.79+	-3.17+	-2.55**	-6.05*	-0.29
	(0.94)	(1.73)	(0.91)	(2.69)	(0.98)
Latino	0.11	11.84+	2.86	8.88	-1.95*
	(0.92)	(7.18)	(1.87)	(6.74)	(0.80)
Learned Helplessness	0.59	-29.75+	-6.00	-22.80	2.57
X Latino	(2.42)	(16.87)	(4.31)	(15.40)	(1.68)
Internal Efficacy	1.79**	-0.03	2.19*	-1.68	2.15**
	(0.61)	(1.50)	(0.93)	(1.85)	(0.63)
External Efficacy	0.62	0.69	-0.23	0.85	--
	(0.56)	(1.22)	(0.52)	(1.45)	--
Trust	-0.17	-1.48	0.36	0.74	0.22
	(0.72)	(1.47)	(0.70)	(1.88)	(0.96)
Interest	2.80**	5.29**	2.74**	6.20**	1.41*
	(0.58)	(1.57)	(0.49)	(1.45)	(0.57)
Education	0.70+	1.02	0.73*	1.85*	0.71
	(0.41)	(0.77)	(0.37)	(0.91)	(0.62)
Income	0.79*	1.16	0.97**	0.19	1.00
	(0.36)	(0.81)	(0.37)	(1.07)	(0.63)
Female	0.75**	0.56	0.09	0.58	-0.28
	(0.21)	(0.45)	(0.21)	(0.59)	(0.36)
Age	0.03	-0.01	1.20*	3.19+	2.47**
	(0.61)	(0.97)	(0.60)	(1.79)	(0.69)
White	0.21	0.94+	0.59*	-1.23	-0.20
	(0.26)	(0.51)	(0.25)	(0.82)	(0.44)
Republican	1.22**	3.41**	0.69*	1.83	0.51
	(0.40)	(0.89)	(0.34)	(1.30)	(0.54)
Democrat	1.15**	2.82**	0.51	1.87	1.05+
	(0.38)	(0.82)	(0.34)	(1.24)	(0.54)
Ideology	-0.25	-2.01+	-0.38	-0.43	-0.01
	(0.56)	(1.14)	(0.54)	(1.14)	(0.67)
Loser Perception	-0.20	0.34	-0.12	0.88	0.19
	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.83)	(0.33)
Constant	-4.38**	-5.63**	-3.18**	-3.93	-2.89*
	(0.87)	(1.92)	(0.86)	(2.58)	(1.14)
N	551	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 3.7 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Gender on Vote Likelihood

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	0.34	-5.53*	-5.77**	-9.01+	-0.08
	(1.30)	(2.66)	(1.70)	(4.56)	(1.09)
Female	2.05**	-0.61	-1.51+	-0.96	-0.46
	(0.67)	(1.28)	(0.80)	(2.16)	(0.64)
Learned Helplessness	-3.56*	3.63	4.09*	3.73	0.46
X Female	(1.72)	(3.36)	(1.97)	(5.38)	(1.57)
Internal Efficacy	1.84**	0.32	2.35*	-1.68	2.14**
	(0.61)	(1.48)	(0.94)	(1.98)	(0.63)
External Efficacy	0.57	0.35	-0.22	0.28	--
	(0.56)	(1.19)	(0.52)	(1.40)	--
Trust	-0.14	-1.37	0.38	0.89	0.17
	(0.72)	(1.46)	(0.69)	(1.75)	(0.95)
Interest	2.83**	5.12**	2.67**	6.04**	1.36*
	(0.58)	(1.53)	(0.49)	(1.40)	(0.56)
Education	0.68+	0.77	0.72+	1.51	0.74
	(0.41)	(0.74)	(0.37)	(1.02)	(0.62)
Income	0.80*	1.36+	0.94*	0.65	0.96
	(0.36)	(0.80)	(0.37)	(1.14)	(0.63)
Age	0.10	0.18	1.18+	2.78	2.50**
	(0.62)	(0.95)	(0.61)	(1.71)	(0.69)
Latino	0.31	-0.38	0.38	-0.30	-0.92+
	(0.32)	(0.70)	(0.40)	(0.84)	(0.49)
White	0.22	0.92+	0.59*	-1.27	-0.16
	(0.26)	(0.51)	(0.25)	(0.85)	(0.46)
Republican	1.22**	3.38**	0.70*	1.98	0.54
	(0.40)	(0.90)	(0.34)	(1.42)	(0.53)
Democrat	1.14**	2.93**	0.51	1.87	1.07*
	(0.38)	(0.85)	(0.34)	(1.31)	(0.53)
Ideology	-0.26	-1.57	-0.37	-0.24	-0.04
	(0.56)	(1.06)	(0.55)	(1.06)	(0.68)
Loser Perception	-0.19	0.23	-0.11	0.62	0.23
	(0.21)	(0.43)	(0.21)	(0.78)	(0.34)
Constant	-5.19**	-5.11*	-1.97+	-2.45	-2.94*
	(0.93)	(2.00)	(1.01)	(3.25)	(1.16)
N	551	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.8 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Income on Vote Likelihood

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	-1.15	-4.07	-2.83	1.47	0.79
	(1.72)	(3.18)	(1.94)	(5.73)	(1.24)
Income	1.15	0.94	0.96	6.41	1.46
	(1.05)	(2.34)	(1.30)	(3.88)	(1.01)
Learned Helplessness	-0.99	1.27	-0.06	-14.91	-1.28
X Income	(2.65)	(5.72)	(3.11)	(9.76)	(2.10)
Internal Efficacy	1.80**	0.32	2.17*	-2.24	2.13**
	(0.61)	(1.49)	(0.93)	(2.06)	(0.62)
External Efficacy	0.61	0.39	-0.28	0.61	--
	(0.56)	(1.18)	(0.52)	(1.36)	--
Trust	-0.14	-1.58	0.42	0.58	0.14
	(0.72)	(1.44)	(0.70)	(1.85)	(0.93)
Interest	2.80**	5.00**	2.67**	6.05**	1.35*
	(0.58)	(1.52)	(0.48)	(1.44)	(0.57)
Education	0.70+	0.81	0.75*	1.68+	0.76
	(0.41)	(0.75)	(0.37)	(1.01)	(0.62)
Female	0.75**	0.70	0.09	0.48	-0.31
	(0.21)	(0.44)	(0.21)	(0.61)	(0.37)
Age	0.04	0.24	1.23*	3.04+	2.49**
	(0.61)	(0.94)	(0.60)	(1.77)	(0.69)
Latino	0.31	-0.51	0.37	-0.37	-0.93+
	(0.32)	(0.69)	(0.40)	(0.85)	(0.48)
White	0.20	0.96+	0.60*	-1.22	-0.17
	(0.26)	(0.50)	(0.25)	(0.87)	(0.44)
Republican	1.22**	3.37**	0.69*	2.20	0.54
	(0.40)	(0.88)	(0.34)	(1.46)	(0.53)
Democrat	1.16**	2.92**	0.53	2.15	1.04+
	(0.38)	(0.82)	(0.34)	(1.37)	(0.54)
Ideology	-0.24	-1.63	-0.33	-0.18	-0.07
	(0.56)	(1.06)	(0.54)	(1.08)	(0.67)
Loser Perception	-0.20	0.27	-0.13	0.70	0.22
	(0.21)	(0.42)	(0.21)	(0.77)	(0.34)
Constant	-4.64**	-5.53**	-3.07**	-6.74*	-3.23*
	(1.04)	(2.05)	(1.09)	(3.19)	(1.33)
N	551	177	677	171	826

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.9 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness on Reported Turnout

Model	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Sample 4	Sample 5	Sample 4	Sample 5	Sample 4	Sample 5	Sample 4	Sample 5	Sample 4	Sample 5
LH X Loser Percept.	22.76**	3.08								
	(8.57)	(1.99)								
LH X White			0.20	6.76*						
			(4.83)	(3.01)						
LH X Latino					9.35	-9.38				
					(5.95)	(7.13)				
LH X Female							-5.77	-1.82		
							(5.96)	(1.79)		
LH X Income									-24.34+	-5.27*
									(12.57)	(2.67)
LH	-25.01**	-4.32**	-7.85+	-8.05**	-9.12*	-2.29*	-4.98	-1.41	6.48	-0.41
	(7.50)	(1.61)	(4.23)	(2.86)	(3.96)	(1.11)	(5.16)	(1.19)	(8.62)	(1.18)
Internal Efficacy	-2.43	0.82	-1.78	1.40	-1.60	1.08	-1.90	1.03	-1.68	1.05
	(1.71)	(0.97)	(1.56)	(1.05)	(1.55)	(1.02)	(1.61)	(1.00)	(1.55)	(0.99)
External Efficacy	0.38	--	0.73	--	0.60	--	0.84	--	1.19	--
	(1.30)	--	(1.29)	--	(1.24)	--	(1.25)	--	(1.25)	--
Trust	-6.18**	-0.86	-5.10**	-0.12	-5.16**	-0.71	-5.11**	-0.99	-4.82*	-0.72
	(1.97)	(1.24)	(1.91)	(1.33)	(1.87)	(1.29)	(1.88)	(1.31)	(1.87)	(1.29)
Interest	4.05**	1.83*	3.09*	1.74*	2.92*	1.75*	3.22*	1.79*	2.82*	1.66*
	(1.41)	(0.79)	(1.39)	(0.81)	(1.38)	(0.78)	(1.40)	(0.80)	(1.41)	(0.83)
Education	0.61	-0.60	0.30	-0.56	0.34	-0.63	0.30	-0.70	0.13	-0.63
	(1.27)	(0.64)	(1.14)	(0.64)	(1.14)	(0.62)	(1.16)	(0.61)	(1.11)	(0.62)
Income	0.60	1.58+	0.91	1.76*	0.98	1.61+	0.86	1.65+	11.81*	4.02*
	(1.17)	(0.91)	(1.04)	(0.90)	(1.05)	(0.91)	(1.04)	(0.92)	(5.66)	(1.60)
Female	-0.50	-0.52	-0.94+	-0.36	-0.91	-0.43	1.61	0.43	-1.02+	-0.36
	(0.61)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.53)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(2.77)	(0.98)	(0.57)	(0.54)
Age	0.54	0.19	1.31	0.33	1.40	0.45	0.98	0.36	1.22	0.18
	(1.58)	(1.30)	(1.63)	(1.16)	(1.63)	(1.21)	(1.59)	(1.20)	(1.66)	(1.18)
Latino	0.18	0.97	0.23	1.52+	-3.95	6.95	0.11	0.96	0.16	1.01
	(0.84)	(0.75)	(0.76)	(0.85)	(2.63)	(5.02)	(0.76)	(0.72)	(0.76)	(0.79)
White	0.11	0.67	0.10	-2.71+	0.22	0.59	0.34	0.59	0.22	0.54
	(0.65)	(0.54)	(2.24)	(1.53)	(0.67)	(0.50)	(0.67)	(0.53)	(0.68)	(0.51)
Republican	1.61	-0.03	1.24	0.00	1.21	-0.18	1.27	-0.18	1.69+	-0.44
	(1.12)	(0.71)	(1.01)	(0.72)	(1.00)	(0.78)	(0.97)	(0.78)	(0.98)	(0.81)
Democrat	0.57	-0.55	0.51	-0.37	0.50	-0.69	0.54	-0.61	0.87	-0.87
	(0.98)	(0.65)	(0.90)	(0.63)	(0.91)	(0.70)	(0.89)	(0.71)	(0.90)	(0.70)
Ideology	-3.91**	-1.42	-4.00**	-1.66+	-3.98**	-1.51+	-3.97**	-1.44	-4.19**	-1.16
	(1.34)	(0.88)	(1.36)	(0.87)	(1.33)	(0.86)	(1.36)	(0.90)	(1.40)	(0.89)
Loser Perception	-9.74*	-1.12	0.36	0.66	0.33	0.33	0.29	0.37	0.47	0.30
	(3.86)	(1.01)	(0.63)	(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.63)	(0.55)
Constant	15.72**	3.50**	7.63**	4.49**	8.13**	2.47*	6.36+	2.10+	0.87	1.77
	(4.33)	(1.29)	(2.79)	(1.64)	(3.06)	(1.17)	(3.41)	(1.18)	(4.89)	(1.12)
N	310	662	310	662	310	662	310	662	310	662

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients for logistic regression models, not odds ratios. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 are weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.10 Effect of Disaffection Measures on Protesting and Rallying

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	2.28*	5.81+	0.45	2.26+	0.92
	(1.15)	(3.59)	(1.27)	(1.22)	(0.87)
Internal Efficacy	2.08*	8.65*	4.10**	-0.58	4.28**
	(0.82)	(3.77)	(1.45)	(0.87)	(0.91)
External Efficacy	1.86*	-2.63	1.86*	0.61	--
	(0.75)	(2.37)	(0.76)	(0.75)	--
Trust	-2.05*	-3.42	-0.19	0.06	2.44*
	(0.98)	(3.21)	(0.97)	(0.90)	(1.24)
Interest	2.43**	-3.46	0.81	2.44**	3.49**
	(0.76)	(3.07)	(0.73)	(0.80)	(1.13)
Education	0.49	0.58	0.49	-0.34	0.84
	(0.52)	(1.51)	(0.54)	(0.43)	(0.54)
Income	-0.34	0.94	-0.51	0.59	0.83
	(0.45)	(1.65)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.73)
Female	0.07	1.56	-0.50+	-0.05	0.23
	(0.27)	(0.97)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.36)
Age	-2.02*	-4.79+	-2.32*	-1.65+	-0.02
	(0.84)	(2.89)	(0.94)	(0.85)	(0.75)
Latino	-0.05	0.00	0.75	0.14	0.70
	(0.41)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.57)	(0.66)
White	-1.07**	0.97	-0.29	-0.25	0.17
	(0.31)	(1.53)	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.55)
Republican	1.73*	15.10	0.08	-0.40	0.05
	(0.67)	(3564.65)	(0.59)	(0.47)	(0.66)
Democrat	0.65	16.38	0.33	-0.08	1.07+
	(0.62)	(3564.65)	(0.57)	(0.51)	(0.63)
Ideology	-1.81*	-0.72	0.55	0.29	0.91
	(0.74)	(2.61)	(0.75)	(0.59)	(0.76)
Loser Perception	-0.13	-0.16	0.26	0.48	0.72+
	(0.27)	(0.97)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.43)
Constant	-4.56**	-23.08	-5.98**	-4.21**	-13.23**
	(1.18)	(3564.65)	(1.35)	(1.17)	(1.68)
N	530	155	678	1152	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$

Table 3.11 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Loser Perception on Protesting

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	2.83+	5.35	1.46	1.22	-0.27
	(1.51)	(4.32)	(1.77)	(5.99)	(1.35)
Loser Perception	0.55	-0.45	0.95	0.96	0.18
	(0.80)	(2.98)	(0.89)	(2.17)	(0.65)
Learned Helplessness	-1.82	0.65	-1.92	3.28	1.90
X Loser Perception	(2.07)	(7.19)	(2.34)	(6.13)	(1.73)
Internal Efficacy	2.26**	8.31*	4.15**	1.14	4.32**
	(0.80)	(3.62)	(1.46)	(2.21)	(0.92)
External Efficacy	1.78*	-2.74	1.89*	1.16	--
	(0.73)	(2.39)	(0.77)	(1.82)	--
Trust	-1.85*	-3.45	-0.21	1.93	2.72*
	(0.95)	(3.25)	(0.97)	(1.54)	(1.27)
Interest	2.30**	-3.03	0.83	3.10	3.57**
	(0.74)	(2.90)	(0.73)	(2.30)	(1.12)
Education	0.40	0.62	0.49	-1.96	0.85
	(0.51)	(1.53)	(0.54)	(1.30)	(0.54)
Income	-0.39	0.93	-0.53	3.60*	0.94
	(0.44)	(1.66)	(0.57)	(1.58)	(0.76)
Female	0.15	1.52	-0.50+	-0.05	0.20
	(0.26)	(0.95)	(0.29)	(0.58)	(0.37)
Age	-2.14**	-4.75+	-2.31*	-3.58+	0.01
	(0.83)	(2.88)	(0.94)	(2.13)	(0.73)
Latino	-0.17	0.00	0.78	0.08	0.76
	(0.39)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.95)	(0.63)
White	-1.10**	0.95	-0.29	3.02*	0.17
	(0.30)	(1.57)	(0.36)	(1.50)	(0.54)
Republican	1.63*	14.81	0.03	0.39	0.08
	(0.66)	(3621.67)	(0.59)	(1.99)	(0.67)
Democrat	0.70	16.39	0.31	0.26	1.04+
	(0.61)	(3621.67)	(0.57)	(1.78)	(0.63)
Ideology	-1.66*	-0.40	0.54	-0.18	0.96
	(0.72)	(2.73)	(0.76)	(6.87)	(0.78)
Constant	-4.78**	-22.94	-6.34**	-10.37**	-13.27**
	(1.23)	(3621.68)	(1.43)	(3.59)	(1.72)
N	549	160	678	149	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.12 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Race on Protesting

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	3.11	0.63	3.43	-8.03	2.68
	(1.90)	(5.77)	(2.83)	(4.97)	(1.80)
White	-0.44	-2.38	1.14	-1.30	1.00
	(0.89)	(3.21)	(1.28)	(2.37)	(1.08)
Learned Helplessness	-1.72	7.39	-3.65	12.64*	-2.41
X White	(2.24)	(7.04)	(3.05)	(5.25)	(2.03)
Internal Efficacy	2.20**	8.35*	3.92**	1.26	4.23**
	(0.81)	(3.64)	(1.45)	(2.12)	(0.92)
External Efficacy	1.82*	-3.45	1.88*	0.82	--
	(0.73)	(2.59)	(0.77)	(1.75)	--
Trust	-1.95*	-3.93	-0.28	2.59	2.22+
	(0.95)	(3.26)	(0.98)	(1.64)	(1.23)
Interest	2.30**	-2.97	0.86	3.15	3.80**
	(0.74)	(2.86)	(0.74)	(2.30)	(1.10)
Education	0.39	0.93	0.49	-2.07	0.80
	(0.51)	(1.59)	(0.54)	(1.34)	(0.54)
Income	-0.44	1.12	-0.48	3.97*	0.87
	(0.44)	(1.65)	(0.57)	(1.67)	(0.75)
Female	0.16	1.66+	-0.50+	-0.16	0.20
	(0.26)	(0.99)	(0.29)	(0.63)	(0.36)
Age	-2.09*	-4.81+	-2.27*	-3.89+	0.01
	(0.83)	(2.90)	(0.95)	(2.32)	(0.74)
Latino	-0.13	0.00	0.76	0.12	0.72
	(0.40)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.96)	(0.65)
Republican	1.68*	14.16	0.11	0.32	0.03
	(0.66)	(2220.21)	(0.59)	(1.98)	(0.66)
Democrat	0.75	16.16	0.33	0.21	1.12+
	(0.61)	(2220.21)	(0.57)	(1.82)	(0.63)
Ideology	-1.66*	0.07	0.43	-1.88	1.04
	(0.72)	(2.44)	(0.76)	(1.75)	(0.78)
Loser Perception	-0.13	-0.37	0.24	2.20**	0.69
	(0.26)	(1.02)	(0.31)	(0.82)	(0.43)
Constant	-4.88**	-20.38	-7.05**	-7.57*	-14.11**
	(1.29)	(2220.21)	(1.67)	(3.39)	(1.84)
N	549	160	678	149	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.13 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Ethnicity on Protesting

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	1.66	5.57	0.93	3.22	0.17
	(1.18)	(3.55)	(1.31)	(3.63)	(1.02)
Latino	-0.75	0.00	3.20+	-3.93	-2.41*
	(1.06)	(0.00)	(1.68)	(2.48)	(1.22)
Learned Helplessness	1.66	0.00	-6.52	11.54+	7.62**
X Latino	(2.77)	(0.00)	(4.39)	(6.02)	(2.40)
Internal Efficacy	2.24**	8.31*	4.15**	2.09	4.32**
	(0.81)	(3.63)	(1.46)	(2.39)	(0.96)
External Efficacy	1.82*	-2.72	1.85*	1.23	--
	(0.73)	(2.38)	(0.77)	(1.82)	--
Trust	-1.93*	-3.51	-0.19	1.40	2.11
	(0.95)	(3.20)	(0.98)	(1.69)	(1.35)
Interest	2.26**	-3.09	0.80	2.79	4.33**
	(0.74)	(2.83)	(0.73)	(2.36)	(1.36)
Education	0.38	0.64	0.37	-2.10	0.80
	(0.51)	(1.51)	(0.54)	(1.28)	(0.55)
Income	-0.41	0.93	-0.50	4.28*	0.85
	(0.44)	(1.66)	(0.57)	(1.77)	(0.74)
Female	0.15	1.51	-0.50+	-0.32	0.28
	(0.26)	(0.95)	(0.30)	(0.63)	(0.37)
Age	-2.16**	-4.70+	-2.33*	-3.25	-0.18
	(0.83)	(2.83)	(0.94)	(2.13)	(0.79)
White	-1.09**	0.99	-0.28	2.94*	0.12
	(0.30)	(1.52)	(0.36)	(1.33)	(0.60)
Republican	1.68*	14.95	0.08	0.24	-0.01
	(0.66)	(4310.40)	(0.59)	(1.94)	(0.66)
Democrat	0.73	16.51	0.32	-0.16	1.21+
	(0.61)	(4310.40)	(0.57)	(1.81)	(0.63)
Ideology	-1.67*	-0.50	0.48	-2.32	1.15
	(0.72)	(2.55)	(0.76)	(1.70)	(0.78)
Loser Perception	-0.11	-0.20	0.28	2.38**	0.78+
	(0.26)	(0.97)	(0.31)	(0.88)	(0.45)
Constant	-4.32**	-23.12	-6.10**	-11.23**	-13.83**
	(1.17)	(4310.41)	(1.35)	(3.55)	(1.84)
N	549	160	678	149	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.14 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Gender on Protesting

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	0.89	1.93	0.13	7.16*	2.52*
	(1.63)	(5.43)	(1.80)	(3.55)	(1.20)
Female	-0.50	-0.73	-0.70	2.58	1.34*
	(0.79)	(2.55)	(0.88)	(2.32)	(0.67)
Learned Helplessness	1.78	6.30	0.58	-7.25	-3.75*
X Female	(2.06)	(6.83)	(2.31)	(6.64)	(1.69)
Internal Efficacy	2.21**	9.40*	4.10**	2.11	4.35**
	(0.81)	(4.06)	(1.45)	(2.56)	(0.88)
External Efficacy	1.74*	-3.03	1.88*	1.41	--
	(0.72)	(2.55)	(0.77)	(2.06)	--
Trust	-1.86+	-3.64	-0.21	2.15	2.45*
	(0.95)	(3.24)	(0.98)	(1.60)	(1.19)
Interest	2.27**	-3.32	0.80	3.21	3.79**
	(0.74)	(2.90)	(0.73)	(2.50)	(1.16)
Education	0.41	0.58	0.47	-2.00+	0.84
	(0.51)	(1.53)	(0.54)	(1.16)	(0.55)
Income	-0.42	0.82	-0.51	4.36**	0.84
	(0.44)	(1.69)	(0.57)	(1.60)	(0.74)
Age	-2.20**	-4.59	-2.32*	-4.82+	0.09
	(0.83)	(2.80)	(0.94)	(2.84)	(0.74)
Latino	-0.18	0.00	0.75	0.16	0.68
	(0.40)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.92)	(0.61)
White	-1.09**	1.30	-0.29	3.36*	0.08
	(0.30)	(1.76)	(0.36)	(1.62)	(0.54)
Republican	1.67*	13.55	0.08	-0.76	0.21
	(0.66)	(1943.30)	(0.59)	(1.87)	(0.68)
Democrat	0.72	15.33	0.33	-0.85	1.26+
	(0.61)	(1943.30)	(0.57)	(1.78)	(0.68)
Ideology	-1.66*	-0.24	0.54	-1.46	1.02
	(0.72)	(2.68)	(0.75)	(1.74)	(0.80)
Loser Perception	-0.11	-0.16	0.26	2.34*	0.79+
	(0.26)	(0.97)	(0.31)	(0.97)	(0.43)
Constant	-4.02**	-21.47	-5.85**	-12.94**	-14.35**
	(1.25)	(1943.30)	(1.44)	(3.35)	(1.97)
N	549	160	678	149	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3.15 Conditional Effect of Learned Helplessness and Income on Protesting

	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4	Sample 5
Learned Helplessness	4.15*	8.51	3.55	28.90**	-3.00
	(1.95)	(6.55)	(2.74)	(7.47)	(2.39)
Income	1.09	3.32	1.54	18.68**	-0.98
	(1.20)	(4.88)	(1.71)	(4.85)	(1.40)
Learned Helplessness	-4.01	-5.74	-5.36	-36.82**	5.34+
X Income	(2.95)	(10.84)	(4.17)	(10.87)	(3.24)
Internal Efficacy	2.21**	8.50*	4.13**	-0.40	4.32**
	(0.80)	(3.70)	(1.43)	(2.13)	(0.95)
External Efficacy	1.76*	-2.79	1.80*	0.07	--
	(0.73)	(2.38)	(0.77)	(1.82)	--
Trust	-1.82+	-4.25	-0.08	3.37+	2.44+
	(0.95)	(3.54)	(0.97)	(1.82)	(1.25)
Interest	2.33**	-3.48	0.85	3.67	3.60**
	(0.74)	(2.99)	(0.73)	(2.61)	(1.13)
Education	0.41	0.80	0.43	-2.24+	0.85
	(0.51)	(1.55)	(0.54)	(1.29)	(0.54)
Female	0.15	1.60	-0.50+	0.71	0.19
	(0.26)	(0.98)	(0.29)	(0.66)	(0.37)
Age	-2.17**	-4.32	-2.40*	-4.04+	-0.10
	(0.84)	(2.89)	(0.95)	(2.36)	(0.75)
Latino	-0.21	0.00	0.74	-1.03	0.72
	(0.40)	(0.00)	(0.51)	(1.30)	(0.65)
White	-1.12**	0.98	-0.27	2.89*	0.14
	(0.30)	(1.50)	(0.37)	(1.42)	(0.55)
Republican	1.74**	13.55	-0.01	-0.08	0.03
	(0.67)	(1610.56)	(0.59)	(1.57)	(0.66)
Democrat	0.77	15.30	0.28	-0.31	1.16+
	(0.62)	(1610.56)	(0.57)	(1.45)	(0.64)
Ideology	-1.71*	-0.78	0.63	-1.43	1.09
	(0.72)	(2.62)	(0.76)	(1.71)	(0.77)
Loser Perception	-0.08	-0.26	0.23	2.38*	0.83+
	(0.26)	(0.98)	(0.31)	(1.00)	(0.45)
Constant	-5.34**	-22.86	-7.20**	-21.59**	-12.14**
	(1.34)	(1610.56)	(1.69)	(4.26)	(1.81)
N	549	160	678	149	698

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses. Samples 4 and 5 weighted to approximate national representativeness. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 3.4 Conditional Effect of Loser Perceptions and Learned Helplessness on Voting Behavior



Figure 3.5 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood

Figure 3.6 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Turnout



Figure 3.7 Conditional Effect of Ethnicity and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood



Figure 3.8 Conditional Effect of Gender and Learned Helplessness on Vote Likelihood



Figure 3.9 Average Marginal Effects of Income on Learned Helplessness for Turnout



Figure 3.10 Mediation Path Diagrams for Learned Helplessness, Income, and Vote Likelihood



Figure 3.11 Mediation Path Diagrams for Learned Helplessness, Income, and Reported Turnout



Figure 3.12 Conditional Effect of Race and Learned Helplessness on Protesting Behavior



Figure 3.13 Conditional Effect of Ethnicity and Learned Helplessness on Protesting



Figure 3.14 Conditional Effect of Gender and Learned Helplessness on Protesting



Figure 3.15 Average Marginal Effects of Learned Helplessness on Income for Protesting



Table 3.16 Effect of Experimental Learned Helplessness Manipulation on Behavior

	(1) Vote Likelihood	(2) Vote Likelihood	(3) Protest/Rally	(4) Protest/Rally
Treatment	0.07	-1.24	0.12	-0.63
	(0.39)	(1.41)	(0.76)	(2.88)
Treatment X Learned Helplessness		3.52		1.92
		(3.66)		(7.08)
Learned Helplessness	-2.33	-2.98+	5.05+	4.66
	(1.49)	(1.65)	(2.96)	(3.29)
Internal Efficacy	0.49	0.48	2.54**	2.54**
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.98)	(0.98)
External Efficacy	-0.11	-0.16	-0.40	-0.45
	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.61)	(0.64)
Trust	-1.00	-0.94	-1.74	-1.64
	(1.14)	(1.15)	(2.47)	(2.49)
Interest	3.75**	3.86**	-1.27	-1.23
	(1.15)	(1.15)	(2.30)	(2.30)
Income	0.56	0.56	0.31	0.33
	(0.64)	(0.64)	(1.30)	(1.30)
Education	1.09+	1.11+	-0.67	-0.69
	(0.62)	(0.63)	(1.28)	(1.28)
Age	0.83	0.84	-3.40+	-3.48+
	(0.81)	(0.81)	(1.87)	(1.89)
White	0.72+	0.68+	0.62	0.54
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(1.02)	(1.05)
Latino	-0.17	-0.16	-0.95	-1.00
	(0.61)	(0.61)	(1.18)	(1.21)
Female	0.86*	0.89*	1.57+	1.59+
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.81)	(0.81)
Republican	2.75**	2.81**	13.61	13.15
	(0.67)	(0.68)	(2229.97)	(1596.09)
Democrat	2.33**	2.41**	15.21	14.79
	(0.64)	(0.65)	(2229.97)	(1596.09)
Ideology	-1.08	-1.08	-1.58	-1.50
	(0.91)	(0.91)	(2.23)	(2.25)
Loser Perception	-0.03	-0.04	-0.05	-0.06
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.71)	(0.71)
Constant	-5.73**	-5.50**	-24.82	-24.13
	(1.68)	(1.70)	(2229.97)	(1596.10)
N	242	242	242	242

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients for logistic regression models, not odds ratios for Sample 2. Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Chapter 4

Table 4.1 Difference of Means Tests for Perceptions of Inequality Between Conditions

	Control	Inequality 1980	Inequality Today	Mean Diff.	Sig. @ p<.05
1) Opportunity to succeed *Higher=everyone has opportunity to succeed	0.57		0.59	-0.03	Yes
	0.57	0.56		0.01	No
		0.56	0.59	0.04	Yes
2) Last 5-10 years, income inequality increased? *Higher=inequality has increased a great deal	0.65		0.62	0.03	Yes
	0.65	0.73		-0.08	Yes
		0.73	0.62	-0.11	Yes
3) Next 5 years, will income diff increase? *Higher=inequality will increase a great deal	0.61		0.61	0.00	No
	0.61	0.67		-0.06	Yes
		0.67	0.61	-0.06	Yes
4) Seriousness of income inequality *Higher=serious problem	0.77		0.75	0.02	Yes
	0.77	0.81		-0.04	Yes
		0.81	0.75	-0.06	Yes
5) Upward mobility *Higher=greater mobility	0.44		0.46	-0.02	Yes
	0.44	0.41		0.03	Yes
		0.41	0.46	0.05	Yes
6) Last several years, your economic situation improved *Higher=greatly improved	0.52		0.51	0.00	No
	0.52	0.51		0.01	No
		0.51	0.51	0.00	No
7) Over next several years, your economic situation improve? *Higher=greatly improve	0.64		0.64	0.00	No
	0.64	0.63		0.00	No
		0.63	0.64	0.01	No
8) Compared to parents, are you better off economically? *Higher=much better off than parents	0.46		0.47	0.00	No
	0.46	0.43		0.03	Yes
		0.43	0.47	0.04	Yes
9) Over last 5 years, compared to others, how are you economically? *Higher=much better than average	0.48		0.51	-0.03	Yes
	0.48	0.48		0.00	No
		0.48	0.51	0.03	Yes

Note: Values reflect means for each condition, as well as the mean differences and whether they were significant at p<.05.

Table 4.2 Disaffection Mean Differences by Inequality Condition

Learned Helplessness

	Mean Difference
Inequality Today vs. Control	-0.001
Inequality 1980 vs. Control	-0.006
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today	-0.005

Internal Efficacy

	Mean Difference
Inequality Today vs. Control	-0.012+
Inequality 1980 vs. Control	-0.015*
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today	-0.004

External Efficacy

	Mean Difference
Inequality Today vs. Control	0.004
Inequality 1980 vs. Control	0.002
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today	-0.001

Trust

	Mean Difference
Inequality Today vs. Control	0.005
Inequality 1980 vs. Control	0.006
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today	0.001

Interest

	Mean Difference
Inequality Today vs. Control	-0.002
Inequality 1980 vs. Control	-0.023*
Inequality 1980 vs Inequality Today	-0.021+

Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the first condition was subtracted from the second condition, e.g., control – inequality today; control – inequality since 1980; inequality today – inequality since 1980.

+ $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$

Table 4.3 Distribution of Income Across Conditions

Level of Income	Control	Inequality 1980	Inequality Today	Total
Under $15,000	57	58	67	182
%	7.97	8.39	9.48	8.61
$15,000 to $24,999	104	74	85	263
%	14.55	10.71	12.02	12.45
$25,000 to $49,999	198	225	204	627
%	27.69	32.56	28.85	29.67
$50,000 to $99,999	270	239	265	774
%	37.76	34.59	37.48	36.63
$100,000 and above	86	95	86	267
%	12.03	13.75	12.16	12.64
Total	715	691	707	2113
%	100	100	100	100

Table 4.4 Effect of Income Inequality Experimental Conditions on Learned Helplessness

	Learned Helplessness
Inequality Today	0.01
	(0.01)
Inequality Since 1980	0.01+
	(0.01)
Internal Efficacy	-0.13**
	(0.02)
External Efficacy	-0.07**
	(0.01)
Trust	-0.03
	(0.02)
Interest	-0.03*
	(0.01)
Education	0.00
	(0.01)
Income	-0.10**
	(0.01)
Female	-0.01
	(0.01)
Age	-0.03+
	(0.02)
Latino	0.00
	(0.01)
White	0.00
	(0.01)
Republican	0.01
	(0.01)
Democrat	0.02
	(0.01)
Ideology	-0.03*
	(0.01)
Loser Perception	0.01
	(0.01)
Constant	0.57**
	(0.02)
N	2000
adj. R2	0.128

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 4.5 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inequality Since 1980 X Learned Helplessness		2.16+				
		(1.16)				
Inequality Today X Learned Helplessness		0.55				
		(1.20)				
Inequality Since 1980 X Internal Efficacy			-0.91			
			(1.10)			
Inequality Today X Internal Efficacy			1.73			
			(1.12)			
Inequality Since 1980 X External Efficacy				-0.55		
				(0.63)		
Inequality Today X External Efficacy				0.21		
				(0.62)		
Inequality Since 1980 X Trust					-0.18	
					(0.88)	
Inequality Today X Trust					0.28	
					(0.86)	
Inequality Since 1980 X Interest						-0.15
						(0.59)
Inequality Today X Interest						0.10
						(0.58)
Inequality Today	-0.11	-0.32	-1.09+	-0.19	-0.22	-0.17
	(0.14)	(0.49)	(0.65)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Inequality Since 1980	-0.23+	-1.07*	0.31	0.00	-0.16	-0.14
	(0.14)	(0.47)	(0.65)	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Learned Helplessness	-1.97**	-2.94**	-2.00**	-1.98**	-1.97**	-1.98**
	(0.49)	(0.87)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Internal Efficacy	2.81**	2.84**	2.50**	2.79**	2.80**	2.80**
	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.83)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)
External Efficacy	-0.28	-0.29	-0.28	-0.17	-0.28	-0.28
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.47)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Trust	0.44	0.42	0.44	0.43	0.39	0.43
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.64)	(0.40)
Interest	2.49**	2.49**	2.50**	2.50**	2.49**	2.50**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.44)
Education	0.65**	0.66**	0.65**	0.66**	0.65**	0.65**

	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Income	0.70**	0.69**	0.68**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Female	0.24*	0.24+	0.23+	0.23+	0.24+	0.24*
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	1.99**	2.01**	1.98**	2.00**	2.00**	1.99**
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Latino	-0.13	-0.13	-0.12	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
White	0.70**	0.69**	0.70**	0.70**	0.71**	0.70**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Republican	0.47*	0.47*	0.47*	0.47*	0.46*	0.47*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Democrat	0.65**	0.66**	0.65**	0.66**	0.65**	0.66**
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Ideology	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34	-0.34
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Loser Perceptions	-0.08	-0.08	-0.09	-0.08	-0.08	-0.08
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	-3.83**	-3.46**	-3.64**	-3.88**	-3.82**	-3.84**
	(0.49)	(0.56)	(0.61)	(0.52)	(0.54)	(0.53)
N	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998	1998
pseudo R2	0.207	0.209	0.209	0.208	0.207	0.207

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 4.1 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Learned Helplessness for Vote Likelihood



Table 4.6 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Disaffection for Protesting

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Inequality Since 1980 X Learned Helplessness		0.22 (1.51)				
Inequality Today X Learned Helplessness		3.61* (1.52)				
Inequality Since 1980 X Internal Efficacy			0.71 (1.64)			
Inequality Today X Internal Efficacy			-2.69+ (1.55)			
Inequality Since 1980 X External Efficacy				-0.71 (0.85)		
Inequality Today X External Efficacy				-0.18 (0.85)		
Inequality Since 1980 X Trust					-0.33 (1.14)	
Inequality Today X Trust					-0.03 (1.16)	
Inequality Since 1980 X Interest						0.01 (0.83)
Inequality Today X Interest						-0.76 (0.79)
Inequality Today	0.12 (0.19)	-1.26* (0.61)	1.88+ (1.03)	0.21 (0.48)	0.13 (0.53)	0.67 (0.61)
Inequality Since 1980	0.18 (0.19)	0.11 (0.58)	-0.30 (1.11)	0.54 (0.48)	0.32 (0.52)	0.16 (0.65)
Learned Helplessness	1.95** (0.66)	0.62 (1.16)	1.96** (0.66)	1.97** (0.66)	1.96** (0.66)	1.96** (0.66)
Internal Efficacy	3.66** (0.77)	3.74** (0.77)	4.44** (1.26)	3.65** (0.77)	3.67** (0.77)	3.65** (0.77)
External Efficacy	1.53** (0.40)	1.58** (0.40)	1.54** (0.40)	1.85** (0.67)	1.53** (0.40)	1.53** (0.40)
Trust	-0.27 (0.53)	-0.33 (0.53)	-0.31 (0.53)	-0.26 (0.53)	-0.14 (0.87)	-0.28 (0.53)
Interest	0.76+ (0.40)	0.73+ (0.40)	0.76+ (0.40)	0.77+ (0.40)	0.76+ (0.40)	1.04 (0.64)
Education	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.13	0.12	0.13

	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Income	-0.27	-0.25	-0.24	-0.28	-0.27	-0.27
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)
Female	-0.22	-0.21	-0.21	-0.23	-0.22	-0.22
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Age	-1.55**	-1.56**	-1.57**	-1.55**	-1.55**	-1.55**
	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)	(0.48)
Latino	0.59*	0.60*	0.58*	0.60*	0.59*	0.58*
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)
White	-0.13	-0.13	-0.14	-0.13	-0.12	-0.14
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Republican	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.34
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Democrat	0.37	0.37	0.36	0.38	0.38	0.37
	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.32)
Ideology	-0.20	-0.20	-0.23	-0.19	-0.19	-0.21
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)	(0.41)
Loser Perceptions	-0.13	-0.12	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13	-0.13
	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.17)
Constant	-5.99**	-5.54**	-6.49**	-6.18**	-6.06**	-6.18**
	(0.74)	(0.81)	(0.99)	(0.80)	(0.81)	(0.83)
N	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000	2000
pseudo R2	0.090	0.095	0.094	0.090	0.090	0.091

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 4.2 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Learned Helplessness for Protesting



Figure 4.3 Effect of Inequality Conditions on Internal Efficacy for Protesting



Table 4.7 Effect of Economic Situation on Learned Helplessness

	(1)	(2)
Economic Situation Has Improved	-0.04*	
	(0.02)	
Economic Situation Will Improve		-0.10**
		(0.02)
Internal Efficacy	-0.08+	-0.08+
	(0.04)	(0.04)
External Efficacy	-0.08**	-0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Trust	-0.08*	-0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Interest	-0.04+	-0.04+
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Income	-0.09**	-0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Female	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	-0.01	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.03)
Latino	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
White	-0.02*	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Democrat	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Ideology	-0.03	-0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Loser Perceptions	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	0.58**	0.63**
	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	678	678
adj. R2	0.147	0.173

Standard errors in parentheses. + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 4.8 Effect of Economic Situation on Vote Likelihood

	(1)	(2)
Economic Situation Has Improved	0.33	
	(0.40)	
Economic Situation Will Improve		0.88+
		(0.46)
Learned Helplessness	-2.80**	-2.43**
	(0.90)	(0.92)
Internal Efficacy	2.12*	2.17*
	(0.93)	(0.93)
External Efficacy	-0.33	-0.35
	(0.52)	(0.52)
Trust	0.40	0.32
	(0.69)	(0.70)
Interest	2.70**	2.71**
	(0.49)	(0.49)
Education	0.77*	0.79*
	(0.37)	(0.37)
Income	0.84*	0.89*
	(0.39)	(0.37)
Female	0.09	0.06
	(0.21)	(0.22)
Age	1.34*	1.51*
	(0.62)	(0.62)
Latino	0.39	0.36
	(0.40)	(0.41)
White	0.59*	0.62*
	(0.25)	(0.25)
Republican	0.69*	0.69*
	(0.34)	(0.34)
Democrat	0.53	0.49
	(0.34)	(0.34)
Ideology	-0.36	-0.38
	(0.54)	(0.54)
Loser Perceptions	-0.11	-0.09
	(0.21)	(0.21)
Constant	-3.18**	-3.77**
	(0.87)	(0.94)
N	677	677
pseudo R2	0.203	0.207

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Chapter 5

Figure 5.1 Polarization Manipulations



Figure 5.2 Disaffection Measures



Figure 5.3 Mean Perceived Polarization by Condition and Sample



Figure 5.4 Mean Learned Helplessness by Condition



Table 5.1 Disaffection Mean Differences by Polarization Condition

Learned Helplessness

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Low vs. Control	0.005	-0.008	0.006
High vs. Control	0.004	-0.009+	0.012
High vs. Low	-0.001	-0.002	0.006

Internal Efficacy

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Low vs. Control	0.043*	-0.015*	-0.010
High vs. Control	0.030+	-0.010+	0.000
High vs. Low	-0.013	0.005	0.010

External Efficacy

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Low vs. Control	0.000	0.017+	-0.027
High vs. Control	-0.005	-0.005	0.025
High vs. Low	-0.005	-0.023*	0.052*

Trust

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Low vs. Control	0.010	0.007	-0.005
High vs. Control	0.009	-0.003	0.012
High vs. Low	-0.001	-0.010	0.017

Interest

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Low vs. Control	0.018	-0.016	-0.026
High vs. Control	0.023	-0.016	0.007
High vs. Low	0.005	0.000	0.033

Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the first condition was subtracted from the second condition, e.g., control – low; control – high; low – high.
+ $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$

Table 5.2 Disaffection Mean Differences by Polarization Condition between Independents and Partisans

Learned Helplessness

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Control	0.030	-0.015	-0.021
Low Polarization	0.004	-0.014	-0.045
High Polarization	-0.064**	-0.021+	-0.022

Internal Efficacy

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Control	0.029	0.026+	0.047
Low Polarization	0.102*	0.029*	0.098*
High Polarization	0.083*	0.001	0.093*

External Efficacy

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Control	0.033	0.107**	0.124*
Low Polarization	0.197**	0.114**	0.093+
High Polarization	0.182**	0.140**	0.051

Trust

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Control	0.062*	0.055**	0.085*
Low Polarization	0.103**	0.038*	0.071+
High Polarization	0.139**	0.090**	0.085*

Interest

	Sample 2	Sample 3	Sample 4 Wave 2
Control	0.057	0.068*	0.024
Low Polarization	0.132*	0.120**	0.073
High Polarization	0.144*	0.024	0.093+

Note: Values reflect mean differences calculated where the mean for independents was subtracted from the mean for partisans. + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<.01$

Figure 5.5 Effect Polarization Conditions on Learned Helplessness by Independent and Partisan Identity



Table 5.3 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low Polarization X Learned Helplessness		1.89				
		(2.17)				
High Polarization X Learned Helplessness		1.49				
		(2.08)				
Low Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.96			
			(1.34)			
High Polarization X Internal Efficacy			-0.14			
			(1.33)			
Low Polarization X External Efficacy				0.11		
				(1.22)		
High Polarization X External Efficacy				2.27+		
				(1.25)		
Low Polarization X Trust					0.61	
					(1.75)	
High Polarization X Trust					3.19+	
					(1.71)	
Low Polarization X Interest						-0.77
						(1.28)
High Polarization X Interest						-1.37
						(1.28)
Low Polarization	-0.04	-0.72	-0.60	-0.09	-0.31	0.45
	(0.26)	(0.83)	(0.84)	(0.59)	(0.76)	(0.85)
High Polarization	0.18	-0.36	0.25	-0.82	-1.11	1.04
	(0.26)	(0.79)	(0.84)	(0.61)	(0.74)	(0.84)
Learned Helplessness	-0.65	-1.75	-0.64	-0.67	-0.75	-0.64
	(0.89)	(1.50)	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.90)	(0.89)
Internal Efficacy	0.66**	1.90**	1.71+	1.99**	1.93**	1.91**
	(0.23)	(0.70)	(1.01)	(0.70)	(0.70)	(0.70)
External Efficacy	0.25	0.75	0.78	-0.04	0.74	0.75
	(0.19)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.93)	(0.57)	(0.56)
Trust	0.34	0.36	0.30	0.32	-0.93	0.42
	(0.78)	(0.78)	(0.79)	(0.78)	(1.22)	(0.78)
Interest	2.17**	2.23**	2.17**	2.25**	2.19**	2.99**
	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.61)	(0.61)	(1.08)
Education	1.01**	1.04**	0.99*	1.04**	1.05**	1.02**
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)

Income	0.15	0.13	0.18	0.13	0.14	0.17
	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)	(0.40)
Female	0.71**	0.70**	0.72**	0.72**	0.73**	0.72**
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)
Age	1.52**	1.53**	1.56**	1.50**	1.46**	1.51**
	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)	(0.53)
White	1.14**	1.13**	1.14**	1.15**	1.12**	1.16**
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)
Latino	-0.20	-0.18	-0.18	-0.24	-0.24	-0.20
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)
Republican	1.24**	1.26**	1.22**	1.21**	1.23**	1.27**
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)
Democrat	1.20**	1.22**	1.20**	1.17**	1.17**	1.21**
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Ideology	-0.69	-0.74	-0.69	-0.70	-0.71	-0.71
	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Loser Perception	0.30	0.31	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30
	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)
Constant	-6.60**	-5.29**	-5.52**	-5.34**	-5.05**	-6.24**
	(1.02)	(1.00)	(1.05)	(0.98)	(1.01)	(1.09)
N	549	549	549	549	549	549

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.4 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low Polarization X Learned Helplessness		1.91				
		(1.16)				
High Polarization X Learned Helplessness		2.07+				
		(1.17)				
Low Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.56			
			(1.13)			
High Polarization X Internal Efficacy			-0.60			
			(1.09)			
Low Polarization X External Efficacy				0.70		
				(0.62)		
High Polarization X External Efficacy				0.19		
				(0.61)		
Low Polarization X Trust					-0.40	
					(0.86)	
High Polarization X Trust					-0.80	
					(0.85)	
Low Polarization X Interest						-0.22
						(0.59)
High Polarization X Interest						-0.31
						(0.58)
Low Polarization	0.10	-0.64	-0.22	-0.18	0.26	0.23
	(0.14)	(0.47)	(0.66)	(0.28)	(0.37)	(0.37)
High Polarization	-0.01	-0.81+	0.33	-0.09	0.32	0.17
	(0.13)	(0.47)	(0.64)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Learned Helplessness	-1.48**	-2.85**	-1.47**	-1.49**	-1.46**	-1.48**
	(0.49)	(0.87)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)	(0.49)
Internal Efficacy	2.34**	2.39**	2.37**	2.34**	2.35**	2.33**
	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.82)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)
External Efficacy	0.56+	0.56+	0.56+	0.27	0.56+	0.56+
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.46)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Trust	-0.28	-0.31	-0.29	-0.28	0.12	-0.28
	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.63)	(0.39)
Interest	2.41**	2.39**	2.42**	2.42**	2.41**	2.59**
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.43)
Education	0.77**	0.77**	0.76**	0.77**	0.77**	0.77**
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)

Income	0.70**	0.71**	0.71**	0.70**	0.69**	0.70**
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Female	0.39**	0.39**	0.39**	0.39**	0.38**	0.39**
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Age	1.35**	1.36**	1.35**	1.34**	1.34**	1.35**
	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.35)
White	0.69**	0.69**	0.70**	0.70**	0.70**	0.69**
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Latino	-0.19	-0.18	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.18
	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)
Republican	0.47*	0.48*	0.46*	0.47*	0.48*	0.47*
	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.19)
Democrat	0.71**	0.71**	0.71**	0.71**	0.71**	0.71**
	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Ideology	-0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)
Loser Perception	0.12	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.12
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Constant	-4.03**	-3.52**	-4.06**	-3.92**	-4.20**	-4.13**
	(0.51)	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.53)	(0.55)	(0.55)
N	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041	2041

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.5 Effect of Polarization Conditions on Disaffection for Vote Likelihood (Sample 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Low Polarization X Learned Helplessness		5.19 (3.28)				
High Polarization X Learned Helplessness		5.26+ (3.09)				
Low Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.26 (0.54)			
High Polarization X Internal Efficacy			-0.30 (0.50)			
Low Polarization X External Efficacy				-0.48 (0.42)		
High Polarization X External Efficacy				0.23 (0.44)		
Low Polarization X Trust					-0.95 (2.17)	
High Polarization X Trust					-0.75 (1.73)	
Low Polarization X Interest						-1.08 (1.59)
High Polarization X Interest						-2.50+ (1.44)
Low Polarization	0.98* (0.42)	-1.08 (1.37)	0.23 (1.72)	2.26* (1.12)	1.41 (1.03)	1.62 (0.99)
High Polarization	0.35 (0.39)	-1.70 (1.20)	1.29 (1.67)	-0.18 (1.08)	0.69 (0.85)	1.83+ (0.95)
Learned Helplessness	-3.60* (1.40)	-6.92** (2.21)	-3.69** (1.39)	-3.76** (1.44)	-3.50* (1.42)	-3.39* (1.35)
Internal Efficacy	0.80 (1.00)	0.21 (0.26)	0.23 (0.38)	0.12 (0.26)	0.19 (0.25)	0.20 (0.24)
External Efficacy	0.24 (0.91)	0.04 (0.23)	0.08 (0.22)	0.13 (0.31)	0.05 (0.23)	0.01 (0.22)
Trust	0.37 (0.97)	0.23 (0.99)	0.43 (0.96)	0.37 (0.99)	0.96 (1.37)	0.49 (0.97)
Interest	3.66** (0.70)	3.72** (0.71)	3.65** (0.70)	3.84** (0.73)	3.70** (0.71)	5.02** (1.15)
Education	1.35* (0.59)	1.32* (0.60)	1.37* (0.60)	1.43* (0.60)	1.36* (0.59)	1.24* (0.61)

Income	0.80	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.10
	(0.83)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Female	0.33	0.30	0.34	0.32	0.34	0.37
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.36)
Age	3.63**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**	0.05**
	(1.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
White	-1.06*	-1.10*	-1.12*	-1.12*	-1.10*	-1.23**
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.47)	(0.49)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Latino	-0.19	-0.28	-0.19	-0.10	-0.21	-0.20
	(0.46)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.48)
Republican	1.34*	1.34*	1.38*	1.51**	1.36*	1.44*
	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.58)
Democrat	1.24*	1.24*	1.25*	1.32*	1.24*	1.24*
	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.52)	(0.53)
Ideology	0.77	0.71	0.76	0.55	0.76	0.73
	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.83)	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.82)
Loser Perception	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.05
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Inevitable Immigration Threat	-1.31*	-1.31*	-1.32*	-1.23*	-1.30*	-1.26*
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Preventable Immigration Threat	-0.49	-0.55	-0.53	-0.50	-0.50	-0.43
	(0.60)	(0.63)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.60)	(0.60)
Inevitable Terror Threat	-0.49	-0.51	-0.56	-0.44	-0.48	-0.49
	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.66)
Preventable Terror Threat	0.12	0.03	0.07	0.19	0.12	0.13
	(0.61)	(0.63)	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.62)
repimm	0.54	0.59	0.52	0.49	0.54	0.58
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.57)	(0.54)	(0.54)
demimm	0.87	0.95	0.84	0.86	0.86	0.81
	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.61)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.59)
bipimm	-0.23	-0.19	-0.28	-0.29	-0.21	-0.21
	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.57)
Constant	-4.25**	-4.01*	-5.62**	-5.56**	-5.86**	-6.27**
	(1.45)	(1.79)	(1.90)	(1.81)	(1.76)	(1.77)
N	477	477	477	477	477	477

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 5.6 Effect of Learned Helplessness by Polarization Conditions on Vote Likelihood



Figure 5.7 Effect of Polarization Conditions for Independents and Partisans on Vote Confidence



Figure 5.8 Effect of Polarization Conditions for Independents and Partisans on Vote Likelihood



Table 5.6 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		-1.32 (0.98)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.08 (0.67)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				0.21 (0.69)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					-1.61 (1.19)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						0.02 (0.71)
Perceived Polarization	-0.00 (0.17)	0.57 (0.46)	-0.05 (0.47)	-0.11 (0.39)	0.66 (0.52)	-0.02 (0.52)
Learned Helplessness	-3.49* (1.75)	3.22 (5.33)	-3.42+ (1.84)	-3.44+ (1.76)	-3.51* (1.76)	-3.48+ (1.79)
Internal Efficacy	0.27 (1.48)	-0.09 (1.50)	-0.13 (3.77)	0.41 (1.54)	0.21 (1.49)	0.28 (1.49)
External Efficacy	0.39 (1.19)	0.34 (1.20)	0.43 (1.24)	-0.73 (3.92)	0.53 (1.20)	0.39 (1.21)
Trust	-1.60 (1.46)	-1.48 (1.48)	-1.60 (1.46)	-1.60 (1.46)	6.92 (6.43)	-1.60 (1.46)
Interest	4.99** (1.56)	5.05** (1.57)	4.98** (1.56)	4.98** (1.56)	4.97** (1.54)	4.90 (4.31)
Education	0.79 (0.75)	0.78 (0.75)	0.80 (0.75)	0.80 (0.75)	0.84 (0.76)	0.79 (0.75)
Income	1.42+ (0.80)	1.63* (0.83)	1.41+ (0.81)	1.37+ (0.82)	1.57+ (0.81)	1.42+ (0.80)
Female	0.70 (0.44)	0.89+ (0.47)	0.69 (0.44)	0.70 (0.44)	0.66 (0.45)	0.70 (0.45)
Age	0.27 (0.96)	0.07 (0.98)	0.26 (0.96)	0.25 (0.96)	0.27 (0.96)	0.27 (0.96)
Latino	-0.52 (0.70)	-0.45 (0.71)	-0.53 (0.70)	-0.55 (0.71)	-0.45 (0.72)	-0.52 (0.70)
White	0.96+ (0.51)	0.81 (0.52)	0.97+ (0.52)	0.97+ (0.51)	0.88+ (0.51)	0.96+ (0.52)
Republican	3.36** (0.88)	3.37** (0.91)	3.34** (0.91)	3.28** (0.92)	3.53** (0.92)	3.36** (0.89)

Democrat	2.92**	2.78**	2.92**	2.90**	3.10**	2.92**
	(0.85)	(0.87)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.88)	(0.85)
Ideology	-1.65	-1.89+	-1.61	-1.56	-2.03+	-1.64
	(1.06)	(1.08)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.11)	(1.10)
Loser Perception	0.27	0.22	0.28	0.30	0.29	0.27
	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.44)	(0.44)
Constant	-5.68**	-8.29**	-5.47*	-5.16+	-9.30**	-5.63+
	(2.03)	(2.87)	(2.74)	(2.65)	(3.39)	(3.03)
N	177	177	177	177	177	177
pseudo R2	0.298	0.306	0.298	0.299	0.306	0.298

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.7 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		0.60 (0.56)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.44 (0.52)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				0.04 (0.29)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					-0.65 (0.41)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						0.27 (0.28)
Perceived Polarization	0.21** (0.07)	-0.02 (0.23)	-0.03 (0.29)	0.20 (0.13)	0.47** (0.18)	0.06 (0.17)
Learned Helplessness	-2.88** (0.90)	-6.05+ (3.15)	-2.83** (0.90)	-2.87** (0.90)	-2.98** (0.91)	-2.84** (0.90)
Internal Efficacy	2.14* (0.94)	2.18* (0.95)	-0.14 (2.86)	2.13* (0.94)	2.22* (0.95)	2.10* (0.94)
External Efficacy	-0.27 (0.53)	-0.24 (0.53)	-0.27 (0.53)	-0.46 (1.59)	-0.32 (0.53)	-0.22 (0.53)
Trust	0.58 (0.70)	0.58 (0.71)	0.56 (0.71)	0.59 (0.71)	3.91+ (2.25)	0.57 (0.70)
Interest	2.45** (0.49)	2.46** (0.50)	2.44** (0.49)	2.45** (0.50)	2.45** (0.50)	1.08 (1.52)
Education	0.60 (0.38)	0.62 (0.38)	0.59 (0.38)	0.60 (0.38)	0.61 (0.38)	0.59 (0.38)
Income	0.95* (0.37)	0.97** (0.37)	0.94* (0.37)	0.95* (0.37)	0.94* (0.38)	0.95* (0.37)
Female	0.09 (0.22)	0.08 (0.22)	0.09 (0.22)	0.09 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.09 (0.22)
Age	1.19* (0.61)	1.19+ (0.61)	1.17+ (0.61)	1.18+ (0.61)	1.24* (0.61)	1.13+ (0.61)
Latino	0.44 (0.41)	0.45 (0.41)	0.41 (0.41)	0.44 (0.41)	0.45 (0.42)	0.42 (0.41)
White	0.52* (0.25)	0.50* (0.25)	0.51* (0.25)	0.52* (0.25)	0.51* (0.25)	0.53* (0.25)
Republican	0.72* (0.34)	0.70* (0.35)	0.73* (0.34)	0.72* (0.34)	0.74* (0.35)	0.71* (0.34)

Democrat	0.58+	0.57+	0.57+	0.58+	0.57+	0.58+
	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.34)
Ideology	-0.18	-0.19	-0.18	-0.18	-0.20	-0.16
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Loser Perception	-0.09	-0.09	-0.10	-0.09	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)
Constant	-4.07**	-2.86+	-2.80	-4.00**	-5.37**	-3.30**
	(0.92)	(1.47)	(1.75)	(1.07)	(1.25)	(1.22)
N	677	677	677	677	677	677
pseudo R2	0.214	0.216	0.215	0.214	0.217	0.215

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.8 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Vote Likelihood (Sample 4 Wave 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		-0.56				
		(1.11)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.04			
			(0.18)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				-0.15		
				(0.15)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					-1.07	
					(0.70)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						-1.37*
						(0.54)
Perceived Polarization	0.21	0.42	0.09	0.59	0.69*	1.06**
	(0.13)	(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.39)	(0.33)	(0.36)
Learned Helplessness	-7.04**	-4.57	-7.01**	-7.12**	-7.38**	-8.07**
	(2.30)	(5.30)	(2.30)	(2.33)	(2.39)	(2.39)
Internal Efficacy	-0.32	-0.33	-0.49	-0.22	-0.23	-0.08
	(0.45)	(0.45)	(0.84)	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.45)
External Efficacy	-0.09	-0.09	-0.09	0.59	0.03	-0.11
	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.38)	(0.75)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Trust	1.15	1.20	1.09	1.76	6.30+	1.14
	(1.86)	(1.89)	(1.86)	(2.10)	(3.74)	(1.88)
Interest	5.69**	5.66**	5.66**	5.57**	5.62**	11.98**
	(1.40)	(1.41)	(1.40)	(1.35)	(1.35)	(2.83)
Education	1.48	1.47	1.48	1.59	1.63	1.65
	(1.02)	(1.03)	(1.02)	(1.05)	(1.06)	(1.07)
Income	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.07
	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Female	0.44	0.49	0.44	0.57	0.59	0.61
	(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.61)	(0.61)
Age	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Latino	-0.48	-0.48	-0.47	-0.28	-0.36	-0.21
	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.86)	(0.91)
White	-1.31	-1.33	-1.29	-1.46+	-1.56+	-1.60+
	(0.84)	(0.83)	(0.83)	(0.85)	(0.85)	(0.82)
Republican	2.07	2.09	2.08	2.45+	2.09+	2.22*
	(1.30)	(1.35)	(1.31)	(1.39)	(1.26)	(1.12)

Democrat	1.93	1.90	1.93	2.01	1.72	1.60
	(1.24)	(1.29)	(1.24)	(1.22)	(1.20)	(1.07)
Ideology	-0.03	-0.09	-0.01	-0.07	-0.09	-0.48
	(1.14)	(1.17)	(1.11)	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.16)
Loser Perception	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.57	0.55	0.63
	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.83)
Inevitable Immigration Threat	-0.20	-0.21	-0.22	-0.29	-0.25	-0.07
	(0.68)	(0.67)	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.70)	(0.70)
Constant	-4.12	-5.05	-3.61	-6.56+	-6.51*	-7.59*
	(2.77)	(3.12)	(3.62)	(3.60)	(3.24)	(3.08)
N	168	168	168	168	168	168

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.9 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior

	(1) Sample 2	(2) Sample 3	(3) Sample 4 Wave 3
Perceived Polarization	0.06	-0.29**	-0.48**
	(0.31)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Learned Helplessness	5.66	0.00	2.13
	(3.61)	(1.29)	(2.29)
Internal Efficacy	8.33*	4.48**	0.11
	(3.66)	(1.48)	(0.41)
External Efficacy	-2.62	1.87*	-0.00
	(2.42)	(0.77)	(0.31)
Trust	-3.56	-0.41	1.77
	(3.22)	(0.98)	(1.52)
Interest	-3.11	1.12	2.74
	(2.84)	(0.75)	(1.77)
Education	0.61	0.68	0.46
	(1.52)	(0.55)	(0.80)
Income	0.95	-0.49	-0.01
	(1.67)	(0.57)	(0.12)
Female	1.53	-0.48	0.45
	(0.96)	(0.29)	(0.59)
Age	-4.77+	-2.18*	0.02
	(2.85)	(0.96)	(0.02)
Latino	0.00	0.77	1.02
	(0.00)	(0.51)	(0.79)
White	1.00	-0.18	0.67
	(1.54)	(0.37)	(0.76)
Republican	14.96	0.08	-0.17
	(3775.15)	(0.59)	(1.12)
Democrat	16.50	0.33	-0.41
	(3775.15)	(0.58)	(1.11)
Ideology	-0.49	0.38	-1.07
	(2.57)	(0.76)	(1.25)
Loser Perception	-0.18	0.25	1.11+
	(0.98)	(0.31)	(0.62)
Constant	-23.51	-4.78**	-5.51+
	(3775.15)	(1.41)	(3.28)
N	160	678	216
pseudo R2	0.365	0.141	--

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.10 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 2)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		1.98 (3.47)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			-2.15 (2.12)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				4.47+ (2.57)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					3.73 (3.58)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						-1.92 (1.66)
Perceived Polarization	0.06 (0.31)	-0.76 (1.37)	1.81 (1.79)	-1.75+ (1.05)	-1.12 (1.13)	1.68 (1.48)
Learned Helplessness	5.66 (3.61)	-5.38 (20.61)	4.06 (3.81)	7.84 (4.95)	6.85+ (4.11)	4.84 (3.54)
Internal Efficacy	8.33* (3.66)	9.39* (4.15)	20.99 (13.54)	11.94* (5.02)	9.61* (4.14)	8.13* (3.84)
External Efficacy	-2.62 (2.42)	-2.35 (2.52)	-2.76 (2.41)	-30.37+ (16.25)	-2.76 (2.53)	-2.84 (2.42)
Trust	-3.56 (3.22)	-3.80 (3.40)	-3.59 (3.32)	-2.47 (3.45)	-25.24 (21.35)	-2.71 (3.26)
Interest	-3.11 (2.84)	-3.82 (3.12)	-3.65 (3.01)	-5.37 (3.44)	-4.16 (3.15)	7.62 (10.01)
Education	0.61 (1.52)	0.80 (1.55)	0.51 (1.55)	0.49 (1.73)	0.51 (1.51)	0.52 (1.57)
Income	0.95 (1.67)	0.56 (1.84)	1.29 (1.70)	-0.23 (1.90)	-0.36 (2.10)	1.13 (1.66)
Female	1.53 (0.96)	1.48 (0.98)	1.58 (0.98)	1.67 (1.03)	1.41 (0.99)	1.57 (0.99)
Age	-4.77+ (2.85)	-4.77+ (2.83)	-4.60 (2.92)	-5.45+ (2.88)	-5.14+ (2.91)	-4.44 (2.95)
Latino	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
White	1.00 (1.54)	1.44 (1.80)	0.82 (1.59)	0.35 (1.87)	1.53 (1.64)	0.35 (1.70)
Republican	14.96 (3775.2)	13.84 (1769.0)	15.19 (2538.8)	16.93 (2666.8)	15.92 (2586.5)	15.42 (2418.5)

Democrat	16.50	15.38	16.22	18.47	17.51	16.13
	(3775.2)	(1769.0)	(2538.8)	(2666.8)	(2586.5)	(2418.5)
Ideology	-0.49	-0.05	-1.33	0.08	0.75	-1.63
	(2.57)	(2.70)	(2.81)	(3.21)	(2.80)	(3.00)
Loser Perception	-0.18	-0.21	-0.45	-0.51	-0.34	-0.61
	(0.98)	(1.01)	(1.03)	(1.00)	(1.03)	(1.05)
Constant	-23.51	-18.44	-32.20	-15.17	-18.13	-31.22
	(3775.2)	(1769.0)	(2538.8)	(2666.8)	(2586.5)	(2418.5)
N	160	160	160	160	160	160
pseudo R2	0.365	0.372	0.380	0.412	0.382	0.385

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.11 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 3)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		-0.00				
		(0.74)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			0.14			
			(0.78)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				-0.05		
				(0.40)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					-0.03	
					(0.53)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						-0.01
						(0.42)
Perceived Polarization	-0.29**	-0.29	-0.38	-0.27	-0.28	-0.29
	(0.11)	(0.29)	(0.51)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.32)
Learned Helplessness	0.00	0.00	0.04	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00
	(1.29)	(4.12)	(1.30)	(1.30)	(1.29)	(1.30)
Internal Efficacy	4.48**	4.48**	3.77	4.49**	4.49**	4.49**
	(1.48)	(1.48)	(4.19)	(1.48)	(1.48)	(1.48)
External Efficacy	1.87*	1.87*	1.88*	2.12	1.87*	1.87*
	(0.77)	(0.78)	(0.78)	(2.24)	(0.77)	(0.78)
Trust	-0.41	-0.41	-0.42	-0.41	-0.23	-0.41
	(0.98)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(2.87)	(0.98)
Interest	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.12	1.16
	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(0.75)	(2.20)
Education	0.68	0.68	0.69	0.68	0.68	0.68
	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Income	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49	-0.49
	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.57)	(0.57)
Female	-0.48	-0.48	-0.48	-0.48+	-0.49	-0.48
	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)
Age	-2.18*	-2.18*	-2.18*	-2.17*	-2.18*	-2.18*
	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.96)	(0.96)
Latino	0.77	0.77	0.76	0.78	0.77	0.78
	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.52)	(0.51)	(0.51)	(0.51)
White	-0.18	-0.18	-0.19	-0.18	-0.18	-0.18
	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.37)
Republican	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)	(0.59)

Democrat	0.33	0.33	0.32	0.33	0.32	0.33
	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Ideology	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.37	0.38
	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Loser Perception	0.25	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)
Constant	-4.78**	-4.78*	-4.34	-4.89**	-4.85**	-4.81*
	(1.41)	(1.97)	(2.80)	(1.67)	(1.77)	(1.97)
N	678	678	678	678	678	678
pseudo R2	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.141

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 5.12 Effect of Perceived Polarization on Rallying/Protest Behavior (Sample 4)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Perceived Polarization X Learned Helplessness		2.71+				
		(1.42)				
Perceived Polarization X Internal Efficacy			-0.36+			
			(0.21)			
Perceived Polarization X External Efficacy				-0.16		
				(0.21)		
Perceived Polarization X Trust					-3.04**	
					(1.07)	
Perceived Polarization X Interest						0.04
						(0.67)
Perceived Polarization	-0.48**	-1.35*	0.83	-0.08	0.99+	-0.51
	(0.18)	(0.53)	(0.77)	(0.56)	(0.52)	(0.52)
Learned Helplessness	2.13	-12.22+	2.79	2.37	2.57	2.12
	(2.29)	(7.19)	(2.46)	(2.42)	(2.29)	(2.30)
Internal Efficacy	0.11	-0.05	1.92+	0.07	0.30	0.11
	(0.41)	(0.41)	(1.08)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.41)
External Efficacy	-0.00	-0.09	-0.18	0.76	0.15	-0.00
	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(1.16)	(0.33)	(0.29)
Trust	1.77	1.78	2.32	2.10	17.00**	1.76
	(1.52)	(1.47)	(1.54)	(1.60)	(5.90)	(1.54)
Interest	2.74	2.46	2.55	2.57	2.41	2.55
	(1.77)	(1.70)	(1.59)	(1.70)	(1.77)	(3.90)
Education	0.46	0.39	0.47	0.55	0.19	0.46
	(0.80)	(0.82)	(0.81)	(0.80)	(0.90)	(0.80)
Income	-0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Female	0.45	0.48	0.65	0.58	0.52	0.44
	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.60)	(0.58)	(0.58)
Age	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino	1.02	1.44+	1.35+	1.06	1.25+	1.01
	(0.79)	(0.73)	(0.74)	(0.76)	(0.69)	(0.78)
White	0.67	0.61	0.56	0.60	0.78	0.67
	(0.76)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.73)	(0.72)	(0.76)
Republican	-0.17	-0.78	-0.27	-0.27	-0.96	-0.15
	(1.12)	(1.11)	(1.10)	(1.11)	(1.16)	(1.24)

Democrat	-0.41	-1.02	-0.61	-0.51	-1.25	-0.39
	(1.11)	(1.06)	(1.13)	(1.09)	(1.09)	(1.15)
Ideology	-1.07	-0.90	-1.00	-0.94	-0.87	-1.07
	(1.25)	(1.14)	(1.30)	(1.24)	(1.14)	(1.27)
Loser Perception	1.11+	1.01	1.13+	1.10+	1.14+	1.11+
	(0.62)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.62)	(0.59)	(0.62)
Constant	-5.51+	0.01	-12.41*	-7.57	-13.39**	-5.36
	(3.28)	(3.97)	(5.39)	(4.69)	(4.61)	(4.46)
N	216	216	216	216	216	216

Coefficients reflect logit coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Figure 5.9 Effect of Perceived Polarization by Learned Helplessness on Rallying and Protesting (Sample 4)



Bibliography

2016 Global Civic Engagement Report. 2016. *Gallup*. Released September 19, 2016. Retrieved from http://www.gallup.com/195686/2016-global-civic-engagement-report.aspx.

Abramowitz, Alan I. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2008. "Is polarization a myth?" *Journal of Politics*, 70: 542-555.

Abramowitz, Alan I., Brad Alexander, and Matthew Gunning. 2006. "Incumbency, Redistricting, and the Decline of Competition in U.S. House Elections." *The Journal of Politics*, 68: 75-88.

Abramson, Lyn Y., Martin E. P. Seligman, and John D. Teasdale. 1978. "Learned helplessness in humans: Critique and reformulation." *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 87(1): 49–74.

Abramson, Paul R., and John H. Aldrich. 1982. "The Decline of Electoral Participation in America." *American Political Science Review*, 76(3): 502-521.

Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. 2016. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Alford, John R. 2001. "We're All in This Together: The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958-1996." In *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?* ed, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

American National Election Studies, The (www.electionstudies.org) TIME SERIES CUMULATIVE DATA FILE [dataset]. Stanford University and the University of Michigan [producers and distributors], 2010.

"Americans' Financial Security: Perception and Reality." March 2015. Pew Charitable Trusts, Issue Brief. http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2015/02/fsm-poll-results-issue-brief_artfinal_v3.pdf

Anderson, Christopher J., and Andrew J. LoTempio. 2002. "Winning, Losing and Political Trust in America." *British Journal of Political Science*, 32: 335–351

Anderson, Craig A., and Brad J. Bushman. 1997. "External Validity of 'Trivial' Experiments: The Case of Laboratory Aggression." *Review of General Psychology*, 1: 19-41.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, and Brian F. Schaffner. 2017. "CCES Common Content, 2016", doi:10.7910/DVN/GDF6Z0, Harvard Dataverse, V1, UNF:6:XRWBSCTbPDuGIDvAN1TOzQ==

Azari, Julie. Jun 15, 2017. "Political violence is a sign of eroding democracy." *Vox*, Retrieved from https://www.vox.com/mischiefs-of-faction/2017/6/15/15808558/political-violence-eroding-democracy

Barber, Benjamin. 1984. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Barro, Josh. 2017. "The collapse in public trust is dangerous to lawmakers — and they can fix it." *Business Insider* June 14, 2017. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.com/congress-public-trust-baseball-shooting-scalise-2017-6

Bartels, Larry. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Berelson, Bernard R., Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Election*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berinsky, Adam J., Gregory A. Huber, and Gabriel S. Lenz. 2012. "Evaluating Online Labor Markets for Experimental Research: Amazon.com's Mechanical Turk." *Political Analysis*, 20: 351–368.

Berkowitz, Leonard. 1972. "Frustrations, comparisons, and other sources of emotion aroused as contributors to social unrest." *Journal of Social Issues* 28: 77–92.

Berkowitz, Leonard, and Edward Donnerstein. 1982. "External Validity is More than Skin Deep: Some Answers to Criticisms of Laboratory Experiments." *American Psychologist*, 37: 245-257.

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. May 2017. *Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2016*. Consumer and Community Development Research Section of the Federal Reserve Board's Division of Consumer and Community Affairs. https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2016-report-economic-well-being-us-households-201705.pdf

Brehm, John W. 1966. *A theory of psychological reactance*. New York: Academic Press.

Brehm, John W. 1972. *Responses to loss of freedom: A theory of psychological reactance.* Morristown: General Learning Press.

Brehm, John, and Wendy Rahn. 1997. "Individual level evidence for the causes and consequences of social capital." *American Journal of Political Science*, 41: 999–1023.

Brown, Irvin and Dillon K. Inouye. 1978. "Learned helplessness through modeling: The role of perceived similarity in competence." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 36(8): 900-908.

Bruch, Sarah K., and Joe Soss. Forthcoming. "Schooling as a Formative Political Experience: Authority Relations and the Education of Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics*.

Bullock, John G., Donald P. Green, and Shang E. Ha. 2010. "Yes, But What's the Mechanism? (Don't Expect an Easy Answer)." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 98: 550-58.

Buhrmester, Michael, Tracy Kwang, and Samuel D. Gosling. 2011. "Amazon's Mechanical Turk: A New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality, Data?" *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6: 3-5.

Campbell, Angus, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller. 1954. *The Voter Decides*. Evanston: Row.

Campbell, Angus, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: Wiley.

Carlsmith, J. Merrill, Phoebe Ellsworth, and Elliot Aronson. 1989. *Methods of Research in Social Psychology*. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Carver, Charles S., Paul H. Blaney, and Michael F. Scheier. 1979a. "Focus of attention, chronic expectancy, and responses to a feared stimulus." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 37: 1186-1195.

Carver, Charles S., Paul H. Blaney, and Michael F. Scheier. 1979b. "Reassertion and giving up: The interactive role of self-directed attention and outcome expectancy." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 37: 1859-1870.

Cemalcilar, Zeynep, Resit Canbeyli, and Diane Sunar. 2010. "Learned Helplessness, Therapy, and Personality Traits: An Experimental Study." The Journal of Social Psychology, 143:1, 65-81.

Chanley, Virginia A, Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn. 2000. "Public Trust in Government in the Reagan Years and Beyond." In *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?* ed, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cheung, Chau-Kiu, and Siu-Tong Kwok. 1996. "Conservative Orientation as a Determinant of Hopelessness." *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 136(3): 333-347.

Chenoweth, Erica, and Jeremy Pressman. 2017. "This is what we learned by counting the women's marches." Monkey Cage, *The Washington Post*. February 7, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/07/this-is-what-we-learned-by-counting-the-womens-marches/?utm_term=.32a9de9f960d

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. "Framing Public Opinion in Competitive Democracies." *American Political Science Review*, 101(4): 637-655.

Citrin, Jack. 1974. "Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government." *American Political Science Review*, 68: 973-88.

Clark, April. 2015. "Rethinking the Decline in Social Capital." *American Politics Research*, 43(4): 569–601.

Clarke, Harold D., and Allan C. Acock. 1989. "National Elections and Political Attitudes: The Case of Political Efficacy." *British Journal of Political Science,* 19: 551-562.

Clarke, Harold D., Allan Kornberg, and Thomas J. Scotto. 2010. "Accentuating the Negative? A Political Efficacy Question-Wording-Experiment." *European Journal of Research Methods for the Behavioral and Social Sciences*, 6: 107-117.

Clifford, Scott, Ryan M. Jewell, and Philip D. Waggoner. 2015. "Are Samples Drawn from Mechanical Turk Valid for Research on Political Ideology?" *Research and Politics*, October-December, DOI: 10.1177/2053168015622072.

Cohen, Geoffrey L., Joshua Aronson, and Claude M. Steele. 2000. "When Beliefs Yield to Evidence." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26: 1151-1164.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics." In *Ideology and Discontent,* David Apter, ed. New York: Free Press.

Cook, Timothy E., and Paul Gronke. 2005. "The Skeptical American: Revisiting the Meanings of Trust in Government and Confidence in Institutions." *The Journal of Politics*, 67(3): 784-803.

Copeland, Cassandra and David N. Laband. 2002. "Expressiveness and Voting." *Public Choice*, 110(3-4): 351-363.

Costa, Dora L., and Matthew E. Kahn. 2003. "Understanding the decline in social capital, 1952-1998." *Kyklos*, 56: 17-46.

Cox, William L.T. Lyn Y. Abramson, Patricia G. Devine, and Steven D. Hollon. 2012. "Stereotypes, Prejudice, and Depression: The Integrated Perspective." *Perspectives on Psychological Science,* 7(5): 427-449.
Craig, Stephen C. 1979. "Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma." *American Political Quarterly,* 7: 225-239.

Craig, Stephen C., and Michael A. Maggiotto. 1982. "Measuring Political Efficacy." *Political Methodology,* 8: 85-109.

Craig, Stephen C., Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver. 1990. "Political Efficacy and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items." *Political Behavior*, 12(3): 289-314.

Cramer, Katherine J. 2016. *The Politics of Resentment: Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Crozat, Matthew. 1998. "Are the Times A-Changin'? Assessing the Acceptance of Protest in Western Democracies." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed, David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow., Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Crump Matthew J. C., John V. McDonnell, and Todd M. Gureckis. 2013. "Evaluating Amazon's Mechanical Turk as a Tool for Experimental Behavioral Research." *PloS one*, 8(3): e57410.

Dahl, Robert A. 1961. *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Davis, Nicholas T., and Matthew P. Hitt. 2016. "Winning, Losing, and the Dynamics of External Political Efficacy." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, doi:10.1093/ijpor/edw013

DeBell, Matthew, and Jon A. Krosnick. 2009. *Computing Weights for American National Election Study Survey Data*. ANES Technical Report series, no. nes012427. Ann Arbor, MI, and Palo Alto, CA: American National Election Studies. Available at: http://www.electionstudies.org/resources/papers/nes012427.pdf.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

DelReal, Jose A. Nov. 10, 2014. "Voter turnout in 2014 was the lowest since WWII." *The Washington Post*. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/11/10/voter-turnout-in-2014-was-the-lowest-since-wwii/

Desilver, Drew. 2017. "U.S. voter turnout trails most developed countries," *Fact Tank, Pew Research Center*, Updated May 15, 2017. Originally published May 6, 2015. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/15/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1969. "Disaffection and Participation in Western Democracies: The Role of Political Oppositions." *The Journal of Politics*, 31(4): 984-1010.

Di Palma, Giuseppe. 1970. *Apathy and Participation: Mass Politics in Western Democracies*. New York: Free Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Druckman, James N., and Kjersten R. Nelson. 2003. "Framing and Deliberation." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47: 728-744.

Druckman, James N., Erik Peterson, and Rune Slothuus. 2013. "How Elite Partisan Polarization Affects Public Opinion Formation." *American Political Science Review*, 107: 57-79.

Drury, John, and Steve Reicher. 2009. "Collective psychological empowerment as a model of social change: Researching crowds and power." *Journal of Social Issues,* 65(4): 707–725.

Duckworth, Angela Lee, and Patrick D. Quinn. 2009. "Development and validation of the Short Grit Scale (Grit- S)." *Journal of Personality Assessment*, 91: 166-174.

Durkheim, Emile. 1893. *The Division of Labor in Society.* New York: The Free Press.

Dweck, Carol S. 1975. "The role of expectations and attributions in the alleviation of learned helplessness." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 131: 674-685.

Dyke, Joshua J., and Edward L. Lascher. 2009. "Direct Democracy and Political Efficacy Reconsidered." *Political Behavior*, 31(3): 401-427.

Dyck, Dennis G., Steve Vallentyne, and Lawrence J. Breen. 1979. "Duration of failure, causal attributions for failure, and subsequent reactions." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,* 15(2): 122-132.

Easton, David. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. *Avoiding politics: How Americans produce apathy in everyday life.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. 1997. "Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism." *Political Psychology*, 18(4): 741–770.

Fernando, Sumam. 1984. "Racism as a cause of depression." *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 30: 41-49.

Filippello, Pina, Luana Sorrenti, Caterina Buzzai, and Sebastiano Costa. 2015. "Perceived Parental Psychological Control and Learned Helplessness: The Role of School Self-efficacy." *School Mental Health*, 7(4): 298–310.

Finifter, Ada W. 1970. "Dimensions of Political Alienation." *American Political Science Review*, 64(2): 389-410.

Fiorina, Morris P. 1976. "The Voting Decision: Instrumental and Expressive Aspects." *The Journal of Politics*, 38(2): 390-413.

García Bedolla, Lisa, and Melissa R. Michelson. 2012. *Mobilizing Inclusion: Transforming the Electorate through Get-Out-the-Vote Campaigns*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Gamson, William A. 1968. *Power and Discontent*. Homewood: The Dorsey Press.

Gamson, William A. 1992. *Talking Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Gaventa, John. 1980. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. Chicago: University of Illinois Press.

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. 2008. "Social Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," *American Political Science Review*, 102: 33-48.

Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Ron Shachar. 2003. "Voting May be Habit Forming: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment." *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3): 540-550.

Gilens, Martin. 2012. *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gillion, Daniel Q. 2013. *The Political Power of Protest: Minority Activism and Shifts in Public Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goodman Joseph K., Cynthia E. Cryder, and Amar Cheema. 2013. "Data Collection in a Flat World: The Strengths and Weaknesses of Mechanical Turk Samples." *Journal of Behavioral Decision Making,* 26(3): 213–224.

Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. 2008. *Get Out the Vote: How to Increase Voter Turnout*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Griffin, John D., and Brian Newman. 2005. "Are Voters Better Represented?" *The Journal of Politic*s, 67(4): 1206-1227.

Grigby Bates, Karen. 2017. "Race And Feminism: Women's March Recalls The Touchy History." NPR. January 21, 2017. http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/01/21/510859909/race-and-feminism-womens-march-recalls-the-touchy-history.

Gundelach, Peter. 1995. "Grass-Roots Activity." In Jan W. van Deth and Elinor Scarbrough, eds, *Impact of Values*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Guo, Jeff. July 1, 2016. "Income inequality today may be higher today than in any other era." *Wonkblog, The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/07/01/income-inequality-today-may-be-the-highest-since-the-nations-founding/?utm_term=.266d42cf64a2

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hacker, Jacob, Philipp Rehm, and Mark Schlesinger. 2013. "The Insecure American: Economic Experiences, Financial Worries, and Policy Attitudes." *Perspectives on Politics*, 11(1), 23-49.

Hare, Christopher, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2015. "Polarization in Congress Has Risen Sharply. Where Is It Going Next?" in *Political Polarization in American Politics*, ed, Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides, pp. 144-151.

Hawes, Daniel, Rene Rocha, and Kenneth Meier. 2012. "Social Capital in the 50 States: Measuring State-Level Social Capital, 1986-2004." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly*, 13(1): 121-138.

Heider, Fritz. 1958. *The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations*. New York: Wiley.

Hero, Rodney E., and Christina Wolbrecht. 2005. "Introduction." In *The Politics of Democratic Inclusion*, ed, Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney E. Hero. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2001. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." *American Political Science Review*, 95: 619-32.

Hetherington, Marc J. 2005. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Hetherington, Marc J., and Thomas J. Rudolph. 2015. *Why Washington Won't Work: Polarization, Political Trust, and The Governing Crisis*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 1995. *Congress as Public Enemy: Public Attitudes toward American Political Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2001. *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hibbing, John R., and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. 2002. *Stealth Democracy: Americans' Beliefs about How Government Should Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Highton, Benjamin, and Raymond E. Wolfinger. 2001. "The Political Implications of Higher Turnout." *British Journal of Political Science*, 31: 179-192.

Hillygus, D. Sunshine, John B. Holbein, and Steven A. Snell. 2015. "The Nitty Gritty: The Unexplored Role of Grit and Perseverance for Political Participation." Working Paper.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Hochschild, Arlie Russell. 2016. *Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right*. New York: The New Press.

Hochschild, Jennifer L. 2005. "From Nominal to Ordinal: Reconceiving Racial and Ethnic Hierarchy in the United States." In *The Politics of Democratic Inclusion*, ed, Christina Wolbrecht and Rodney E. Hero. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Imai, Kosuke, Luke Keele, and Dustin Tingley. 2010. "A General Approach to Causal Mediation Analysis." *Psychological Methods*, 15(4): 309 –334.

Imai, Kosuke, Dustin Tingley, and Teppei Yamamoto. 2013. "Experimental Designs for Identifying Causal Mechanisms." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, 176: 5–51.

Jackman Robert W., and Ross A. Miller. 1998. "Social Capital and Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1: 47-73.

Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jaime L. Napier 2009. "Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities." *Annual Review of Psychology*, 60: 307-337.

Jost, John T., Jack Glaser, Arie W. Kruglanski, and Frank J. Sulloway. 2003. "Political conservatism as motivated social cognition." *Psychological Bulletin,* 129(3): 339–75.

Jost, John T., Christopher M. Federico, and Jamie L. Napier. 2013. "Political Ideologies and Their Social Psychological Functions" In Michael Freeden, Lyman Tower Sargent, and Marc Stears. *Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Kaase, Max, and Kenneth Newton. 1995. *Beliefs in Government*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Kane, Thomas J. 1987. "Giving Back Control: Long-Term Poverty and Motivation." *Social Service Review*, 61(3): 405-419.

Kilibarda, Konstantin, and Daria Roithmayr. Dec. 1 2016. "The Myth of the Rust Belt Revolt." Slate.com. Retrieved from: http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/12/the_myth_of_the_rust_belt_revolt.html.

King, Anthony. 2000. "Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

King, David C. 1997. "The Polarization of American Parties and Mistrust of Government." In *Why People Don't Trust Government*, ed. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, and David C. King. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Klandermans, Bert. 1984. "Mobilization and participation: Social-psychological expansions of resource mobilization theory. *American Sociological Review,* 49(5): 583–600.

Klandermans, Bert. 1997. *The Social Psychology of Protest*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Klandermans, Bert. 2014. "Presidential Address: Identity Politics and Politicized Identities: Identity Processes and the Dynamics of Protest." *Political Psychology*, 35: 1-22.

Klandermans Bert, and Marga De Weerd. 2000. "Group identification and political protest." In: Stryker S, Owens TJ, and White RW, eds. *Self, Identity, and Social Movements.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 68–92.

Klandermans Bert, Jojanneke van der Toorn J, and Jacquelien van Stekelenburg. 2008. "Embeddedness and grievances: Collective action participation among immigrants." *American Sociological Review*, 73(6): 992-1012.

Klar, Samara and Yanna Krupnikov. 2016. *Independent Politics: How American Disdain for Parties Leads to Political Inaction*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Knack, Stephen. 2002. "Social Capital and the Quality of Government: Evidence from the States." *American Journal of Political Science*, 46(4): 772-785.

Koole, Sander L., Karianne Smeets, Ad van Knippenberg, and Ap Dijksterhuis. 1999. "The cessation of rumination through self-affirmation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 111–125.

Kornberg, Allan, and Harold D. Clarke. 1992. *Citizens and Community: Political Support in a Representative Democracy.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kraus, Michael W., Paul K. Piff, and Dacher Keltner. 2009. "Social Class, Sense of Control, and Social Explanation." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 97(6): 992–1004.

Kruglanski, Arie W. 1989. *Lay epistemics and human knowledge: Cognitive and motivational bases.* New York: Plenum.

Kruglanski, Arie W. 2004. *The Psychology of Closed Mindedness*. East Essex: Taylor & Francis.

Kuziemko, Ilyana, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantchev. 2013. "How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments." *National Bureau of Economic Research*, NBER Working Paper No. 18865.

Kuziemko, Ilyana, Michael I. Norton, Emmanuel Saez, and Stefanie Stantchev. 2015. "How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from Randomized Survey Experiments." *American Economic Review*, 105(4): 1478-1508.

Lampman, Robert J. 1959. *The Low Income Population and Economic Growth,* U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Study Paper No. 12. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.

Lane, Robert Edwards. 1959. *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Langer, Ellen. 1983. *The Psychology of Control*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Layman, Geoffrey C., and Thomas M. Carsey. 2002. "Party Polarization and 'Conflict Extension' in the American Electorate." *American Journal of Political Science,* 46: 786-802.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet. 1948. *The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind In a Presidential Campaign* (2nd Edition). New York: Columbia University Press.

Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. 2014. *Who Votes Now? Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Levay, Kevin E., Jeremy Freese, and James N. Druckman. 2016. "The Demographic and Political Composition of Mechanical Turk Samples" *SAGEOpen* January-March 2016: 1-17 doi:10/1177/2158244916636433.

Levendusky, Matthew, S. 2010. "Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization." *Political Behavior*, 32(1): 111-131.

Levine, Adam Seth. 2015. *American Insecurity: Why Our Economic Fears Lead to Political Inaction*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lewis-Beck, Michael S., William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg. 2008. *The American Voter Revisited*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lind, E. Allen, and Tom R. Tyler. 1988. *The Social Psychology of Procedural Justice*. New York: Plenum Press.

Logan, John R., Jennifer Darrah, and Sookhee Oh. 2012. "The Impact of Race and Ethnicity, Immigration and Political Context on Participation in American Electoral Politics." *Social Forces*, 90(3): 993-1022.

Lupia, Arthur. 2016. *Uninformed: Why People Know So Little About Politics and What We Can Do About It*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Luskin, Robert C. 1990. "Explaining Political Sophistication." *Political Behavior,* 12(4): 331- 361.

Luttig, Matthew. 2013. "The Structure of Inequality and Americans' Attitudes toward Redistribution." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 77 (3): 811-821.

Luttig, Matthew D. 2016. "The Rise of Partisan Rigidity: The Nature and Origins of Partisan Extremism in American Politics." PhD diss., University of Minnesota.

Macedo, Stephen, Yvette Alex-Assensoh, Jeffrey M. Berry, Michael Brintnall, David E. Campbell, Luis Ricardo Fraga, Archon Fung, William A. Galston, Christopher F. Karpowitz, Margaret Levi, Meira Levinson, Keena Lipsitz, Richard G. Niemi, Robert D. Putnam, Wendy M. Rahn, Rob Reich, Robert R. Rodgers, Todd Swanstrom, and Katherine Cramer Walsh. 2005. *Democracy at Risk: How Political Choices Undermine*

Citizen Participation, and What We Can Do About It. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Madison, Dolley. 1814. "The Burning of Washington." The National Center for Public Policy Research. Retrieved 05/09/2017. http://www.nationalcenter.org/WashingtonBurning1814.html

Maier, Steven F., and Martin E. P. Seligman. 1976. "Learned helplessness: Theory and evidence." *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 105: 3-46.

Maier, Steven F., Martin E. P. Seligman, and Richard L. Solomon. 1969. "Pavlovian fear conditioning and learned helplessness: Effects on escape and avoidance behavior of (a) the CS-US contingency, and (b) the independence of the US and voluntary responding." In *Punishment*, ed. Byron A. Campbell and Russell M. Church. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

McAdam, Doug. 1982. *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

McBride, J. 1996. *The Color of Water: A Black Man's Tribute to His White Mother.* New York: Riverhead Books, Putnam's.

McCarty, Nolan. 2015. "What We Know and What Do Not Know about Our Polarized Politics," in *Political Polarization in American Politics*, ed, Daniel J. Hopkins and John Sides, pp. 1-10.

McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2006. *Polarized America*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

McCarthy, John D., and Clark McPhail. 1998. "Institutionalization of Protest in the United States." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed, David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

McCarthy, John D., and Mayer N. Zald. 1977. "Resource mobilisation and social movements: A partial theory." *American Journal of Sociology,* 82(6): 1212–1241.

McClurg, Scott. 2003. "Social networks and political participation: The role of social interaction in explaining political participation." *Political Research Quarterly*, 56: 449-464.

McClurg, Scott, Joanne M. Miller, David A. M. Peterson, and Kyle L. Saunders. 2015 "Polarized Politics and Political Interest." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 16-19, Chicago, IL.

McDill, Edward L., and Jeanne Clare Ridley. 1962. "Status, Anomia, Political Alienation, and Political Participation." *American Journal of Sociology,* 68(2): 205-213.

McKean, Keith Joseph. 1994. "Using multiple risk factors to assess the behavioral, cognitive, and affective effects of learned helplessness." *The Journal of Psychology*, 128(2): 177-183.

Meyer, David S., and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. "The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century." In *The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century*, ed, David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Mikulincer, Mario. 1988. "A case study of three theories of learned helplessness: The role of test importance." *Motivation and Emotion,* 12, 371-383.

Mikulincer, Mario. 1994. *Human Learned Helplessness: A Coping Perspective*. New York: Springer Science+Business Media.

Milbrath, Lester W., and Madan Lal Goel. 1977. *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

Miller, Arthur H. 1974. "Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964-1970." *American Political Science Review,* 68: 951-972.

Miller, Arthur H. 1974. "Rejoinder to 'Comment' by Jack Citrin: Political Discontent or Ritualism?" *American Political Science Review,* 68: 989-1001.

Miller, Joanne M., and Kyle L. Saunders. 2016. "It's Not All About Resources Explaining (or Not) the Instability of Individual-Level Political Participation Over Time." *American Politics Research*, 44(6): 943-981.

Miller, Joanne M., Kyle L. Saunders, and Christina E. Farhart. 2016. "Conspiracy Endorsement as Motivated Reasoning: The Moderating Roles of Political Knowledge and Trust." *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(4): 824-844.

Montero, José Ramón, Richard Gunther, and Mariano Torcal. 1997. "Democracy in Spain: Legitimacy, discontent, and disaffection." *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 32(3): 124-160.

Morrell, Michael E. 2003. "Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy." *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67(4), 589-602.

Morrell, Michael E. 2005. "Deliberation, Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy." *Political Behavior*, 27: 49-69.

Mowrer, O. Hobart. 1947. "On the dual nature of learning—A reinterpretation of 'conditioning' and 'problem-solving.'" *Harvard Educational Review,* 17: 102-150.

Mutz, Diana. 2005. "Social Trust and e-Commerce: Experimental Evidence for the Effects of Social Trust on Individuals' economic behavior." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 69(3): 393-416.

Myrdal, Gunnar. 1996. *Black and African American Studies: An American Dilemma, the Negro Problem, and Modern Democracy.* Original edition 1944. New York: Harper & Row. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

National Low Income Housing Coalition. 2017b. *The gap: A shortage of affordable homes*, March 2017. Washington, DC: Author http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/Gap-Report_2017_interactive.pdf

Neuman, W. Russell. 1986. *The Paradox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the American Electorate*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Newton, Kenneth, and Pippa Norris. 2000. "Confidence in Public Institutions." In *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, ed, Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Nie, Norman H., Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik. 1976. *The Changing American Voter*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Niemi, Richard G., Stephen C. Craig, and Franco Mattei. 1991. "Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study." *American Political Science Review*, 85(4): 1407-1413.

Norris, Pippa. 2011. *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

"*Out of Reach 2017."* 2017. In *Out of Reach 2017: The High Cost of Housing*. Washington, D.C.: National Low Income Housing Coalition. http://nlihc.org/sites/default/files/oor/OOR_2017.pdf

Page, Benjamin I., and Lawrence R. Jacobs. 2009. *Class War? What Americans Really Think about Economic Inequality.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Pateman, Carole. 1970. *Participation and Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: University Press.

Pavlov, Ivan P. 1927. *Conditioned Reflexes: An Investigation of the Physiological Activity of the Cerebral Cortex*. Translated and Edited by G. V. Anrep. London: Oxford University Press. In 2010. *Annals of Neuroscience*. 17(3): 136–141.

Peterson, Christopher. 1993. "Helpless Behavior." *Behavior Therapy and Research*, 31(3): 289-295.

Peterson, Christopher, Steven F. Maier, and Martin E. P. Seligman. 1993. *Learned Helplessness: A Theory for the Age of Personal Control*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Peterson, Christopher, and Albert J. Stunkard. 1989. "Personal control and health promotion," *Social Science and Medicine*, 28: 819-828.

Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?*, ed. Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2003. "Income Inequality in the United States, 1913–1998." *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 118: 1–39.

Piketty, Thomas, and Emmanuel Saez. 2006. "The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and International Perspective." *American Economic Review,* 96: 200–205.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. 2000. *Why Americans Still Don't Vote: And Why Politicians Want It That Way*. Boston: Beacon Press Books.

Powell, Lois. 1990. "Factors associated with the underrepresentation of African Americans in mathematics and science. *Journal of Negro Education*, 59: 292-298.

Prior, Markus. 2010. "You've Either Got It or You Don't? The Stability of Political Interest over the Life Cycle." *Journal of Politics*, 72:747-766.

Putnam, Robert D. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Putnam, Robert D. 1995. "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Social Capital in America." *PS: Political Science and Politics,* 28:664-83.

Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Putnam, Robert D. 2015. *Our Kids: The American Dream in Crisis*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Quinless, Frances W., and Mary Anne McDermott Nelson. 1988. "Measure of Learned Helplessness." *Nursing Research,* 37: 11-15.

Regan, Michael. Nov. 20, 2016. "What does voter turnout tell us about the 2016 election?" *PBS Newshour* http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/voter-turnout-2016-elections/

Reich, Robert. April 27, 2015. "Why So Many Americans Feel So Powerless." Huffington Post, (Updated June 27, 2015). Retrieved May 2, 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/why-so-many-americans-fee_b_7150874.html

Rescorla, Robert A., and Richard L. Soloman. 1967. "Two-process learning theory: Relationship between Pavlovian conditioning and instrumental learning." *Psychological Review*, 74: 151-182.

Riker, William H. and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1968. A Theory of the Calculus of Voting. *American Political Science Review*, 62: 25-42.

Rodin, Judith, and Ellen J. Langer. 1977. Long-term effects of a control-relevant intervention with the institutionalized aged. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35(12): 897.

Rodin, Judith, and Ellen J. Langer. 1976. The effect of choice and enhanced personal responsibility for the aged: A field experiment in an institutional setting. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,* 34(2): 191-198.

Rolfe, Meredith. 2012. *Voter Turnout: A Social Theory of Political Participation*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Rosen, Rebecca J. 2016. "The Circles of American Financial Hell." (May 5, 2016). *The Atlantic.* https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/05/american-financial-hell/481107/?utm_source=atlfb

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John Mark Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America.* New York: Macmillan.

Saez, Emmanuel, and Gabriel Zucman. 2016. "Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 131(2): 519-578.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1960. *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. New York: Thompson Learning.

Schlotzman, Kay Lehman, Sidney Verba, and Henry E. Brady. 2012. *The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American Democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1942. *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.

Secret, Philip E., and James B. Johnson. 1985. "Political Efficacy, Political Trust, and Electoral Participation: A Longitudinal Analysis." *The Western Journal of Black Studies*, 9(2): 74-83.

Seeman, Melvin. 1959. "On the Meaning of Alienation." *American Sociological Review*, 24(6): 783-791.

Segatti, Paolo. 2006. "Forty years of political disaffection" In *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social capital, institutions, and politics*, ed, Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero. New York: Routledge.

Seligman, Martin E. P. 1972. "Learned helplessness." *Annual Review of Medicine,* 23(1): 407–412.

Seligman, Martin E. P. 1975. *Helplessness: On depression, development, and death*. San Francisco: Freeman.

Seligman, Martin E. P. 1981. "A learned helplessness point of view." In *Behavior Therapy for Depression: Present Status and Future Directions*, ed. Lynn P. Rehm. New York: Academic Press.

Seligman, Martin E. P. and Steven F. Maier 1967. "Failure to escape traumatic shock." *Journal of Experimental Psychology*, 74:1-9.

Seligman, Martin E. P., Steven F. Maier, and Richard L. Solomon. 1971. "Unpredictable and uncontrollable aversive events." In *Aversive conditioning and learning*, ed. F. R. Brush. New York: Academic Press.

Seligson, Mitchell A. 1980. "Trust, Efficacy and Modes of Political Participation: A Study of Costa Rican Peasants." *British Journal of Political Science*, 10:75-98.

Shani, Danielle. 2009. *On the Origins of Political Interest*. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University.

Simkin, David K., Jan P. Lederer, and Martin E. P. Seligman. 1983. "Learned Helplessness in Groups." *Behavioral Research Theory*, 21(6): 613-622.

Sinclair, Betsy. 2012. *The Social Citizen: Peer Networks and Political Behavior*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Skinner, Burrhus F. 1938. *The behavior or organisms: An experimental analysis.* New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Smith, Bruce W., Jeanne Dalen, Kathryn Wiggins, Erin Tooley, Paulette Christopher, and Jennifer Bernard. "The Brief Resilience Scale: Assessing the Ability to Bounce Back." *International Journal of Behavioral Medicine*, 15: 194–200, 2008

Sokhey, Anand Edward and Scott McClurg. 2012. "Social Networks and Correct Voting." *Journal of Politics*, 74(3): 751-764.

Steele, Claude M. 1988. "The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the Self." In Leonard Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 21, pp. 261-302). New York: Academic Press.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stokes, Donald E. 1962. "Popular Evaluations of Government: An Empirical Assessment." In *Ethics and Bigness: Scientific, Academic, Religious, Political and Military*, ed, Harlan Cleveland and Harold D. Lasswell. New York: Harper and Brothers.

Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. *Power in Movement: Collective Action, Social Movements and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tausch, Nicole, Julia C. Becker, Russell Spears, Oliver Christ, Rim Saab, Purnima Singh, and Roomana N. Siddiqui. 2011. "Explaining radical group behaviour: Developing emotion and efficacy routes to normative and non-normative collective action." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 101: 129-148.

Taylor, Paul, Cary Funk, and April K. Clark. 2007. "Americans and Social Trust: Who, Where and Why" Pew Research Center, Social and Demographic Trends Report. Retrieved from http://pewsocialtrends.org/pubs/414/americans-and-social-trust- who-where-andwhy

Templeton, Fredric. 1966. "Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research Findings." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30(2): 249-261.

Tilly, Charles. 1983. "Speaking Your Mind without Elections, Surveys, or Social Movements." *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 147: 461-478.

Timpone, Richard J. 1998. "Structure, Behavior, and Voter Turnout in the United States." *The American Political Science Review*, 92: 145-158.

Torcal, Mariano. 2003. "Political Disaffection and Democratization History in New Democracies." Working paper. Retrieved from Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies June 11, 2016. https://kellogg.nd.edu/publications/workingpapers/WPS/308.pdf

Torcal, Mariano, and José Ramón Montero. 2006. *Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies: Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics*, ed, Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero. New York: Routledge.

Tyler, Tom R. 2001. "The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with Government." In *What is it About Government that Americans Dislike?* ed, John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Uhlaner, Carole Jean. 1989. "Relational Goods and Participation: Incorporating Sociability into a Theory of Rational Action," *Public Choice*, 62(3): 253-285.

van Deth, Jan W. 2000. "Interesting but Irrelevant: Social Capital and the Saliency of Politics in Western Europe." European Journal of Political Research 37:115-147.

Van Hiel Alain, Mario Pandelaere, and Bart Duriez. 2004. "The impact of need for closure on conservative beliefs and racism: differential mediation by authoritarian submission and authoritarian dominance." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,* 30(7):824–37.

Van Stekelenburg, Jacquelien, and Bert Klandermans. 2010. "The Social Psychology of Protest." *Sociopedia.isa*, 1-13.

Vance, J. D. 2016. *Hillbilly Elegy: A Memoir of a Family and Culture in Crisis*. New York: HarperCollins.

Verba, Sidney, and Norman Nie. 1972. *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality.* New York: Harper and Row.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlotzman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality: Civic Volunteerism in American Politics*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Vollmayr, Barbara, and Peter Gass. 2013. "Learned helplessness: unique features and translational value of a cognitive depression model." *Cell Tissue Research,* 354:171–178.

"Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2016." U.S. Census Bureau. Updated May 12, 2017. Retrieved from https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/voting-and-registration/p20-580.html

Wallace, George. Nov. 30, 2016. “Voter turnout at 20-year low in 2016.” *CNN Politics. http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/11/politics/popular-vote-turnout-2016/*

Watson, John B. 1924. *Behaviorism*. New York: People's Institute Publishing Company.

Webster, Steven W., and Alan I. Abramowitz. 2017. “The Ideological Foundations of Affective Polarization in the U.S. Electorate” *American Politics Research*, Available OnlineFirst, doi: 10.1177/1532673X17703132

Weinberg Jill D., Jeremy Freese, and David McElhattan. 2014. “Comparing Data Characteristics and Results of an Online Factorial Survey Between a Population-Based and Crowdsource-Recruited Sample.” *Sociological Science,* 1: 292–310.

Weisz, John R. 1981. “Learned helplessness in black and white children identified by their schools as retarded and nonretarded: Performance deterioration in response to failure.” *Developmental Psychology*, 17: 449-508.

Winefield, Anthony H., Adrian Barnett, and Marika Tiggemann. 1985. “Learned helplessness deficits: Uncontrollable outcomes or perceived failure?” Motivation and Emotion, 9(2): 185-195. doi:10.1007/BF00991575

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Wortman, Camille B., and Leonard Dintzer. 1978. “Is an attributional analysis of the learned helplessness phenomenon viable?” *Journal of Abnormal Psychology,* 87: 75-90.

Wortman, Camile B., Lawrence Panciera, Lisa Shusterman, and Jack Hibscher. 1976. “Attributions of causality and reactions to uncontrollable outcomes.” *Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology,* 12(3): 301-316.

Wright, Steven C., Donald M. Taylor, and Fathali M. Moghaddam. 1990. “The relationship of perceptions and emotions to behavior in the face of collective inequality.” *Social Justice Research,* 4(3): 229–250.

Zaller, John. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Appendix A. Sample Summaries and Descriptive Statistics

This appendix provides brief summaries of each of the samples utilized for the dissertation analyses. Samples 1-3 were large convenience samples collected from Amazon.com's online work place, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Sample 4 was similarly a large convenience sample collected through Survey Sampling International (SSI) and raked weights were created to approximate national representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative proportional fitting procedure proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights adjust the observed data to match several different known population parameters, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, education, and income. Sample 5 was collected as a 1,000-person module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) through YouGov and is also weighted to approximate national representativeness.

While representative samples are very difficult and expensive to gain access to, the use of MTurk in social science research is growing in popularity, as it provides access to more demographically diverse samples of the U.S. voting-age population than student-convenience and Internet samples (see Berinsky et al. 2012; Buhrmester et al. 2011; Levay et al. 2016), as well as high quality data (Crump et al. 2013; Goodman et al. 2013; Weinberg et al. 2014). In the context of political, attitudinal and personality variables, recent research provides strong empirical evidence that MTurk conservatives do not differ from conservatives in two nationally representative samples (the ANES and GfK) on a number of attitudinal and personality variables (Clifford et al. 2015).

To ensure the validity of the convenience samples collected from MTurk, a handful of steps were taken. First, to prevent workers who are not U.S. residents, respondents needed to confirm their US residency by providing their zip code, and the survey Human Intelligence Task (HIT) advertisement was only displayed to workers who met the qualification of having a U.S. address. Second, surveys were launched during East Coast work hours on work days. Third, as there were more than one MTurk sample collected, workers were prevented from taking multiple the surveys multiple times and were prevented from taking subsequent surveys. Lastly, respondents were informed in the HIT advertisement and in the consent form with their payment would be contingent upon their completing the survey and providing a unique code that would appear only upon survey completion.

Sample Summary Table

Sample	Disaffection Measures	Demographic and Attitudinal Controls	Participation Dependent Variables	Experiment(s)	Source	Total N	Panel	Survey Weights?
Sample 1	LHS, Internal Efficacy, External Efficacy, Trust, Interest	Age; Sex; Race; Ethnicity; Education; Income; Party ID; Ideology; Loser Perception	Vote Likelihood; Retrospective Protest	Self-Affirmation Manipulation	MTurk	4,349; 728 in control only condition	No.	No.
Sample 2	LHS, Internal Efficacy, External Efficacy, Trust, Interest	Age; Sex; Race; Ethnicity; Education; Income; Party ID; Ideology; Loser Perception	Vote Likelihood; Retrospective Protest	Elite Polarization and Learned Helplessness Manipulations	MTurk	816; 201 in control only condition	No.	No.
Sample 3	LHS, Internal Efficacy, External Efficacy, Trust, Interest	Age; Sex; Race; Ethnicity; Education; Income; Party ID; Ideology; Loser Perception	Vote Confidence; Vote Likelihood; Retrospective Protest	Elite Polarization and Inequality Manipulations	MTurk	3,696; 731 in control only condition	No.	No.
Sample 4	LHS, Internal Efficacy (2-item), External Efficacy (2-item), Trust, Interest	Age; Sex; Race; Ethnicity; Education; Income; Party ID; Ideology; Loser Perception	Vote Confidence (Wave 1); Vote Likelihood (Waves 2 and 3); Reported Turnout (Wave 4); Retrospective Protest (Wave 3)	Elite Polarization and Learned Helplessness Manipulations (Wave 2)	Survey Sampling International (SSI)	Wave 1 (N= 3,552); Wave 2 (N=2,020); Wave 3 (N=1,234); Wave 4 (N=1,713); 179 in control only condition Wave 2	Yes. 3 Pre-Election Waves; 1 Post-Election Wave	Yes.
Sample 5	LHS (5-item), Internal Efficacy (1-item), Trust, Interest	Age; Sex; Race; Ethnicity; Education; Income; Party ID; Ideology; Loser Perception	Vote Likelihood (Intent; Wave 1); Reported Turnout (Wave 2); Retrospective Protest (Wave 2)	No Manipulations	CCES module through YouGov	Wave 1 (N=1,000); Wave 2 (N=835)	Yes. 1 Pre-Election Wave; 1 Post-Election Wave	Yes.

Sample 1 – Summer 2016 MTurk

Sample 1 is a large internet convenience sample. It was collected during the summer of 2016, obtained from Amazon.com's online workplace, Mechanical Turk (MTurk). The survey was in the field between May 20, 2016 and July 20, 2016, and 4349 U.S. adults 18 years of age or older were recruited. Respondents were provided with monetary compensation upon completing the survey. This survey was collected as part of collaborative work with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders on conspiracy endorsement. My dissertation items were included in the survey. Since this survey includes experimental conditions not relevant to my dissertation, discussion and analyses of Sample 1 are limited to the control condition. Despite sampling from the MTurk online population, respondents were not allowed to participate in multiple surveys.

		Sample 1	
		N	%
Age	(in years, range 18-84)	712	*Avg.: 34.46*
Sex/Gender	Male	310	*43.48*
	Female	403	*56.52*
Race	White	562	*79.15*
	Non-white	148	*20.85*
Education	Up to and including high school credential	50	*7.05*
	Some post-high school, no bachelor's	338	*47.67*
	Bachelor's degree	234	*33.00*
	Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor's Degree	87	*12.27*
Income	Under $15,000	88	*12.34*
	$15,000 to $24,999	81	*11.36*
	$25,000 to $49,999	218	*30.58*
	$50,000 to $99,999	225	*31.56*
	$100,000 and above	101	*14.17*
Ethnicity	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	83	*11.64*
	Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	630	*88.36*
Party ID	Democrat	426	*60.51*
	Independent	85	*12.07*
	Republican	193	*27.41*
Ideology	Liberal	350	*48.68*
	Moderate	183	*25.45*
	Conservative	166	*25.87*

Sample 2 – Combined Summer Pilots (MTurk)

Sample 2 is the second internet convenience sample collected from Amazon.com's MTurk. Between June 11 and July 24, 2016, 816 U.S. adults were recruited through TurkPrime. Respondents participated in survey experiments on elite polarization piloted during this time period. Since respondents who participated in one pilot were prevented from participating in the subsequent pilot only a few weeks later, the pilots were combined to increase the cell sizes for each condition. The experimental pilots were identical – one pilot was originally used for an NSF Doctoral Dissertation Improvement Grant application and the second was a pilot for inclusion in the CSPP multi-investigator panel (Sample 4). Respondents were randomly assigned to an experimental manipulation for low or high elite polarization, as well as a condition where learned helplessness was induced or not. Respondents were compensated for their time, commensurate with norms for the sampling procedure. The surveys took 25 minutes, on average, to complete, depending on the condition to which they were assigned.

		Sample 2	
		N	%
Age	(in years, range 18-75)	789	*Avg.: 37.37*
Sex/Gender	Male	364	*46.43*
	Female	420	*53.57*
Race	White	617	*78.30*
	Non-white	171	*21.70*
Education	Up to and including high school credential	82	*10.42*
	Some post-high school, no bachelor's	315	*40.03*
	Bachelor's degree	270	*34.31*
	Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor's Degree	120	*15.25*
Income	Under $15,000	87	*11.04*
	$15,000 to $24,999	112	*14.21*
	$25,000 to $49,999	232	*29.44*
	$50,000 to $99,999	275	*34.90*
	$100,000 and above	82	*10.41*
Ethnicity	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	68	*8.62*
	Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	721	*91.38*
Party ID	Democrat	438	*57.11*
	Independent	108	*14.08*
	Republican	221	*28.81*
Ideology	Liberal	404	*50.19*
	Moderate	186	*23.11*
	Conservative	215	*26.71*

Sample 3 – Pre-/Post-Election Panel (MTurk)

Similar to Samples 1 and 2, Sample 3 is also a large convenience internet sample collected on Amazon.com's MTurk through TurkPrime. Within this sample, 3,696 U.S. adults over the age of 18 were recruited during the week leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential Election (November 3 - 8, 2016). This data collection effort included two survey experiments, one on elite polarization and another on income inequality. Respondents were randomly assigned to the control or one experimental condition. The polarization and inequality conditions were not crossed and respondents were randomly assigned to the control or one of the experiments. Respondents who participated in Samples 1 or 2 were prevented from participating in subsequent MTurk surveys and thus, were not allowed to participate in the pre-election survey, Sample 3. Respondents from the control condition were also re-contacted post-election in June 2017. Respondents in all MTurk samples were compensated for their time, commensurate with norms for the sampling procedure. Depending on the condition to which they were assigned, the surveys took 20-25 minutes, on average to complete.

		Sample 3	
		N	%
Age	(in years, range 18-87)	3539	*Avg.: 37.60*
Sex/Gender	Male	1273	*36.09*
	Female	2254	*63.91*
Race	White	2849	*80.66*
	Non-white	683	*19.34*
Education	Up to and including high school credential	341	*9.68*
	Some post-high school, no bachelor's	1387	*39.37*
	Bachelor's degree	1275	*36.19*
	Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor's Degree	520	*14.76*
Income	Under $15,000	320	*9.05*
	$15,000 to $24,999	413	*11.68*
	$25,000 to $49,999	1037	*29.33*
	$50,000 to $99,999	1310	*37.05*
	$100,000 and above	456	*12.90*
Ethnicity	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	285	*8.06*
	Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	3253	*91.94*
Party ID	Democrat	1838	*53.92*
	Independent	399	*11.70*
	Republican	1172	*34.38*
Ideology	Liberal	1706	*48.19*
	Moderate	794	*22.43*
	Conservative	1040	*29.38*

Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1descriptive statistics.

Sample 4 – CSPP Panel (SSI)

Sample 4 was collected as part of a large, multi-investigator panel study conducted by the Center for the Study of Political Psychology (CSPP) at the University of Minnesota leading up to and following the 2016 Presidential Election. The CSPP Presidential Election Panel Study (CSPP-PEPS) study included a 4-wave panel design, three waves prior to the election and one post-election wave. Specifically, 3,552 U.S. adults were recruited using Survey Sampling International (SSI) for an online survey investigating beliefs about current events and political affairs, and were offered monetary compensation upon completing each wave of the study. Sample size at wave 1 was determined to increase the likelihood that approximately 1,500 participants would be retained across all 4-waves, based on estimated attrition provided by SSI. Attrition for the full sample across the four waves was 49%, with 1,732 participants responding to the post-election, wave 4 survey.

The analyses below focus on measures administered at wave 1 (July 1 - 18, 2016), a survey experiment administered at wave 2 (September 10 - 16, 2016), wave 3, which was administered immediately prior to the 2016 Presidential Election (October 20 - October 29, 2016), and measures administered at wave 4, post-election (November 7 - 10, 2016). Attrition from wave 1 (n= 3,552) to wave 4 (n=1,713) for participants who responded to all of our measures was approximately 39%. In wave 2, respondents were randomly assigned to a control condition or an elite polarization condition (low or high polarization). Respondents were then randomly assigned to a manipulation that induced learned helplessness or not. The respondents who participated in the experiment in wave 2 took an average of 69 minutes to complete the survey. It is important to note that the polarization and learned helplessness experiment on wave 2 was one of many experiments to which the respondents were exposed.

The analyses reported within the chapters have been weighted to approximate national representativeness. The raked weights follow the iterative proportional fitting procedure proposed by DeBell and Krosnick (2009). These weights adjust the observed data to match several different known population parameters, i.e., race, ethnicity, gender, education, and income. As a few weights can be quite large, weight scores were truncated at 5.0, following general practices. The raked weights reflect distributions similar to other gold standard surveys, such as the American National Election Studies.

		Sample 4 - Unweighted		Sample 4 - Weighted	
		N	%	*N*	%
Age	(in years, range 18-93)	3501	*Avg.: 51.32*	3496	*Avg.: 43.81*
Sex/Gender	Male	1342	*37.93*	1341	*47.08*
	Female	2196	*62.07*	2192	*52.92*
Race	White	2723	*76.73*	2720	*79.99*
	Non-white	826	*23.27*	824	*20.01*
Education	Up to and including high school credential	730	*20.63*	729	*38.68*
	Some post-high school, no bachelor's	1197	*33.82*	1196	*30.7*
	Bachelor's degree	1009	*28.51*	1009	*18.73*
	Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor's Degree	603	*17.04*	600	*11.89*
Income	Under $15,000	333	*9.48*	332	*12.56*
	$15,000 to $24,999	333	*9.47*	333	*10.17*
	$25,000 to $49,999	929	*26.43*	928	*24.97*
	$50,000 to $99,999	1312	*37.33*	1310	*30.13*
	$100,000 and above	608	*17.29*	607	*22.17*
Ethnicity	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	607	*17.12*	607	*17.43*
	Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	2939	*82.88*	2934	*82.57*
Party ID	Democrat	1767	*50.34*	1764	*47.57*
	Independent	367	*10.46*	367	*12.49*
	Republican	1376	*39.20*	1374	*39.94*
Ideology	Liberal	1096	*31.31*	1094	*30.57*
	Moderate	1104	*31.54*	1103	*33.35*
	Conservative	1300	*37.14*	1298	*36.08*

Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1descriptive statistics.

Sample 5 – Cooperative Congressional Election Study (YouGov)

Sample 5 was collected as a University of Minnesota 1,000-person module of the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), in collaboration with Joanne Miller and Kyle Saunders. Brief measures of key dissertation items were included, with the exception of a measure of external efficacy, which was excluded from the 2016 common content module. Thus, analyses from this sample include brief disaffection measures, plus demographic measures included within the CCES Common Content (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2017). The 2016 CCES was fielded in October and November 2016 (pre- and post-election waves) through YouGov.[40] Respondents were compensated for their participation through the YouGov panel. Analyses included within the dissertation are also weighted using raked weights to approximate national representativeness.

		Sample 5 - Unweighted		Sample 5 - Weighted	
		N	%	*N*	%
Age	(in years, range 18-87)	1000	*Avg.: 48.04*	1000	*Avg.: 46.87*
Sex/Gender	Male	472	*47.20*	472	*48.16*
	Female	528	*52.80*	528	*51.84*
Race	White	725	*72.50*	725	*73.57*
	Non-white	275	*27.50*	275	*26.43*
Education	Up to and including high school credential	281	*28.10*	281	*40.55*
	Some post-high school, no bachelor's	355	*35.50*	355	*32.84*
	Bachelor's degree	216	*21.60*	216	*17.22*
	Graduate Degree or Post Bachelor's Degree	148	*14.80*	148	*9.40*
Income	Under $19,999	112	*12.25*	112	*13.62*
	$20,000 to $29,999	82	*8.97*	82	*9.91*
	$30,000 to $49,999	214	*23.41*	214	*24.63*
	$50,000 to $99,999	309	*33.81*	309	*33.91*
	$100,000 and above	197	*21.55*	197	*17.93*
Ethnicity	Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	101	*10.11*	101	*9.98*
	Not Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino	898	*89.89*	898	*90.02*
Party ID	Democrat	481	*50.06*	481	*47.27*
	Independent	153	*15.92*	153	*15.00*
	Republican	327	*34.02*	327	*37.73*
Ideology	Liberal	325	*34.57*	325	*31.47*
	Moderate	241	*25.64*	241	*24.44*
	Conservative	374	*39.78*	374	*44.08*

Note: This table reflects pre-election, wave 1 descriptive statistics.

[40] Additional information on the CCES may be found at: https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/.

Appendix B. Question Wording (*Response Options in Italics*)

Elite Polarization Manipulation Check Question

On a scale of 1-7, with 1 being least polarized and 7 being most polarized, how polarized would you say the parties are in America today? *Not at all Polarized (1), Extremely Polarized (7)* [Samples 1-4]

Inequality Manipulation Check Questions

Now I'd like to ask you some questions about differences among people in our society. Do you think everyone in American society has an opportunity to succeed, most do, only some have this opportunity, or no one does? *Everyone does, Most everyone does, Only some people do, No one does* [Sample 3]

Over the last 5-10 years, do you think income inequality has increased, stayed the same, or decreased? *Increased a great deal*, *Increased slightly*, *Stayed the same*, *Decreased slightly*, *Decreased a great deal* [Sample 3]

Over the next 5 years, do you think income differences will increase, stay about the same, or decrease? *Increase a great deal*, *Increase slightly*, *Stay about the same*, *Decrease slightly*, *Decrease a great deal* [Sample 3]

Do you see the current extent of income inequality in our society as a serious problem, somewhat of a problem, or not much of a problem? *Serious problem*, *Somewhat of a problem*, *Not much of a problem*, *Not a problem at all* [Sample 3]

How much upward mobility – children doing better than the family they come from – do you think there is in America? *A great deal of upward mobility*, *A lot of upward mobility*, *A moderate amount of upward mobility*, *A little upward mobility*, *No upward mobility at all* [Sample 3]

Over the last several years has your economic situation improved, stayed the same, or gotten worse? *Greatly improved*, *Somewhat improved*, *Slightly improved*, *Stayed the same*, *Slightly worsened*, *Somewhat worsened*, *Greatly worsened* [Sample 3]

Over the next several years, do you think your economic situation is likely to improve, stay the same, or get worse? *Greatly improve*, *Somewhat improve*, *Slightly improve*, *Stay the same*, *Slightly worsen*, *Somewhat worsen*, *Greatly worsen* [Sample 3]

Compared to your parents, are you better off economically, about the same, or worse off? *Much better off, Somewhat better off, About the same, Somewhat worse off, Much worse off* [Sample 3]

Over the last 5 years, when you compare your economic situation to how others in our society are doing, do you think you are doing better than average, about the same, or worse than average? *Much better than average*, *Somewhat better than average*, *About the same*, *Somewhat worse than average*, *Much worse than average* [Sample 3]

Political Participation

How likely is it that you will vote in the national election in November 2016? *Extremely likely, Very likely, Somewhat likely, Not too likely, Not at all likely* [Samples 1-5]

How confident are you in this choice [voting for your preferred candidate]?
Extremely confident (7), Not confident at all (1) [Sample 2]
Extremely confident (5), Not confident at all (1) [Sample 3]

CCES Common Content – CC16_364
Does R Intend to Vote in 2016? *Yes, definitely*, *Probably*, *I already voted (early or absentee)*, *No*, *Undecided*, *Skipped*, *Not Asked* [Sample 5]

Thinking back to the 2016 national election, for whom did you vote for president? *Hillary Clinton, Donald Trump, Other, I'm not eligible to vote, I didn't vote* [Sample 3 post-election]

In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following statements best describes you?
I did not vote in the election this November, I thought about voting this time, but did not, I usually vote, but did not this time, I am sure I voted [Sample 4 post-election]

CCES Common Content – CC16_401
Voted 2016: *I did not vote in the election this Nov., I thought about voting this time - but didn't, I usually vote, but didn't this time, I attempted to vote but did not or could not, I definitely voted in the General Election, Skipped, Not Asked* [Sample 5]

Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in support of a candidate running for national, state, or local office or in support of a political issue? *Yes, No* [Samples 1-3, 5 (asked 6 months)]

Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in opposition of a candidate running for national, state, or local office or in opposition of a political issue? *Yes, No* [Samples 1-3, 5 (asked 6 months)]

Within the last 3 months, have you taken part in a rally in support of / opposition to a candidate running for national, state, or local office or in support of / opposition to a political issue? *No, Yes* [Sample 4]

Cynicism

Do you think that quite a few of the people running the federal government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? *Many of the people running the federal government are crooked, Not very many people running the federal government are crooked, Hardly any people running the federal government are crooked* [Samples 1-4]

Do you think that quite a few of the people running your local government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? *Many of the people running the local government are crooked, Not very many people running the local government are crooked, Hardly any people running the local government are crooked* [Samples 1-3]

How often do politicians lie? *All of the time, Most of the time, Some of the time, Rarely, Never* [Samples 1-3]

Having elections makes the government pay attention to what people think. *Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree* [Samples 1-4]

Democratic Satisfaction

On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United States? *Very satisfied, Fairly satisfied, Not very satisfied, Not at all satisfied* [Samples 1-3]

Government Feeling Thermometer

We would like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and groups, as well as other people who are in the news these days. You will see the name of a person or group. We'd like you to rate that person or group using something we call a feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. To register your rating, just move the slide bar up or down until you reach the number on the scale that best represents your feelings toward the person or group. If you don't recognize a person or group, you can just click "Next" to move on to the next question. *The Federal Government in Washington* [Samples 1-3]

Learned Helplessness

Now we have a set of questions concerning how people feel. After reading each item, please respond as to how closely you agree or disagree with how each item describes you and your feelings about yourself. (Response options: *Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree*) [Samples 1-4]

*No matter how much energy I put into a task, I feel I have no control over the outcome.
I feel that my ability to solve problems is the cause of my success.
I can find solutions to difficult problems.
I don't place myself in situations in which I cannot predict the outcome.
If I complete a task successfully, it is probably because of my ability.
I have the ability to solve most of life's problems.
When I do not succeed at a task I do not attempt any similar tasks because I feel that I will fail them also.
When something doesn't turn out the way I planned, I know it is because I didn't have the ability to start with.
*Other people have more control over their success and/or failure than I do.
I try new tasks if I have failed similar ones in the past.
When I perform poorly it is because I don't have the ability to perform better.
I accept tasks even if I am not sure that I will succeed at them.
*I feel that I have little control over the outcomes of my work.
I am successful at most tasks I try.
*I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks.
I am able to reach my goals in life.
When I don't succeed at a task, I find myself blaming my own stupidity for my failure.
*No matter how hard I try, things never seem to work out the way I want them to.
I feel that my success reflects my ability, not chance.
My behavior seems to influence the success of a work group.

*These five questions were included in the brief measure used in Sample 5.

Learned Helplessness

Now we have a set of questions concerning how people feel **about participating in politics**. After reading each item, please respond as to how closely you agree or disagree with how each item describes you and your feelings about yourself. (Response options: *Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree*) [Sample 3]

No matter how much energy I put into a politics, I feel I have no control over the outcome.
Other people have more control over political successes and/or failures than I do.
I feel that I have little control over the political outcomes.
I feel that anyone else could be better than me in most tasks related to politics.
No matter how hard I try, political outcomes never seem to work out the way I want them to.

Internal Efficacy

I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. *Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree* [Samples 1-3]

I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics.
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3 and 5]

Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. *Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree* [Samples 1-3]

How often do politics and government seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on? *Always*, *Most of the time*, *About half of the time*, *Some of the time*, *Never* [Samples 1-4]

How well do you understand the important political issues facing our country?
Extremely well, Very well, Moderately well, Slightly well, Not well at all [Samples 1-4]

External Efficacy

How much do public officials care what people like you think?
A great deal, A lot, A moderate amount, A little, Not at all [Samples 1-4]

How much can people like you affect what the government does?
A great deal, A lot, A moderate amount, A little, Not at all [Samples 1-4]

Public officials don't care much what people like me think.
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3]

People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
Strongly agree, Agree, Disagree, Strongly disagree [Samples 1-3]

Trust

How much of the time do you think you can trust the federal government in Washington, D.C. to do what is right?
Almost always, *Most of the time*, *Some of the time*, *Almost never* [Samples 1-5]

How much of the time do you think you can trust law enforcement to do what is right?
Almost always, *Most of the time*, *Some of the time*, *Almost never* [Samples 1-5]

How much of the time do you think you can trust the media to do what is right?
Almost always, *Most of the time*, *Some of the time*, *Almost never* [Samples 1-5]

How much of the time do you think you can trust people in general to do what is right?
Almost always, *Most of the time*, *Some of the time*, *Almost never* [Samples 1-5]

Political Interest

How interested are you in information about what's going on in national government and politics? *Extremely interested, Very interested, Somewhat interested, Not too interested, Not at all interested* [Samples 1-4]

How much of the time are you interested in the news on government and politics? *Most of the time, Some of the time, Only now and then, Hardly at all* [Sample 5]

Political Ideology

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale? *Extremely Liberal, Liberal, Slightly Liberal, Moderate; Middle of the Road, Slightly Conservative, Conservative, or Extremely Conservative* [Samples 1-5]

Party Identification

Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what? *Democrat, Republican, Independent, Other Party, please specify* [Samples 1-4; Branched]

Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat? *Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat*

Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican? *Strong Republican, Not very strong Republican*

Do you think of yourself as closer to the Democratic Party or the Republican Party? *Closer to the Democratic Party, Closer to the Republican Party, Closer to Neither Party*

pid7, 7-point Party ID: *Strong Democrat, Not very strong Democrat, Lean Democrat, Independent, Lean Republican, Not very strong Republican, Strong Republican* [Sample 5]

Sex

Are you *male or female*? [Samples 1-5]

Age

What age did you turn *on your most recent birthday*? [Samples 1-3]

What is your age? [Sample 4]

In what year were you born? [Sample 5]

Education

What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have received? *Less than 1st grade, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th grade, 5th or 6th grade, 7th or 8th grade, 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade, 12th grade no diploma, High school graduate - high school diploma or equivalent (for example: GED), Some college but no degree, Associate degree (For example: Occupational/vocational program or Academic program), Bachelor's Degree (For example: BA, AB, BS), Master's Degree (For example: MA, MS, MEng, MEd, MSW, MBA), Professional School Degree (For example: MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD), Doctorate degree (For example: PhD, EdD), Other, please specify* [Samples 1-3]

What is the highest level of education you have completed? *Less than high school*, *High school diploma or equivalent*, *Some college*, *Associate's Degree*, *Bachelor's Degree*, *Master's Degree*, *Advanced Degree (PhD, DPHIL, JD, MD, DDS, etc.)* [Sample 4]
What is the highest level of education you have completed? *No HS, High school graduate, some college, 2-year, 4-year, post-grad* [Samples 5]

Income

The next question is about the total income of YOUR HOUSEHOLD for the PAST 12 MONTHS. Please include your income PLUS the income of all members living in your household (including cohabiting partners and armed forces members living at home). Please count income BEFORE TAXES, including income from all sources (such as wages, salaries, tips, net income from a business, interest, dividends, child support, alimony, and Social Security, public assistance, pensions, or retirement benefits).

What was your total HOUSEHOLD income in the past 12 months? *Under $5,000, $5,000-9,999, $10,000-12,499, $12,500-14,999, $15,000-17,499, $17,500-19,999, $20,000-22,499, $22,500-24,999, $25,000-27,499, $27,500-29,999, $30,000-34,999, $35,000-39,999, $40,000-44,999, $45,000-49,999, $50,000-54,999, $55,000-59,999, $60,000-64,999, $65,000-69,999, $70,000-74,999, $75,000-79,999, $80,000-89,999, $90,000-99,999, $100,000-109,999, $110,000-124,999, $125,000-149,999, $150,000-174,999, $175,000-249,999, $250,000 or more*
[Samples 1-3]

We would like to get an estimate of your total household income in the past 12 months before taxes. Please select one of the items from the list below: Please select one of the following: *Less than $10,000*, *$10,000 - $14,999*, *$15,000 - $24,999*, *$25,000 - $34,999*, *$35,000 - $49,999*, *$50,000 - $74,999*, *$75,000 - $99,999*, *$100,000 - $149,999*, *$150,000 - $199,999*, *$200,000 or more* [Sample 4]

Less than $10,000, *$10,000 - $19,999*, *$20,000 - $29,999*, *$30,000 - $39,999*, *$40,000 - $49,999*, *$50,000 - $59,999*, *$60,000 - $69,999*, *$70,000 - $79,999*, *$80,000 - $99,999*, *$100,000 - $119,999*, *$120,000 - $149,999*, *$150,000 - $199,999*, *$200,000 - $249,999*, *$250,000 - $349,999* [Sample 5]

Latino

Are you *Spanish, Hispanic, or Latin*o? *Yes, No* [Samples 1-4]

Hispanic, Spanish, Latino or Hispanic origin or descent: *Yes, No* [Sample 5]

Race

Below is a list of five race categories. Please choose one or more races that you consider yourself to be. Check all that apply: *White, Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, Other, please specify* [Samples 1-3]

What racial or ethnic group best describes you? *Black, Asian, Native American, White, Other* [Sample 4]

White, *Black*, *Hispanic*, *Asian*, *Native American*, *Mixed*, *Other*, *Middle Eastern* [Sample 5]

Loser Perception

Thinking about the way things are going in politics today, on the issues that matter to you, would you say your side has been winning more often than it's been losing, or losing more often than it's been winning? *winning more often than losing, losing more often than winning* [Samples 1-5]

Authoritarianism

Although there are a number of qualities that people feel that children should have, every person thinks that some are more important than others. Below are pairs of desirable qualities. For each pair, please indicate which one you think is more important for a child to have: 1) *independence or respect for elders*; 2) *curiosity or good manners*; 3) *obedience or self-reliance*; 4) *being considerate or well behaved*. [Samples 1-5]

Experience with Law Enforcement

Have you ever been pulled over by a law enforcement officer?
Never, Once or twice, A few times, Many times [Sample 3]

[If respondents said they had been pulled over]
On average, these experiences have been…
Extremely negative, Somewhat negative, Neither negative nor positive, Somewhat positive, Extremely positive [Sample 3]

Experience with Government Officials
Suppose there were some questions that you had to take to a government office. Do you think you would be given equal treatment? *Yes, It depends, No* [Sample 3]

If you explained your point of view to the officials, would they give your point of view serious consideration? *A great deal of consideration, Some consideration, Not much consideration, No consideration at all, I wouldn't say anything* [Sample 3]

Experience with Welfare
Speaking of government programs, I'd like to ask about the experience of you and members of your immediate family with several programs. Please say for each of the following if you, a family member, or both you and a family member have received some benefit / payment. Family here means brothers or sisters, your children, or your parents? *Welfare or public assistance* [Sample 3]

Behavioral Measure
At the end of this survey, before submitting the HIT, would you be willing to give a few extra minutes of your time or a small donation to participate in one or more of the following activities? If you are interested, please select the activities you are willing to participate in and you will be redirected to the appropriate page. If you select more than one, you will be directed to multiple locations. [Please select all that apply] *Write a brief note to one of your elected representatives (1); Write a post on social media (2); Donate to a political campaign of your choosing (3); Donate to a non-profit or community organization of your choosing (4); Watch a political ad of your choosing (5); Watch a cat video (6); No, thanks. I'm not interested in participating. (7)*

The previous question was a measure of willingness to participate and engage. You will not be asked to complete any of the activities selected. Thank you very much for your willingness to participate in these additional activities. Click the next button to complete the remainder of the survey and receive your unique code. [Sample 3]

Appendix C. Inequality Experimental Manipulations

Inequality Today Experimental Manipulation

In the following pages, you will be presented with some information about today's U.S. income distribution and you will be asked a few questions regarding the information. Please look over the information carefully, as you will be asked a few questions about the information presented.

Based upon recent IRS Individual Income Tax Statistics, which reflect average annual household income, the following distribution shows the total sum of incomes earned in households, before taxes or deductions. These values include wages and salaries from all jobs, pension income, any investment and business income, and/or unemployment benefits. If you file taxes, the average annual household income amount is what you report on your federal income tax return before taking any deductions.

10% of households earn less than $5,000
17% of households earn less than $10,000
25% of households earn less than $15,000
32% of households earn less than $20,000
39% of households earn less than $25,000
46% of households earn less than $30,000
52% of households earn less than $35,000
57% of households earn less than $40,000
62% of households earn less than $45,000
66% of households earn less than $50,000
69% of households earn less than $55,000
73% of households earn less than $60,000
75% of households earn less than $65,000
78% of households earn less than $70,000
80% of households earn less than $75,000
82% of households earn less than $80,000
84% of households earn less than $85,000
86% of households earn less than $90,000
87% of households earn less than $95,000
89% of households earn less than $100,000
90% of households earn less than $105,000
91% of households earn less than $110,000
93% of households earn less than $125,000
95% of households earn less than $150,000
97% of households earn less than $175,000
98% of households earn less than $200,000
98% of households earn less than $250,000
99.1% of households earn less than $300,000
99.4% of households earn less than $500,000
99.8% of households earn less than $1,000,000

Please enter your approximate annual household income in U.S. dollars in the box below:

_____

Based upon the information above, approximately what percentage of U.S. households earn less than your household? _____

Also, based upon the information above, what percentage of US households earn less than... (Click on and slide the bar to select the correct percentage)

_____ households earning less than $15,000

_____ households earning less than $50,000

_____ households earning less than $85,000

_____ households earning less than $105,000

_____ households earning less than $250,000

Inequality Since 1980 Experimental Manipulation

In the following pages, you will be presented with some information about the difference between today's U.S. income distribution and 1980's U.S. income distribution. Please look over the information carefully, as you will be asked a few questions on the information presented.

Income inequality has increased dramatically in the U.S. since 1980. Incomes of poorer and middle-income families have grown very little, while top family incomes have grown a lot.

A household today making $_____	would have made $_____ in 1980:	This household would have earned:
$2,490	$4,230	70% more in 1980.
$4,240	$6,550	54% more in 1980.
$5,480	$8,000	46% more in 1980.
$10,000	$14,000	39% more in 1980.
$15,400	$21,400	39% more in 1980.
$20,000	$27,800	39% more in 1980.
$25,000	$34,100	36% more in 1980.
$30,400	$41,400	36% more in 1980.
$35,500	$47,900	35% more in 1980.
$40,500	$53,800	33% more in 1980.
$44,900	$58,900	31% more in 1980.
$51,000	$65,600	29% more in 1980.
$55,100	$69,900	27% more in 1980.
$61,300	$76,000	24% more in 1980.
$65,000	$79,300	22% more in 1980.
$71,000	$84,800	20% more in 1980.
$75,200	$88,800	18% more in 1980.
$104,000	$113,000	9% more in 1980.
$121,000	$126,000	4% more in 1980.
$153,000	$147,000	4% less in 1980.
$200,000	$175,000	12% less in 1980.
$250,000	$206,000	18% less in 1980.
$493,000	$329,000	33% less in 1980.
$1,200,000	$597,000	50% less in 1980.

[PRESENTED IN A CLEAN GRID]

Please enter your approximate annual household income in US dollars in the box below:

_____

How would YOU be doing if inequality had not increased since the 1980s? Based upon the information above, approximately what would your household income be if income inequality had not increased? _____

Also, based upon the information above, what percentage more (or less) would the following households be earning if income inequality had not increased since 1980? (Click on and slide the bar to select the correct percentage)

_____ households today earning $15,400

_____ households today earning $51,000

_____ households today earning $75,000

_____ households today earning $104,000

_____ households today earning $250,000

Appendix D. Polarization Experimental Manipulations

Low Polarization Experimental Manipulation

In the following pages, we will present you with some information about the policy positions of the political parties in America today and ask you your opinion on these policies. We ask that you please look over the information carefully, as we will subsequently ask you some questions on the information presented.

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation that would require mining companies to spend more time than they currently do reviewing the environmental impact of a new project prior to starting mining operations. Some people support this proposal, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed this proposal that would require that mining companies spend more time reviewing the environmental impact of a project than they are currently required to in order to start new mining operations. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far apart. Democrats tend to support the proposed additional requirements on mining companies; Republicans tend to oppose the proposed additional requirements on mining companies.

However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal that would require mining companies to spend more time reviewing the environmental impact of a project prior to starting new mining operations?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation over whether to cut spending on Medicaid (government supported health insurance for the poor). Some people support cutting spending on Medicaid. Others oppose cutting spending on Medicaid.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed cutting spending on Medicaid. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far apart. Democrats tend to oppose cutting spending on Medicaid; Republicans tend to support cutting spending on Medicaid.

However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal to cut Medicaid spending?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation that would roll back affirmative action laws by banning the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Some people support this proposal, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far apart. Democrats tend to oppose the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions; Republicans tend to support the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions.

However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation to combat global warming. Some people support legislation to combat global warming, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed legislation to combat global warming. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is not stark on this issue, as the parties are not very far apart. Democrats tend to support legislation to combat global warming. Republicans tend to oppose legislation to combat global warming.

However, members of each party can be found on both sides of the issue.

What is your opinion on legislation to combat global warming?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

High Polarization Experimental Manipulation

In the following pages, we will present you with some information about the policy positions of the political parties in America today and ask you your opinion on these policies. We ask that you please look over the information carefully, as we will subsequently ask you some questions on the information presented.

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation that would require mining companies to spend more time than they currently do reviewing the environmental impact of a new project prior to starting mining operations. Some people support this proposal, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed this proposal that would require that mining companies spend more time reviewing the environmental impact of a project than they are currently required to in order to start new mining operations. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. Democrats strongly support the proposed additional requirements on mining companies; Republicans strongly oppose the proposed additional requirements on mining companies. Also, most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party on this issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal that would require mining companies to spend more time reviewing the environmental impact of a project prior to starting new mining operations?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation over whether to cut spending on Medicaid (government supported health insurance for the poor). Some people support cutting spending on Medicaid. Others oppose cutting spending on Medicaid.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed cutting spending on Medicaid. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. Democrats strongly oppose cutting spending on Medicaid; Republicans strongly support cutting spending on Medicaid. Also, most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party on this issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal to cut Medicaid spending?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation that would roll back affirmative action laws by banning the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Some people support this proposal, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. Democrats strongly oppose the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions; Republicans strongly support the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions. Also, most members of each party are on the same side as the rest of their party on this issue.

What is your opinion on the proposal to ban the use of racial criteria in college admissions?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

[page break]

The federal government is currently considering legislation to combat global warming. Some people support legislation to combat global warming, others oppose it.

We asked members of Congress whether they supported or opposed legislation to combat global warming. Here's how they responded:



Opinions of Members of Congress
(Red = Republicans; Blue = Democrats)

As you can see, the partisan divide is stark on this issue, as the parties are very far apart. Democrats strongly support legislation to combat global warming. Republicans strongly oppose legislation to combat global warming. Also, most members of each party are on the same side of as the rest of their party on this issue.

What is your opinion on legislation to combat global warming?

I strongly support the proposal
I support the proposal
I somewhat support the proposal
Neutral
I somewhat oppose the proposal
I oppose the proposal
I strongly oppose the proposal

Appendix E. Learned Helplessness Experimental Manipulations

Manipulation

Please think about a time when you ***repeatedly*** tried to do something and failed to succeed. Then write a paragraph about that experience.

Manipulation Check

Regarding the statement above, how important to you was what you wrote about?